CRIME REDUCTION AND LOCAL PARTNERSHIP S IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH COLUMBIA
By
Sherry-Lynn Bot
Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice, University College of the Fraser Valley, 2003

MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In the
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice
© Sherry-Lynn Bot 2007
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF THE FRASER VALLEY
Spring 2007

All rights reserved. This work may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without permission of the author.

Abstract
This paper explores the challenges of and the explanations for multi-agency partnerships
in crime reduction work in the United Kingdom and Canada. It begins by reviewing the
rise of crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom with a focus on legislation,
programs, and strategies with partners. Partnerships at the local level, information
sharing, accountability, roles and responsibilities, and value conflicts and power
differentials in partnerships are additional themes in the paper. The City of Surrey Crime
Reduction Strategy is provided as a Canadian example of multi-agency partnerships. An
explanation for the rise of partnership work is also outlined in the paper. The differences
in government structure, legislation, and delivery of a crime reduction model,
accountability systems, blurring boundaries, and the offloading of responsibilities are
discussed and analysed. The paper concludes by providing recommendations for further
crime reduction and partnership studies.

iii

Acknowledgments
I could not have completed this paper without the belief and support from my husband as
well as the encouragement from family and friends. My gratitude is extended to my
committee members, Dr. Martin Silverstein and Dr. Darryl Plecas, who have guided me
through this writing process and have helped me throughout my academic path. I am
thankful to the RCMP and the City of Surrey and its counterparts for allowing me to get
involved in researching their crime reduction strategy from the onset. Special thanks are
given to fellow classmates for their encouragement as we shared the graduate school
journey together.

iv

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction....................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature.................................................................................... 4
Crime Reduction Partnerships in the United Kingdom .................................................. 4
a. Legislation and Policies for Partnerships ................................................................ 4
b. The Development of Partnerships........................................................................... 6
c. Expanding the Policing Family through Partnerships............................................. 9
d. Programs and Strategies for Partnerships ............................................................. 11
Challenges for Crime Reduction Partnerships .............................................................. 14
a. Information and Resource Sharing in Partnerships............................................... 14
b. Accountability in Partnerships .............................................................................. 16
c. Partnerships at the Local Level............................................................................. 19
d. Roles and Responsibilities in Partnerships ........................................................... 21
e. Value Conflicts and Power Differentials in Partnerships ..................................... 25
Crime Reduction Partnerships in Canada ..................................................................... 28
Chapter 3: Explanations for Governance through Partnerships........................................ 37
Chapter 4: Discussion and Analysis ................................................................................. 47
a. Government Structures and Legislation.................................................................... 47
b. Implementation and Delivery.................................................................................... 49
c. Governance Issues..................................................................................................... 54
Chapter 5: Conclusion....................................................................................................... 58
References ......................................................................................................................... 61

v

Chapter 1: Introduction
The emerge nce of crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom and the
recent development of similar multi-agency partnerships in Surrey, British Columbia will
be the focus of this paper. Crime reduction in the United Kingdom is based on
collaboration and commitment between agency leaders, city officials, and police at the
local level. In the United Kingdom crime reduction model targets are identified, partners
are held accountable, and strategies are evaluated. The aim of this comprehensive
approach is to give some of the work of preventing and reducing crime a new focus
across a wide range of local agency services. Crime reduction is a matter of putting
crime and disorder considerations at the center of decision making for a wider range of
agency leaders who will work in partnership with police (Rogers, 2006; United Kingdom
Government Crime Reduction, 2006).
Essentially, the crime reduction model in the United Kingdom is made up of the
following components: drug treatment, prolific offenders, youth programs, evidencebased research, partnerships, and integrated justice. The crime reduction model is
broader in that it also encompasses education, employment, housing, offender
management, and reintegration. Examples of crime reduction include a sophisticated
drug strategy program, a prolific offender strategy, and certain crime prevention
strategies. Multi-agency coordination in these strategies is needed in order to effectively
and efficiently deal with crime and individuals involved in the crime cycle (Ro gers, 2006;
United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction, 2006).

