INCORPORATING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IN
INTEGRATED CROSS-BORDER MARITIME
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

By
Shane Holmquist
B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2004

A PAPER SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In the
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice

© Shane Holmquist 2017
UNIVERSITY OF THE FRASER VALLEY
Winter 2017

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by
photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.

Approval
Name:

Shane Holmquist

Degree:

Master of Arts (Criminal Justice)

Title:

Incorporating Intelligence-led policing in Integrated
Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement in British
Columbia

Examining Committee
Dr. Amy Prevost, Examining Committee Chair
GPC Chair
Director, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice
University of the Fraser Valley

Senior Supervisor:
Dr. Darryl Plecas
Professor Emeritus, University of the Fraser Valley

External Examiner:
Bob Rich
Chief Constable
Abbotsford Police Department

Date Defended/Approved:

ii

Declaration of Partial Copyright License
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University of the Fraser Valley
Abbotsford, B.C.

iii

Abstract
British Columbia shares a southern maritime border with Washington State
that bisects the Gulf Islands from the San Juan Islands. The RCMP is responsible
for the maritime border security between ports of entry. Challenges to maritime
border enforcement include a lack of marine domain awareness, globalization,
terrorism, transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, criminal networks,
and jurisdictional issues.
The RCMP have partnered with the US Coast Guard to enforce crossborder criminality in a program called the Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law
Enforcement Operations Act (ICMLEO), also referred to as Shiprider. The
Shiprider program was implemented under the standard model of policing. By
gathering and utilizing better information, adapting an intelligence-led approach,
and leveraging technology, the Shiprider program could become more efficacious.

iv

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my senior supervisor, Darryl Plecas. Some great early
morning and late night discussions helped lay the foundation for this paper. His
comments, advice, and feedback were invaluable.
I would also like to thank the University of Fraser Valley professors who
facilitated my journey through the Master’s Degree Program and opened my
mind to the diverse issues in criminal justice.

v

Dedication
This paper is dedicated to my wife, Jennifer, who has been a constant
source of support and encouragement for me. Without her support, I would have
missed this life-changing experience. It is also dedicated to our two children,
Shelby and Parker, who have yet to learn the importance of being life-long
learners, and appreciate that there is no elevator to success – sometimes you
have to take the stairs.

vi

Table of Contents
Abstract................................................................................................................ iv
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... v
Dedication ............................................................................................................ vi
ICMLEO (Shiprider) vessel .................................................................................. ix
Chapter 1: The border to be protected: Canada’s western coastline .................... 1
Lack of marine domain awareness ................................................................ 2
Globalization .................................................................................................. 3
Terrorism ....................................................................................................... 4
Transnational organized crime and drug trafficking ....................................... 5
Criminal networks and jurisdictional issues ................................................... 7
Recent examples of cross-border criminality in BC ....................................... 7
Who is responsible for maritime border security? .......................................... 8
Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations Act............. 9
How well Is Shiprider working? .................................................................... 10
The standard model of policing Is not working ............................................. 12
Chapter 2: What are other countries doing? ....................................................... 13
United Kingdom ........................................................................................... 13
Australia ....................................................................................................... 14
Israel ............................................................................................................ 16
Chapter 3: What about leveraging information, intelligence, and technology? .... 17
Information-led policing ................................................................................ 18
Intelligence-led policing ............................................................................... 19
Technology-led policing ............................................................................... 21
Chapter 4: Proposed strategies to improve Shiprider ......................................... 23
To become more information-led ................................................................. 24
To become more intelligence-led ................................................................. 25
To become more technology-led ................................................................. 26

vii

Chapter 5: Conclusion ........................................................................................ 27
References ......................................................................................................... 29

viii

ICMLEO (Shiprider) vessel

This 29-foot RCMP vessel is flying the Canadian flag, American flag, and
U.S. Coast Guard flag which indicate an Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law
Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO) vessel, staffed with U.S. Coast Guard and
RCMP members, operating in both Canadian and United States waters.

ix

Chapter 1: The border to be protected: Canada’s western
coastline
Canada is the second largest country in the world and its western border
has a coastline of more than 27,000 kilometers. British Columbia is connected to
the Pacific Ocean, the world’s largest body of water, comprising an area of
approximately 182,000 square kilometers or approximately 1/3 of the Earth’s
surface (Shuman, 2016). The Pacific Ocean is a major contributor to the world
economy and connects British Columbia to maritime trade routes in Asia,
Indonesia, Australia, and South America.
The Strait of Juan de Fuca is 161 kilometers long, between 18 to 27
kilometers wide, and is bisected by an invisible line separating British Columbia
from Washington State. Vessels may have to cross the international boundary to
get to their destinations. For example, BC Ferries passenger vessels that depart
from Tsawwassen. B.C. have to travel through United States waters to reach
Victoria, B.C. Container ships travelling to Seattle have to cross into Canadian
waters, and ships travelling to Vancouver have to cross into United States waters
when arriving or leaving their port(s) of call (Lynch and Gerbrecht, 2008). Figure 1
(Google Inc., 2016) on the following page depicts the British Columbia/Washington
State maritime boundary.