1

If crime reduction continues to be implemented in Canada, it may require a
fundamental shift within the Criminal Justice System, particularly at the local levels, and
could eventually be viewed as a new paradigm that will require major changes in the way
agencies and governments manage crime reduction. However, it is apparent from the
disjointed approach that currently exists between agencies, such as health, education,
corrections, courts, and police, that a change in governance is necessary (City of Surrey,
2007a).
This paper will be organized into five chapters consisting of an introduction,
review of the literature, explanations for governance through partnerships, discussion and
analysis of the literature, and conclusion. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on local
partnerships and multi- agency work in the United Kingdom and Canada. It consists of
the history and development of crime reduction in the United Kingdom and the
challenges for partnership work, including: (1) information and resource sharing in
partnerships, (2) accountability in partnerships, (3) partnerships at the local level, (4)
roles and responsibilities in partnerships, and (5) value conflicts and power differentials
in partnerships. Canada’s partnership approach, specifically through the example of City
of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy, will be included in the literature review.
Chapter 3 explains the emergence of partnerships and draws on the literature
about governance strategies, community mobilization, and partnerships in the United
Kingdom and Canada. The importance of inter-agency and multi-agency cooperation,
key public partners, service providers, community involvement, and the private sector
will also be included in this chapter.

2

Chapter 4 examines the importance of multi-agency cooperation in implementing
crime reduction strategies as well as the extent to which the United Kingdom crime
reduction model of partnerships can be applied at the local level in a Canadian context.
Additional areas of discussion include the practicality of the current governance and
responsibilization strategies in Canada and whether they need to be challenged and
improved. Differences between the United Kingdom and Canada in legislation,
government structures, and implementation and delivery will also be discussed. Chapter
5 brings together a summary of findings and recommendations and proposals for future
research.

3

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Prior to discus sing the implementation of crime reduction strategies in the form of
multi-agency partnerships in Canada, it is important to examine closely the studies and
work previously conducted by others in the area of crime reduction partnerships.
Therefore, the focus in this chapter will be on the partnership approaches being used in
the United Kingdom. The below literature review is divided into sections which are
intended to inform the reader about the theories and positions in the field of crime
reduction with a focus on multi-agency partnership work.

Crime Reduction Partnerships in the United Kingdom
There are several key pieces of legislation and government policies as well as
publications that influenced crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom (U.K.),
prior to the enactment of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA). While a full
discussion on the U.K. policy context is not possible in this paper, the most significant
pieces relating to multi- agency partnerships will be examined.

a. Legislation and Policies for Partnerships
The Home Office Crime Reduction Centre (2003) is useful in summarizing the
steps that led up to the Crime and Disorder Act. Partnership work has been officially
advocated in the U.K. since the 1984 inter-departmental circular which encouraged the
organization of multi- agency groups at the local level to tackle crime. In 1988 the Safer
Cities program started and focused on specific problems and multi-agency projects in
inner cities. In 1990 another circular as well as a booklet emphasizing partnerships in

4

crime prevention was issued. In 1991, the Morgan Report said that crime prevention
work should be coordinated at the local level. According to the Morgan Report,
structure, leadership, information, identity, durability, and resources were the six main
elements that needed to be addressed along with providing the local authorities with
statutory duty. The Morgan report presented the shift in language from ‘crime
prevention’ to ‘crime and disorder reduction’ (Hughes and Gilling, 2004).
The significance of the Morgan Report is commonly referred to throughout the
literature even though the Conservative government at the time did not implement the
recommendations from the report (Crawford, 1999; Home Office Crime Reduction
Centre, 2003; Hughes and Edwards, 2005; Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Rogers, 2006).
Instead, the recommendations of the Morgan Report were put forward in 1997 by the
Labour government. The next significant step towards crime reduction and the
partnership approach took place in 1998 with the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA). The
CDA took into account the recommendations of the Morgan Report regarding local
statutory responsibility along with multi-agency partnerships and audits (Home Office
Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Rogers, 2006).
The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a framework for agencies to work
together on locally-agreed targets. The ‘responsible authorities’ referred to in the CDA
consist of the local government and the police. Health Services, known as Primary Care
Trust in England, and Fire Services have since been added as responsible authorities
when the CDA was amended by the Police Reform Act 2002 (Rogers, 2006). In
partnership, these authorities have the responsibility for creating, implementing, and
monitoring a crime reduction strategy. The CDA also states that any other state- led