1

Substantial vessel traffic occurs in and around the maritime border not only
by large vessels but smaller ones too. According to the National Marine
Manufacturers Association (2012), approximately 610,000 vessels are registered
in British Columbia with a majority of those vessels operating near the maritime
border with Washington State.
Lack of marine domain awareness
The maritime border is the least understood and least protected
environment (Moore, 2011). This could be because of the difficulty in seeing what
is going on and the difficulty in responding to it (Paulus and Asgary, 2010). Other
reasons could include the lack of maritime assets, particularly assets with the
capacity to act offshore (Moore, 2011), and the lack of dedicated land-based and
airborne surveillance assets. The culmination of these factors may result in little or
no deterrence against illegal activity around the maritime border. Paul McHaile,

2

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, has stated there is a need
to develop a mature concept of maritime enforcement in the Northern command
area (Patch, 2008).
Globalization
Implementation of North American Free Trade Agreement on January 1,
1994 was a response to globalization by Canada, the USA, and Mexico (Desrohes,
2005).

Since then, many countries have deregulated their economies and

liberalized trade to promote faster economic growth, to gain easier access to
capital and technology, lower costs, gain higher productivity, and improve their
standard of living (Pocuca & Zanne, 2006).
Maritime transport has become the backbone of globalization and world
trade.

According to the International Maritime Organization (2012) marine

transport vessels carry 80-90% of the international trade cargo and contributes 3.5
to 5% of the world Gross Domestic Product. The Port of Vancouver is Canada’s
busiest seaport and carries approximately 60% of all of Canada’s $143 billion
overseas trade of goods (including both exports and imports) (Transport Canada,
2015). The safe and rapid movement of maritime cargo is vital to Canada’s
economy.
The globalization trend can been seen as beneficial or detrimental to global
stability, the environment, peace, and sustainable development (Corbett and
Winebrake, 2008). Lieutenant Commander Moore of the United Kingdom Ministry
of Defense has indicated that a terrorist attack on their maritime supply chain could
result in catastrophic shortages of food, fuel, and other vital resources within a few

3

days because over 90% of its country’s trade travel by sea (Moore, 2011).
Terrorism
The terrorist attack in the United States on 9/11 has caused many countries
to re-evaluate their border security (Alach, 2011; den Hengst-Bruggeling, de Graff,
and van Scheepstal, 2013; Carter, 2013; Svendsen, 2012, and Carter and Phillips,
2015). Numerous academic studies on maritime terrorism have been qualitative
and incorporate discussions around a number of highly publicized terrorist attacks
against marine targets (Asal and Hastings, 2015).
Over the past few years though, there has been a noticeable rise in highprofile terrorist attacks at sea (Chatterjee, 2014). The most significant loss of life
from a maritime terrorist attack was in 2004 when more than 110 people died as a
result of a terrorist bomb on the Super Ferry 14 passenger ferry in the Philippines.
Other attacks include the small vessel attack on the oil tanker MV Limburg in 2002,
and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 when 17 American sailors where
killed by suicide attackers using a small vessel (Howe, 2010).
Contemporary terrorist groups may be actively seeking to extend their
operational mandates into the maritime environment to overcome heightened landbased counter-terrorism security measures (Greenberg, 2006). An atrocity
orchestrated from the sea has the potential for an even bigger disruption of global
commerce or a greater physical impact than the events of 9/11 (Mugridge, 2010).
Terrorists could use large vessels such as oil tankers as ramming devices, could
plant a bomb on a passenger ship, or conduct a mass shooting on a BC Ferries
vessel. A study of 3,969 cargo vessels conducted by Winchester, Sampson, and

4

Shelly (2006) found the median number of crew on a vessel between 1,000 to
2,999 gross tons were 11 and large cargo vessels between 70,000 to 99,999 gross
tons only had a complement of 23 crew members.
In addition to large vessels, terrorist groups may also exploit small vessels.
Michael Chertoff, the US Secretary of Homeland Security has expressed concerns
of a terrorist group using a small vessel as a conveyance to smuggle a weapon of
mass destruction (Chertoff, 2007). The US Coast Guard has stated that small
vessels weighing less than 300 gross tons represent one of the greatest risks from
terrorism in the maritime domain (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013).
Transnational organized crime and drug trafficking
The sure scale and diversity of transnational organized crime activity within
the maritime domain is impossible to quantify (Mugridge, 2010). This could be
because of two significant barriers: understanding the complexity of the problem,
and the secrecy of the participants (Ratcliffe, Strang, and Taylor, 2014).
Transnational organized crime groups successfully operate in economies and
markets where: law enforcement environments are under resourced, lack capacity,
and geographically challenged (McNulty, 2013). The maritime border between
British Columbia and Washington State represents an area that has the potential
to be abused by transnational organized crime groups.
Transnational organized crime is not a new problem; however, it has been
accentuated by the impact of globalization. Because of globalization, criminal
organizations can globalize their operations, position themselves in new markets,
and expand the range of their illicit activities (Lee and Farer, 1999). Transnational