5

person or authority has the duty to cooperate with these responsible authority partners in
reducing crime. The CDA has had the impact of tying the government bodies together
under the law (Rogers, 2006).

b. The Development of Partnerships
As a result of the CDA, three-hundred-and-seventy-six Crime and Disorder
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) were created in England and Wales. The statutory
partnerships in Wales were known as Community Safety Partnerships, but they were
essentially the same as CDRPs in England. While the CDRPs were funded by the Home
Office, they gave the lead responsibility for crime and disorder reduction to the police
and local authorities which were set up in geographical areas and were considered to be
the local government (Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003).
The CDRPs include investments in initiatives to improve prevention, sentencing,
target hardening, work with offenders, and to tackle high volume crime. The Crime and
Disorder Act created new powers, some of which are: anti-social behaviour orders,
reparation orders, parenting orders, local curfew schemes, removal of truants, drug
treatment and testing orders, and information sharing between agencies (Home Office
Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Rogers, 2006). The structure of most CDRPs consist of a
CDRP tasking, coordinating, and commissioning group with several specific task forces
branching off of it to assist the process, such as street robberies working group, car
crimes working group, and domestic burglary working group. Rogers explains that the
tasking group “oversees the implementation of the strategic vision, making the aims and
objectives a reality by liaising with the different task groups to ensure that the
partnership’s targets are attained” (2006:42). They adopt a joint problem solving

6

approach to tackling issues, such as drug misuse. In addition, community consultation is
a requirement for the CDRPs as this information-sharing process helps the partnerships
decide what priorities will guide their strategy (Rogers, 2006).
The CDA resulted in the formation of several other partnerships and boards most
of which are multi-agency in order to meet the crime reduction objectives of the Home
Office. While this list is not inclusive, some of these partnerships include Local Strategic
Partnerships (LSPs), Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs), Youth Justice Board (YJB),
Youth Offending Teams (YOTs), Drug Action Teams (DATs), and Criminal Justice
Intervention Teams (CJITs) (Rogers, 2006). These partnerships and boards will be
summarized below in their related context.
A Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) is a single non-statutory, multi-agency body
which matches local authority boundaries. Essentially, the role of the LSPs are
overarching local coordination between the private, community, and voluntary sectors;
delivering improved services and meeting government targets; and developing and
delivering a community strategy and Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategies (Homel,
Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004b).
Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs) were set up in 2003 and have a current
count of forty-three boards across England. They are responsible for the justice system at
the local level because they (1) increase offences brought to justice, (2) reduce ineffective
trials, (3) improve timeliness in courts, (4) enforce fines, and (5) meet the young offender
pledge. The young offender pledge is accelerating time from arrest to sentence for
persistent young offenders (United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction, 2006).

7

The Youth Justice Board (YJB) was established by the Crime and Disorder Act.
The YJB is a Home Office sponsored non-departmental public body which has the task of
monitoring and coordinating the delivery of youth justice services for young people.
Youth Offending Teams (YOTS) were also formed under the CDA. YOTS are multiagency groups implementing and coordinating youth justice services at the local level.
The Youth Justice Board and anyone working in the youth justice system have a statutory
duty of preventing offending by youth (Chapman and Niven, 2000).
Drug Action Teams (DATs) are integrated with CDRPs and are responsible for
the delivery of the drug strategy locally by commissioning services, monitoring progress,
and communicating with stakeholders. Drug treatment services are often managed
through a Drug Action Team partnership that provides treatment and other services for
offenders with drug problems. Essentially, the DATs deliver on the ground treatment,
assessments, and referrals (Millie and Erol, 2006).
The Home Office (2006) describes the Drug Interventions Program (DIP) as the
key element of the strategy to tackle drug-related crime. It aims to prevent crime through
early interventions as well as reduce crime levels by engaging the most problematic and
prolific offenders. It offers offenders whose crimes are drug-related the support they
need to break the cycle of drug misuse, offending behaviour, and custody.
The Drugs Act aims to increase the effectiveness of the DIP by getting more
offenders into treatment as there is clear evidence that treatment works. For every one
pound spent on treatment, at least 9.50 pounds is saved in criminal justice and health
costs (Rogers, 2006). If tested positive in DIP, an offender is legally required to see a
drugs worker, which is a huge legislative step forward. As a result, this legislation

8

increases the number of people in treatment since drug workers see people while they are
still in custody. If the individual is not charged and is released, they go to a Criminal
Justice Intervention Team (CJIT) which also has offices outside of prison. It is important
to note that the Drug Strategy has a workforce development strategy to ensure that there
are sufficient ly trained drug workers to meet the demand for treatment (Millie and Erol,
2006).
Criminal Justice Intervention Teams (CJITs) facilitate delivery at the local level
and are set up by the Drug Action Teams. CJITs deliver the DIP program in local areas
by case managing clients in treatment from the point of arrest to sentence, as well as
during their time in prison and upon release through aftercare. While the CJITs get them
into treatment and deal with the services of the inter-agency work, an offender manager
supervises the offender’s process (Home Office, 2004).

c. Expanding the Policing Family through Partnerships
Since the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, in addition to
the offender ma nager position, policing in the U.K. has become pluralized through
partnerships and the creation of new positions. Hughes and Gilling claim that “this
apparent redistribution – but actual ‘dispersal’ – of governmental competencies and
responsibilities and the creation of new local actors – not least community safety
managers – that play a role in crime control and safety policies is most developed in
Britain” (2004:130). The crime reduction or community safety manager plays an
important role in liaising with partnerships and developing policy and strategies. Hughes
and Gilling describe the community safety manager as “o ne of the key new partnership
experts” (2004:130). Stockdale and Whitehead recognize that “a project manager of

9

some sort is necessary for project implementation, as this person can devote themselves
to the project rather than do it on top of existing duties” (2003:226).
While the community safety manager appears to be an important player in
community safety and crime reduction, other positions have also been created in an effort
to share the police workload. Community safety officers are part of what Rogers (2006)
refers to as the ‘extended policing family’. The Police Community Support Officer
(PCSO) patrols and uses his or her powers to resolve order maintenance problems as well
as assist the beat manager with assistance in dealing with minor instances of public
disorder and anti-social problems. The purpose of these officers is “to provide visible
and accessible uniformed presence and to engage with the public and as such they spend
the majority of their time patrolling on foot and dealing with low-level antisocial
behaviour” (Cooper et al., 2006; as cited in Bullock, Erol, & Tilley, 2006:128).
Another way policing has been pluralized in the U.K. is through neighbourhood
wardens. They are uniformed and offer what Bullock et al. call a “semi-official
presence” (2006:966). They do their security patrols in residential areas, but they also
assist with environmental improvements, liaison with landlords and tenants, look after
void properties, respond to minor instances of anti-social behaviour, and are an
information source for the local authorities (Bullock et al., 2006; Johnston, 2001;
Johnston and Shearing, 2003). In addition, Bullock et al. describe traffic wardens who
enforce road traffic offences and issue fixed-penalty notices for certain other offences.
Similar to neighbourhood wardens, traffic wardens supply the police with criminal and
community intelligence through their visible presence in the community.

10

As in other countries, private security guards are used for extra services at pubs,
concerts, and commercial property. In the U.K., private security guards are also used for
prisoner escort and other custody duties assisting police officers (Bullock et al., 2006). In
addition to the above listed control agents, Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTVs) are risk
management techniques in the U.K. (Rose 2000). Building on what appears to already be
taking place in the U.K., Gilling suggests:
The police service may find it easier to manage its new-found responsibilities
through a division of labour which may ultimately result in two-tier policing,
where the police service seeks to manage serious crime, as now through a
combination of prevention and detection, while a combination of other agencies,
including local authority patrols and other bodies, private security organizations
and the local community itself, take on the major responsibility for minor crimes
and disorder. (2000:137)