5

organized crime groups may exploit differences in costs of goods and taxation
levels between Canada and the United States (for example, alcohol, tobacco, and
firearms). Simple inconsistencies in taxation between countries can create
profitable opportunities for organized crime purchase goods or unregulated items
in one country and illegally distribute in another country.
Drug trafficking by sea has grown throughout the twentieth century (Aune,
1990). Transnational organized criminal groups have been known to be
extensively involved in the exportation of drugs from one country to another. The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015) found that the maritime
smuggling of cocaine accounted for 60% of the total quantities seized, with an
average seizure from 2009 to 2014 being 365 kilograms. In 2005, a total of 2,556
kilograms of cocaine were seized in Canada (Government of Canada, 2005).
Approximately 10% of the cocaine transits via air, and the remaining 90% may
transit via the sea (Atkinson, Kress and Szechtman, 2017). As well, Criminal
Intelligence Service Canada (2014) has observed an increase in drug cartels
operating in Canada and seeking to establish direct cocaine supplies rather than
third party distribution. As of 2007, the most common drugs being smuggled
between Canada and the United States were MDMA, cocaine, and marihuana
(Public Safety Canada, 2015).
Canadian Border Services x-ray shipping containers that arrive on large
vessels at ports of entry but do not do this for smaller vessels. Relatively little
advance has been made in dealing with smuggling opportunities presented by
small vessels because their regulations are almost exclusively focused on safety

6

rather than security (Ziock, Boehnen, Ernst, Fabris, Hayward, Karnowski, Paquit,
Patolla, and Trombino, 2015). Needless to say, without intelligence, it would take
a miracle to single out a handful of the 610,000 vessels in British Columbia that
are illegally importing drugs.
Criminal networks and jurisdictional issues
In the last 20 years, organized crime groups have become more complex
and networked, which poses evolving challenges for law enforcement. These new
network structures increase their flexibility and they can avoid the hierarchies that
previously governed more traditional criminal networks. New criminal network
groups can quickly adapt to changing market conditions and outsource portions of
their operations rather than keeping all of their expertise “in-house” (Bjeloper and
Finklea, 2013).
One of the ways transnational organized crime groups conceal criminal
activity is to commit it in multiple national or international jurisdictions, using gaps
in law enforcement information sharing to their advantage (Ratcliffe, 2016).
Transnational organized crime groups see borders as opportunities while law
enforcement sees borders as obstacles that involve multiple legal issues in
multiple jurisdictions and extradition treaties.

These jurisdictional issues can

present substantial diplomatic and practical challenges for law enforcement
(Bjeloper and Finklea, 2013).
Recent examples of cross-border criminality in BC
In recent years there have been a number of incidents of cross-border
criminality including human trafficking, drug importation, and money laundering.

7

The MV Sun Sea was a cargo ship that was intercepted off the coast of British
Columbia on August 12, 2010. 492 Sri Lanken asylum seekers were on board, all
of whom made refugee claims. According to a CBC news article, this one incident
cost the Canadian Border Services Agency $22 million dollars, the Immigration
and Refugee Board $908,000 and the RCMP $2.1 million dollars (CBC, 2011,
February 9).
According to a CBC news article (CBC, 2010, March 15) the RCMP seized
1,001 kilograms of cocaine from ‘The Huntress’, a 50-foot sailboat registered in
Panama in Port Hardy in 2011. Most of the cocaine seizures entering Canada have
been from major seaports (United Nations office on Drugs and Crime, 2015).
Clearly, transport by sea plays an important role in transporting controlled
substances (Radionov, 2010).
According to a Times Colonist article (Dickson, 2013, March 12), a male
from Vancouver Island was arrested just after midnight on March 25, 2011 near
the maritime Canada-U.S. border. Police officers from the Vancouver Island
Border Integrity Unit attempted to stop a vessel operating without navigation lights
when they observed a package being thrown overboard. The package was
retrieved by police and found to contain $2.6 million dollars in U.S. currency.
Who is responsible for maritime border security?
When people think of border security they may think it is the responsibility
of the Canadian Coast Guard, however; they are not a constabulary force. The
Canadian Coast Guard (2013) is a Federal civilian maritime operational
organization tasked with managing aids to navigation; marine communications and

8

traffic services; marine search and rescue; pollution response; icebreaking; and
waterways management.
The United States Coast Guard is substantially different then the Canadian
Coast Guard because it is a division of the U.S. military and is the principle Federal
agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship
in the United States ports and waterways (U.S. Coast Guard, 2017).
The Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for border
security at designated seaports. When entering Canadian waters, the master of
the vessel must report his/her arrival to the CBSA without delay. The CBSA Marine
Program identifies and intercepts people and goods that are inadmissible to
Canada and seeking entry at a marine point of entry (Canadian Border Services,
2016). Between ports of entry, though, maritime border security is the responsibility
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP maintains a presence
in the maritime border regions to address inbound and outbound criminal threats,
which include national security crimes and transnational organized crime networks
used to illegally move people or illicit merchandise (Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, 2015).
Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations Act
British Columbia and Washington State share social and economic
conditions that have laid the foundation for the development of a shared maritime
border enforcement program. On February 4, 2011 former President Barak Obama
and former Prime Minister Stephen Harper launched the Beyond the Border: a
Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness with a vision