d. Programs and Strategies for Partnerships
Much of the current work taking place in the U.K. is based on the partnerships
and positions mentioned above and initiatives that stem from the United Kingdom’s
Crime Reduction Program (CRP) which begun in 1998 ending in 2002. Chapman and
Niven (2000) describe the program as being an evidence-based approach to crime
reduction where resources are invested in initiatives that provide significant and sustained
impacts on levels of crime. The Crime Reduction Program covers five general themes.
The first theme is working with families, children, and schools to prevent young people
from becoming future offenders. The second theme entails tackling high volume crime in
communities. The development of products and systems which are more resistant to
crime is the third theme. Lastly, more effective sentencing practices and working with
offenders to ensure they do not re-offend are the remaining two themes (Bullock, Farrell,
& Tilley, 2002; Chapman and Niven, 2000; Tilley, 2004).

11

A defining aspect of the U.K. crime reduction model is the Prolific and Priority
Offender (PPO) scheme developed in 2004. It focuses resources on and targets the small
minority of people that commit the most crime. The idea behind this scheme is that by
targeting such people, this will bring down wider offending levels (Dawson, 2005; Home
Office, 2004; Millie and Erol, 2006).
The PPO strategy is delivered at the local level by the police, but it is managed by
the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. The PPO strategy requires multi-agency
work between all agencies dealing with adult offenders. Also, since a PPO is not a
legally defined term, the locality can determine their PPOs by deciding which individuals
in their locality cause the most crime and disorder. The police National Intelligence
Model (NIM) and a matrix system are used to make final decisions as to who is
considered a PPO (Dawson, 2005; Home Office, 2004).
The partnerships are guided by three complementary strands that were developed for
the PPO strategy:
1. Prevent and deter: stopping people, in particular young people, from becoming
involved in offending behaviour and becoming prolific offenders.
2. Catch and convict: actively tackling adults who are already prolific offenders.
3. Rehabilitate and resettle: working with identified prolific adult offenders serving
custodial or community-based sentences to stop re-offending by offering a range
of support services postsentence, delivered through joint agency working.
(Dawson, 2005; Home Office, 2004; Rogers, 2006)

Worrall, Dunkerton, and Leacock explain that the last two strands are delivered as a
whole. The offender is given the choice to turn away from crime and rehabilitate or get
caught and go to prison as “t here is an agreed procedure for swift enforcement in the
event of noncompliance or further offending (which requires the co-operation of courts)”
(2001/2002:289).

12

The rehabilitate and resettle strand require the work of many agencies, including
the police and drug treatment workers. However, The National Probation Service and the
Prison Service are the main partners. The Home Office (2004c; as cited in Millie and
Erol, 2006:696) states “the rehabilitate-and-resettle strand aimed to ensure that in every
CDRP close partnership working is in place, with the result that seamless, effective case
management is guaranteed for every PPO”. This takes place through care plans and
premium or wrap-around services. If an offender receives any training or treatment while
in prison, this information is passed on to external support agencies once the offender is
no longer in prison (Millie and Erol, 2006). Dawson (2005) explains how the multiagency partnership work has results in an increase in data sharing which provides all
agencies involved with a PPO with a complete picture of the offender since becoming
involved with the justice system.
A challenge that has impeded the PPO strategy is insufficient housing being
available upon release. Millie and Erol emphasize that in order to resolve such housing
issues, partnership work has been key. They describe “better linkages across agencies”
(2006:770) as an important factor for the PPO strategy to work. In particular, Homel,
Nutley, Webb, and Tilley (2004a) found that links with prisons, drug agencies, and
employment and training providers are important in resettlement of offenders.
In summary, partnerships in the United Kingdom were developed as a result of
the Crime and Disorder Act and created the Crime Reduction Program along with crime
reduction strategies such as the Drug Strategy, Drug Interventions Program, Prolific and
Priority Offender Scheme, CCTVs, parenting orders, and information sharing
agreements. Crime reduction partnerships, teams, boards, and roles were created in an

13

effort to reduce crime through multi-agency approaches. The Crime and Disorder
Reduction Partnerships are a key component to crime reduction strategies at the local
level and serve as an overarching body for other partnerships.