9

of establishing a partnership to enhance security and accelerate the legitimate flow
of people, goods, and services across the border (Public Safety Canada, 2016).
One of the 32 initiatives was the development of the Integrated Cross-border
Maritime Law Enforcement Operations Act, S.C. 2012, c. 19 s. 368, also referred
to as Shiprider. This Act was implemented to provide additional means to prevent,
detect, and suppress criminal offences and violations of the law at sea or waters
along the international boundary between Canada and the United States.

The Shiprider program is co-managed by the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and the United States Coast Guard. Law enforcement personnel from
Canada and the United States work alongside on board each other‘s vessels in
the sovereign waters of both countries. Within Canada, the Shiprider program is
governed under Part 1 Section 7 (1)(d) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act
R.S.C., 1985, c.R-10 and in the United States, the Shiprider program is governed
under Title 19 USC 1401 (Hataley, 2015).
Shiprider has been seen as a successful initiative and is being assessed by
both countries for permanent implementation (Lynch and Gerbrecht, 2008).
The U.S. Coast Guard (2017) indicates they want to continue to build upon
international bilateral agreements and work with interagency and international
partners to grow partner nation capacity. This indicates the Shiprider program is
here to stay and may even include further expansion.
How well Is Shiprider working?
The Shiprider program is more than just flying the flags of two countries; it
is about international inter-agency cooperation. The Shiprider program is an

10

impressive example of international cooperation. The Assistant Deputy Minister at
Public Safety Canada has stated that Shiprider been proven to be an effective
method of deterring and interdicting cross-border criminality (Parliament of
Canada, 2012).
Hataley and Leuprecht (2013) indicate the Shiprider program is unlikely to
be effective at combatting transnational organized crime because of the length of
the border; the capacity to screen all cargo and people; and the capacity of
organized crime groups to adapt to law enforcement strategies. This indicates a
need to take a risk management approach to cross-border criminality. However, it
can be a difficult endeavor when just one maritime shipment of drugs can represent
significant costs to society. Rehm, Baliunas, Brochu, Fisher, Gnam, Patra, Popova,
Sarnocinska-Hart and Taylor (2006), for instance, estimated the total societal cost
of substance abuse in Canada to be $39.8 billion dollars.
One may think that a highly political program involving international law
enforcement inter-operability would undergo a yearly program evaluation –
however this has yet to occur. The Office of the Auditor General (2013) states the
RCMP needs to develop a framework to measure and monitor the performance of
its border law enforcement activities. Manjarrez (2015) states that there are several
variables to effective border security but apprehension statistics and situational
awareness enhance the ability to determine success or failure of border security
efforts.
Some Shiprider program data was published by Public Safety Canada
(2016) for the year of 2015, indicating that 243 patrols were conducted, four people

11

were arrested and 25 violation tickets were issued. Public Safety Canada nor
media releases by the RCMP indicate the seizure of any drugs or disruption of any
organized crime group in 2015 by the Shiprider program.
The standard model of policing Is not working
The lack of available statistics on the Shiprider program is not surprising
because it operates under a standard model of policing. This model consist of
random patrols across the entire area of responsibility, rapid response, routine
deployment of officers to crime investigations, and reliance on law enforcement
and the legal system to suppress criminal activity (Weisburd and Eck, 2004). The
uniformed presence is a visual deterrent, makes police vessels available to assist
with emergencies at sea, and routinized vessel inspections help populate police
databases.
A study by Lum, Koper, and Telep (2010) found that these traditional beliefs
about crime-fighting approaches persist even though other models (such as
intelligence-led policing) can be more effective. Random patrols may increase the
probability that cross-border criminal activity would be interrupted – however,
Shiprider resources are insufficient to present a credible deterrence in maritime
cross-border criminality 24 hours a day.
The standard model of policing has no overarching strategy and does not
place significant emphasis on data and intelligence analysis as a central
component of police strategic thinking (Ratcliffe, 2016). The standard model of
policing has been criticized for several decades as being ineffective. Unfortunately,

12

many police managers still rely on traditional enforcement tactics as the sole
response to crime problems (Ratcliffe, 2016).
Any organizational change such as organizational flexibility, data-driven
decision making, and innovative problem solving that represents any substantive
change from past management practices remains a challenge for police (Willis,
Mastrofski, Weisburd, and Greenspan, 2004). Exiting out the standard model of
policing can be difficult. The shift to intelligence-led policing is the most significant
and profound paradigm change in modern policing (Ratcliffe, 2016). Carter and
Phillips (2015) state that intelligence-led policing requires a shift in police
management, organizational structure and even day-to-day operations.