Challenges for Crime Reduction Partnerships
a. Information and Resource Sharing in Partnerships
Throughout the crime reduction literature, a common obstacle to partnership work
is the process of information and resource sharing along with appropriate disclosure
between agencies and partners (Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006; Dawson, 2005;
Gilling, 2005; Laycock and Webb, 2003; Maguire, 2004; Millie and Erol, 2006; Rogers,
2006). Bullock et al. state that “the general aim of working in partnership in the field of
crime reduction is to share and mobilize resources in order to target them to best effect
and to avoid unnecessary confusion, duplication and contradiction” (2006:143). Maguire
(2004) also points out the cost-effective and efficient aspects of multi-agency
cooperation.
Similarly, Rogers states “working together requires all local agencies to share
information and to collaborate in planning basic service delivery in the interests of the
community” (2006:39). A number of writers list a variety of sources of information that
are needed to assist in forming a crime reduction strategy and to profile an area. These
include recorded crime figures, service calls, census information, unemployment data,
retail crime, housing data, social services data, exclusion and truancy data from schools,
details of noise complaints from environmental health departments, probation data on
offenders, data on drug treatment from health authorities, accident and emergency
records on assaults, police authority data, fire service statistics, and data from voluntary

14

and private sector organizations (Bullock et al., 2002; Burgess, 2003; Hough and Tilley,
1998; Rogers, 2006). Information from all of the above agencies provides a more
accurate picture of the problem and its social context (Bullock et al., 2002; Hough and
Tilley, 1998).
Burgess (2003) lists partners that can assist in decreasing the supply of drugs
while recognizing that this is still primarily a police responsibility. These partners are:
neighbourhood or community wardens, traffic wardens, caretakers, and housing
management staff. Burgess also found that “this can identify buildings from which drugs
are sold, streets with young people hanging around and the size, position and nuisance
caused by sex markets” (2003:14).
The Crime and Disorder Act was supposed to aid data sharing between agencies
within the constraints of the 1998 Data Protection Act; however, Laycock and Webb
argue that this has not happened. They claim that “two thirds of bids had no data from
other agencies when clearly in many cases this would have been extremely useful”
(2003:291). Some of the problems with multi-agency data sharing are (1) data
protection, (2) practical difficulties of exchanging data between different computer
systems, (3) geo-coding to different boundaries, (4) failures to collect or record
information; incomplete or inaccurate data, (5) failure to code/enter information collected
in standard ways, (6) issues of confidentiality, and (7) suspicion about why the data is
needed and how it will be used (Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006; Dawson, 2005;
Gilling, 2005; Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Laycock and Webb, 2003).
Obtaining information from health services has been a challenge, specifically
drug treatment agencies. The basis for this problem is a conflict between patient

15

confidentiality issues and the general need for public protection (Keene, Rodriguez, &
Badger, 2005; Laycock and Webb, 2003; Maguire, 2004). Burgess (2003) discusses how
drug agencies are in a position where they can provide possible information that will help
with locating hot spots and specific individuals involved in the drug market. However,
he explains that many of these agencies are reluctant to share sensitive information about
individuals because they are there to provide a service to the drug users. In relation to the
obstacles discussed Maguire claims:
It was unwise to assume that cooperation with crime reduction projects could
readily be obtained from agencies for whom crime was not a focus of their
mainstream activities. …Such problems were usually eased or resolved over
time, but caused delays, changes or omissions in the planned implementation of
multi-stranded projects. (2004:223)

Some partnerships have dealt with the challenge of information exchange by having an
information sharing agreement which addresses some of the concerns mentioned above.
Rogers (2006) notes that many agencies involved in CDRPs use a protocol which clearly
states the responsibilities regarding sharing information.

b. Accountability in Partnerships
Gilling (2000) describes crime prevention in most countries over the past century
to be a ‘principle’, whereas the U.K. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 emphasizes crime
prevention as a ‘practical project’. Accountability in the U.K. is often determined and
described by strategies, audits, performance management objectives and targets,
assessments, and others. Also, there is a heavy emphasis on evaluation and the
requirement to publish these accountability systems (Hough and Tilley, 1998; Maguire,
2004).

16

The Home Office accountability systems have a managerial focus. Crawford
claims:
The Crime and Disorder Act is infused with a managerialist philosophy which is
output-fixated and driven by performance measurement. …The local community
safety partnerships reflect this managerialist focus in the tasks and duties which
they have been allocated. They will be required to set targets and identify
performance indicators. (1998a:248)

The 2006 Home Office document titled Reducing crime, the harm caused by drugs and
anti-social behaviour: Delivering PSA 1, PSA 4 and PSA 2: Partnership Assessment and
Delivery System (PADS): Guidance for partnerships is an assessment process which
measures partnerships against ten indicators of quality in its ability to deliver and sustain
improvements in crime reduction, to deliver the government’s drug strategy, and to tackle
anti-social behaviour. These qua lity indicators are leadership, establishing a shared
vision and processes to deliver the vision, managing the local Community Safety
Strategy, relationship management/people and partners, problem solving, effective use of
resources, successful programs, performance management, community engagement, and
communication.
The audit is one of the U.K.’s main accountability methods as it helps
partnerships set targets and develop strategies. Rogers advises that “an audit is
essentially a piece of research and should be structured to reflect sound research
principles” (2006:202). He lists four areas for carrying out an audit: engaging with the
community, reviewing activity and performance, helping to plan for change, and
identifying priorities that fit in with broader community plans.
Evidence-based policy and practice are evident in the U.K.’s accountability
methods and lend themselves to the ‘modernization agenda’, according to Bullock et al.:

17

‘Modernization’ has included, among other things, performance management,
local responsiveness, a move in principle to government steering (setting
priorities and targets) and local agency rowing (deciding what to do to get there),
joined-up working and the promise of devolved authority for those who perform
well (earned autonomy), in addition to an emphasis on EBPP and the improved
effectiveness, efficiency and value for money that are expected to follow suit.
(2006:172)

Crawford (1998a) also describes the setting of performance standards to be a process of
governmental ‘steering’.
Gilling claims that the concern over how crime prevention partnerships have
performed and been perceived in the past is the reason for governmental concern and
heavy involvement of the Audit Commission in crime reduction initiatives. He advises
that the Audit Commission deals with “the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and value
for money of local public services, such as the police and local authorities, who are now
heavily involved in CDRPs” (2005:735). Crawford shares some of these crime
prevention partnership concerns:
There is a distinct ambivalence about crime prevention; it is much lauded but less
often practiced. For example, despite the heavy financial burden of the criminal
justice system, relatively little money is allocated to crime prevention. (1998b:
63)
Only belatedly have issues concerned with the implementation and delivery of
crime prevention risen to the fore in the criminological literature. In the naivete
of the early days of crime prevention it was as if all that was needed was a ‘good
idea’ and the rest would take care of itself. However, researchers have
highlighted the importance of the concept of programme, its delivery and
evaluation. (1998b:161)

In addition, Crawford states:
…the relationship between ‘prevention’ and ‘partnerships’ can be explained in
part by the fact that crime prevention has tended to exist as a peripheral concern
of numerous agencies, and yet a core activity of none. (1999:44)

The partnerships are accountable to the community; therefore, it is appropriate
that community consultation and engagement are other accountability mechanisms in the

18

strategies developed. In 2006, the Home Office conducted a review of the partnership
provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This review included a recommendation
that CDRPs engage more fully with communities. In addition to being an accountability
concern, this recommendation is focused on the Home Office governance strategy of
engaging with the community (Bullock et al., 2006).
A local survey is now part of the audit process for every crime and disorder
partnership (Rogers, 2006). Community consultation is one of the responsibilities of the
CDRPs as it is part of the process leading up to the development of a crime reduction
strategy that reflects the priority problems in a locality (Home Office Crime Reduction
College, 2003).
The influence of the civil renewal agenda can be seen in the government's most
recent White Paper on police reform, Building Safer Communities Together, which
argues for the following governance structure:
A genuinely "bottom-up" approach to decision making on community safety
issues - with opportunities for direct input and engagement for communities,
together with strong oversight mechanisms at a local level and a higher,
"strategic" level. (United Kingdom, Home Office 2003b:5.54; as cited in Hope,
2005:381-382)