Chapter 2: What are other countries doing?
The lack of maritime border security has transnational consequences
because organized crime groups operate across borders (Bueger, 2015). The
2008 United Nations Secretary General’s Report indicates that the maritime
security strategies of the recognizes that United States, European Union, and the
United Kingdom equally emphasize the importance of multilateralism and joint
coordinated responses to maritime security (United Nations, 2008). Some
countries are lacking marine domain awareness, some have made improvements,
and some have taken a militarized approach to marmite border security.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (U.K.) is still trying to develop a successful maritime
border security program. Lieutenant Commander Moore of the U.K. Ministry of

13

Defense has stated the U.K. has a serious lack of assets to comprehensively cover
their 16,800 km of coastline (Moore, 2011). The Cabinet Office made two
recommendations: strengthen oversight

of

maritime security through a

collaborative and cohesive approach to preventing and responding to national
security risks, and improve situational awareness. Seven strategic objectives were
set: governance and decision-making; situational awareness; capability to act;
protection of key assets; international engagement; partnerships and private
sector engagement; and legal frameworks. According to Moore (2007) the U.K.
Ministry of Defense (2007) Future Maritime Operational Concept, has contributed
little to the effective security of the United Kingdom.
Controlled substances are still being transported to the United Kingdom.
According the International Business Times (Wright, 2017) in February 2017,
police in the United Kingdom seized 4,240 kilograms of cocaine from a fishing boat
off the coast of South America. The success of this seizure was a result of interagency cooperation between the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency, the
US Coast Guard, and the US Drug Enforcement Agency.
Australia
In the absence of a traditional Coast Guard, Australia protects its maritime
security through the Australian Border Force. Australia has 37,000 kilometers of
coastline and has one of the largest and one of the most challenging border
environments in the world (Noonan and Williams, 2016). Australia is heavily reliant
on maintaining open sea-lanes for trade because they are an island nation.

14

The Maritime Border Command (MBC) is a multi-agency task force that acts
as the maritime law enforcement arm of the Australian Border Force. MBC utilizes
assets assigned from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (civil)
and the Department of Defense (military) and acts as the primary government law
enforcement organization in the Australian maritime domain. MBC does not selfgenerate tasking, rather it responds to the requests of 26 client agencies (including
the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Australian Fisheries Management
Authority, and the Australian Federal Police).
A number of maritime security challenges in Australia in recent years have
included drugs and people smuggling, illegal fishing and threats to marine
biosecurity (Schofield, Tsamenyi, and Palma, 2008).

In 2005-2006 period

Customs and Defense in Australia delivered an estimated 151.24 million square
nautical miles of aerial surveillance which is the equivalent of 4,276 vessel sea
days of marine surveillance.
The Australian Border Force uses technology such as satellite marine
surveillance, high-resolution cameras, radar, infrared sensors, unmanned airborne
vehicles, helicopters, and Armidale class patrol vessels. Australia has clearly made
substantial progress in enhancing its maritime surveillance and enforcement
capabilities over the past ten years (Schofield, Tsamenyi, and Palma, 2008). In
December 2006 the Australian Defense Department introduced new rules of
maritime engagement, which provides for a “graduated” range of responses. If the
vessel is non-compliant the response could range from a verbal warnings, the use

15

of tear gas, or firing across the bow of the vessel (Schofield, Tsamenyi, and Palma,
2008).
Drugs are still coming into their country. Australia MBC has intercepted a
substantial quantity of cocaine – for example, according to the New Zealand
Herald, a 50-foot sailboat was intercepted 300 km off the cost of Sydney, Australia
in February 2017 by the MBC. Some 1.4 tonnes of cocaine were located on the
vessel, making this the largest drug seizure in Australian history (Keogh, 2017,
February 6).
Israel
Israel takes a military approach to their maritime border security. If a vessel
is identified operating 200 miles off the coast of Israeli the authorities will initiate
radio contact. At approximately 50 miles out, unmanned aerial systems monitor
inbound traffic and provide geo-location to maritime patrol aircraft that overfly
ships. If a vessel evades or ignores the Israeli Navy they can be expected to be
fired upon and have their vessel seized if it crosses into the 12 nautical mile limit
(Patch, 2008). No surprise this works.
When you look around the world, there are a variety of ways to enhance
border security. It is highly unlikely that Canada will develop a militarized approach
like Israel. This author believes one of the base ways to improve maritime border
security is to leverage as many agencies as possible: to utilize information,
intelligence and technology to your advantage to improve maritime border security.

16

Chapter 3: What about leveraging information, intelligence,
and technology?
To better tackle maritime cross-border criminality, the RCMP could improve
their marine domain awareness, become information-led, intelligence-led, and
leverage technology. The standard model of uniformed vessel patrols has not
worked. The lack of clarity and an absence of a common understanding of criminal
intelligence terminology and processes can hamper information sharing between
agencies (Ratcliffe, 2016). In a country where there is more than one agency
involved in the campaign against drug trafficking, the various law enforcement
agencies sometimes compete with others for increase prestige, projects and
funding. Such rivalry results in a lack of communication, co-operation and coordination between agencies, which, in turn, leads to bungled offensives against
drug trafficking (Aune, 1990).
Agreeing on when to share and use intelligence places agencies at
loggerheads with each other in times of crisis (Ratcliffe, 2016). Given the
transnational character of many crimes, international cooperation is not only
important; it is the only possible response. Greater sharing of information and the
coordination of joint operations by law enforcement agencies is needed across the
world (Fedotov, 2015).
The United Nations (2015) stresses the importance of international
cooperation in maritime security and that it is a shared responsibility that requires
a new vision of collective security. Memorandums of understanding between law
enforcement and national security agencies are often cumbersome and

17

convoluted, and put up walls of bureaucracy in the path of timely information
sharing. Even if the bureaucratic hurdles could be overcome, there are other, more
intangible problems such as a web of interagency competition, local and national
laws, security clearance issues, turf protection, and rivalry, all of which inhibit
actual cooperation (Sheptycki, 2002). There are some obvious hurdles to
overcome to transform Shiprider into an information-led, intelligence-led and
technology-led program.
Information-led policing
Police officers require as much information as possible to guide their
operational and strategic decision-making. Being truly information-led means that
police have knowledge of and access to many more tools and options beyond the
constraints of apprehending, arresting, charging, and processing offenders. New
strategies have been made possible through a broad movement in policing that
has discovered the benefit – and necessity – of using data to inform decisions and
drive crime control strategies (Ratcliffe, 2016).
To successfully interdict maritime shipments of drugs, police commanders
need to have information on timing, location, size of the drug shipments, and the
means of transportation (Atkinson, Kress and Szechtman, 2017). Information
sharing must become a policy and not an informal process (Peterson, 2005).
Lieutenant Joshua Sagers of the Seattle-based Coast Guard Station District 13
indicates he uses a best-guess approach to vessel deployments when he does not
have actionable intelligence on cross-border criminality (Marcario, 2009).

18

Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters (2014) suggest that creating a
database of all criminals; fully account for and understand your jurisdiction’s crime
and disorder problems; and maintaining an up-to-date list of all community
resources are ways a police agency can become more information-led. The
maritime community is often the best source of information about offenders,
vessels they operate, and when they travel on the water. Establishing and
maintaining consistent contact with public is central to being information-led
(Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014). A marina out-reach program could
help

Shiprider

become

more

information-led.

Uniform

patrols

can

be

supplemented with walking the docks, and engaging people about boating safety
and cross-border maritime criminality. Being information-led means involving the
local communities in crime prevention and crime reduction strategies (Cohen,
Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014). Kelling and Moore (1988) argue that police
management needs to refocus their attention on establishing effective problemsolving partnerships within the communities they police. There is a difference
between information and intelligence. Once the information is collected from the
community, it needs to be turned into intelligence by further evaluation and
analysis (Peterson, 2005).
Intelligence-led policing
James (2014) argues that the foundations of intelligence-led policing was
introduced by the Urban Beat Policing in Britain in 1967, while Carter and Phillips
(2015) argue that the foundations came from the United Kingdom’s National
Intelligence Model. Regardless of where intelligence-led policing originated, some

19

academics agree there is a lack of empirical research on intelligence-led policing
and how this philosophy should be conceptualized (Alach, 2011; Carter, 2013;
Carter, Phillips, and Gayadeen, 2014; Carter and Phillips, 2015).
Intelligence-led policing is one of the most enduring approaches to crime
control (Ratcliffe, 2016) and is the most effective way to combat organized crime
(Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2014). These factors include recognizing
the standard model of policing was not working and recognizing the information
sharing pitfalls after 9/11 (Alach, 2011; den Hengst-Bruggeling, de Graff, and van
Scheepstal, 2013; Carter, 2013; Svendsen, 2012, and Carter and Phillips, 2015);
decreasing police budgets and increasing workloads (Herchenrader and MyhillJones, 2015); a small number of crimes are created by a small number of offenders
(Alach, 2011; Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2016); and
targeting criminal rather than crime allow police to be proactive and thus prevent
more crimes from happening (den Hengst-Bruggeling, de Graff, and van
Scheepstal, 2013).
In December 2000 the RCMP adopted a discourse of intelligence-led
policing after perceived failures of trying to adopt the community-policing model
(Deukmedjian, 2006). Over the years, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2014)
have refined their definition of intelligence to include the reliance on both tactical
intelligence (operational) and strategic intelligence (prioritization and resource
allocation). Intelligence-led policing is an evolving model that drives operations
rather than operations dictating intelligence-gathering priorities (Ratcliffe, 2016).

20

Intelligence-led policing is about: information; analysis of the information;
knowledge and behavior of decision-makers who use the analyzed information;
and the knowledge by decision-makers who assign police resources (den HengstBruggeling, de Graff, and van Scheepstal, 2013). Ratcliffe (2016) argues
intelligence-led policing encompasses the following fundamental attributes: crime
mapping and spatial analysis (due to the central place of crime hot spots in the
definition of intelligence-led policing); structured thinking (given the importance of
strategic analysis and the need to influence decision makers at the executive
level); crime scripts (a technique that helps deconstruct complex crime problems);
and, hypothesis testing (to enable a more scientific and evidence-based approach
to crime problems).
The successful implementation of intelligence-led policing requires an
organizational environment that has the training, experience, and the maturity to
drive evidence-based resource decisions based on analysis and criminal
intelligence (Ratcliffe, 2016). If intelligence-led policing is to succeed and develop
as the central paradigm of policing in the 21st century, then police managers need
to address training and education in crime reduction practices, not only for
analysts, but for all police officers (Ratcliffe, 2016).
Technology-led policing
Technological advances in transportation and communication have
fundamentally changed the context in which organized crime operates (Lee and
Farer, 1999). Transnational organized crime groups have access to cellular
phones, satellite phones, encryption, GPS, and electronic money transfers. The

21

requirement to obtain search warrants for satellite phones registered in other
countries, breaking cellular encryption, and tracking international money transfers
can be a time-consuming process for Canadian police officers.
Technological

developments

have

also

improved

maritime

law

enforcement’s ability to detect and track cross-border criminality by using a variety
of new technologies. Technology such as SIGNALIS radar, satellites, remote
sensing equipment, high altitude aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
are part of an effective surveillance and vessel monitoring system (Walker, 2011).
Other equipment such as gyroscopic binoculars, Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR),
night vision, and side scanning sonar devices may also enhance the ability to track
vessels involved in criminal activity.
Technology is not necessarily helping police formulate new approaches to
policing, but rather improving customary responses to crime and disorder problems
(Ratcliffe, 2016). Technology such as social networking platforms (Twitter,
Facebook, Youtube, text messaging, blogging, and police-based websites) may
make a community feel informed (Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014).
When a community is more informed, it increases citizen satisfaction and trust in
the police (Weisburd and Ech, 2004; Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter, and Bennet,
2014).
Crime and criminal behavior is multi-faceted and complex. In an
environment of physical restraint and growing fears of terrorist activities, police are
turning to intelligence and analytics technology to conduct information gathering
and risk analysis (Sanders, Weston, and Schott, 2015). Predictive analytics

22

software comprises predictive modeling to address the who, when and why
questions regarding patterns of behavior, and forecasting their future behavior
patterns. The emerging technology of predictive analytics is evolving rapidly and
providing law enforcement agencies with better insight as to when and where
crimes are most likely to occur (Lozada, 2014). Leveraging analytics software
programs will allow police managers to make recommendations and draw solid
conclusions from the processing of information and intelligence.
If new technologies are to be part of intelligence-led policing, effective use
of the technology has to combine with leadership to sustain such innovations
(Darroch and Mazerolle, 2013). Technology training for police emphasizes the how
to, rather than the why to, which suggests a shallow implementation and
conceptualization of the role of technology within policing, and intelligence-led
policing (Ratcliffe, 2016). A study conducted by Koper, Lum and Willis (2014) found
that police officers have limited guidance and understanding of how technology
might help them and their agencies and police agencies lacked reward systems to
encourage innovative responses to crime. The range of data and information
sources available to police analysts might lead one to expect that we are on the
brink of a new era of holistic policing, but there is a real possibility that intelligenceled policing can become the victim of paralysis by analysis (Ratcliffe, 2016).

Chapter 4: Proposed strategies to improve Shiprider
Improving the Shiprider program is not about improving the vessel
handling skills of the members. Rather, it is about improving marine domain

23

awareness. The Shiprider program is an impressive example of inter-agency
cooperation and needs to becoming more information-led, more intelligence-led
and more technology-led.
To become more information-led
Establishing a marina out-reach program could help the Shiprider become
more information-led. The maritime community may be the best source of
information about offenders, vessels they operate, and when they travel on the
water. Establishing and maintaining consistent contact with public is central to
being information-led (Cohen, Plecas, McCormick, and Peters, 2014). A
community policing approach increases citizen satisfaction and trust in the police
(Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter and Bennet, 2014). Instead of uniform vessel patrols,
members could get off the boat, walk the docks, and engage the boating
community on conversations about boating safety and maritime cross-border
issues.
Shiprider members could conduct presentations to boating communities,
sailing clubs, and boating associations on maritime crime prevention initiatives and
cross-border criminality. Being information-led means involving the local
communities in crime prevention and crime reduction strategies (Cohen, Plecas,
McCormick, and Peters, 2014).
Crimestoppers (2016) is a non-profit society that receives anonymous tip
information about criminal activity and provides it to the police. The media have
helped promote the program and often run historical missing persons and unsolved
homicides. For those wishing to remain anonymous in the maritime community,

24

Shiprider members could encourage people to use this confidential reporting
system. Furthermore, Crimestoppers posters could be posted in marinas,
encouraging people to report suspicious marine activity.
The use of aerial surveillance could assist in gathering information on vessel
activity (location, speed, and direction). A surveillance plane is more covert than a
vessel and can cover a larger area in a shorter period of time. Furthermore, liaising
with recreational airplane/helicopter pilots could yield further information related to
vessel locations and potential cross-border criminality.
To become more intelligence-led
A study of ten police departments by Peterson (2005) found different
operational and organizational styles with the implementation of an intelligenceled approach; however, there were ten commonalities: command commitment;
problem clarity; active collaboration; effective intelligence; information sharing;
clearly defined goals; results-oriented tactics and strategies; holistic
investigations; officer accountability; and continuous assessment. It is clear that
implementing a successful intelligence-led philosophy involves more than just
hiring a criminal intelligence analyst. There are issues as well with integrated
analysts into the police culture. Phillips (2012) found that less than half of crime
analysts feel accepted as part of the police culture.
In 2004, under Canada’s National Security Policy, Coastal Marine Security
Operations Centres (MSOCs) were established to support a national response to
perceived and real marine security threats to the country. A MSOC was
established in Victoria and comprises members of the Department of National

25

Defence, RCMP, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Coast Guard,
Canada Border Services Agency, and Transport Canada. The goal of MSOC is to
enable government departments and agencies to work together and share
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information (within the legal
mandate of agencies/departments) through interagency staffing and collaboration,
which in turn allow the MSOCs to support an organized response to potential
marine threats and avoid duplication of both efforts and resources (Transport
Canada, 2013).
Police managers could have access to the strategic intelligence generated
by MSOC. Agency leaders should make extra effort to either utilize intelligence
products in their decision-making (Carter and Phillips, 2015). According to
Peterson (2005) police agencies can adopt an intelligence-led approach by
adopting mission statements, writing intelligence policies and procedures,
participating in information sharing, establishing appropriate security, and adopting
legal safeguards for the intelligence that is generated.
Further integration with the Navy could establish joint patrols where RCMP
members board military ships to conduct offshore surveillance and potentially
identify cross-border criminality occurring in an environment outside the Shiprider
patrol area. The participation of the Navy in drug patrols and offensives would
provide them with useful training and, at the same time, complement existing
interdiction forces (Aune, 1990).
To become more technology-led

26

Technology is moving at such a fast rate that it becomes obsolete by the
time it is fully implemented. Some police managers may expect technology to bring
about transformative change and feel frustrated when it does not happen. It takes
time, effort, and willpower to get major transformative effects from new technology
(Fitzgerald, Kruschwitz, Bonnet, and Welch, 2013). A prerequisite to become
technology-led is to foster a culture that is willing to learn.
Technologies such as SIGNALIS radar, GPS navigation, and forwardlooking infrared (FLIR) technology are becoming user friendly. Many of these
systems, along with advanced maritime weather forecasts, interactive tidal
schedules, commercial vessel radio traffic monitoring systems, above and below
water sensors, side sonar, and surveillance camera can be incorporated together
to enhance marine domain awareness. It becomes evident that predictive analytics
software needs to be incorporated to analyze data from these multiple sources. In
short, the success of the Shiprider program is through the combination of
information, intelligence, and technology.

Chapter 5: Conclusion
As noted at the outset of this paper, in referencing Moore (2011), the
maritime border is the least understood and least protected environment.
Transnational organized crime groups have taken advantage of globalization and
operate in economies where: law enforcement environments are under-resourced,
lack capacity, and are geographically challenged (McNulty, 2013). It will not be
long before contemporary terrorist groups learn from transnational organized crime

27

groups and take advantage of the maritime environment. An atrocity orchestrated
from the sea has a potential for an ever-bigger disruption of global commerce than
the events of 9/11 (Mugridge, 2010).
The RCMP is responsible for border security between ports of entry and the
Shiprider program, coordinated by the RCMP and the U.S. Coast Guard, is an
impressive example of international cross-border cooperation. However; the
Shiprider program should no longer work under the standard model of policing
because it has no overarching strategy and does not place significant emphasis
on data and intelligence analysis. The Shiprider program will be doomed to failure
if the main focus continues to follow the standard model of policing.
A uniformed maritime police presence may have the ability to deter some
cross-border criminal activity and there is value in conducting non-routine patrols
and surge operations. However, this author proposes that the first priority of the
Shiprider program is to have an intelligence-led philosophy. The shift to
intelligence-led policing is the most profound paradigm change in modern policing
(Ratcliffe, 2016). Successful implementation of intelligence-led policing will
require: command commitment; problem clarity; active collaboration; effective
intelligence; information sharing; clearly defined goals; results-oriented tactics and
strategies;

holistic

investigations;

officer

accountability;

and

continuous

assessment.
One of the keys to improving the Shiprider program is to act on the tactical
and strategic intelligence that is being generated through the Marine Security
Operations Centre in Victoria, B.C. According to Radcliffe (2016) intelligence-led

28

policing has the potential to be the most important law enforcement development
of the century and sustained effort will be required for it to maintain momentum.

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