c. Partnerships at the Local Level
Crawford (1999) raises the question of why partnerships in criminal justice are on
the rise. Rogers states:
The consequence of believing the myths for so long has been the creation of an
expensive, inefficient, and self-perpetuating criminal justice system, a high crime
rate, and large numbers of young people drifting into crime, which appears hard
to refute. Consequently, it is argued, only a comprehensive partnership approach
to tackling crime and its associated problems involving all agencies can be seen
as the way forward. (2006:10)

19

The Criminal Justice System will not be able to prevent crime on its own because it is not
in control of many of the social and environmental causations of crime, and this is the
reason for the emphasis on partnership work (Bright, 1991; Capobianco, 2005; Crawford,
1998b, 1999; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Scott, 2005).
Many writers conclude that governments and other agencies at the local level are
in the most strategic position to directly deal with crime and disorder issues through
policy development (Bright, 1991; Hope, 2001; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Shaw,
2001). Crawford states:
The very notion of community safety echoes the importance of locality. It stands
in contrast to what Rosenbaum (1988a) referred to as an ‘implant hypothesis’
which underscores much crime prevention practice, whereby pre-packaged
programmes are implanted into local social environments with little sensitivity to
the specific local context in the implementation process. Rather than solutions
being imposed on a local ecology, they should emerge out of the environment in
which they have to survive. (1998b:193)

Bright (1991) asserts that the crime prevention component of such services needs
to be strengthened. Capobianco states that there needs to be “emphasis on what can be
done to prevent crime from occurring before the intervention of the criminal justice
system, and to complement the work of the criminal justice system” (2005:5). Scott
recognizes:
Much of police business consists of handling problems and cases that fall through
the cracks in the ‘social net’ or constitute an overflow stemming from the limited
resources of other agencies – for example, mentally ill persons who are not
adequately cared for in the community; drug addicts who do not receive
treatment services; parks, playgrounds and housing developments that are not
adequately maintained; and cars and homes that are abandoned, etc. (2005:395)

In 1990 the United Nations Congress wanted to “bring together those with
responsibility for planning and development, for family, health, employment and training,
housing and social services, leisure activities, schools, the police and the justice system in

20

order to deal with the conditions that generate crime” (United Nations, 1991; as cited in
Rogers, 2006:27; Crawford, 1998b:32).

d. Roles and Responsibilities in Partnerships
Shaw (2006) advises that it is not the community safety concepts that have
changed much over the years; instead, it is that they have been enhanced, and there has
been a shift in the roles and responsibilities of all the actors. In the U.K., crime control
was traditionally known to be the responsibility of the Home Office, police, and criminal
justice agencies (Rogers, 2006; Stenson and Edwards, 2003). The Crime and Disorder
Act 1998 intended to end the police monopoly over crime control by legislating a shared
responsibility between the local authorities (Rogers, 2006).
In order to decipher if there is a dominant agency in a partnership, Crawford uses the
five models of coordination and structure which were identified in the Morgan Report:
?
?
?
?
?

The ‘independent’ model, with an independent coordinator
The ‘local authority based’ model
The ‘police centred local’ model
The ‘police centred headquarters’ model
The ‘indeterminate’ model, with no clear leader, coordinator or strategy. (1998b:170)

The ‘corporate’ model was added by Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994). This model has no
lead agency; therefore, the partnership group shares responsibility. Crawford (1998b)
suggests that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a model of its own because the
police and local authority are designated as the leaders.
Probation and education are examples of cooperating bodies that have been
identified as having the expertise and resources to contribute to crime control; therefore,
they have a legal obligation to help deliver the objectives of crime reduction strategies
(Rogers, 2006). As a result, the recognition of specific roles and expectations of these

21

agencies is important in order to determine what information, resources, and knowledge
they can provide.
The responsible authorities must also invite the participation of others such as
social landlords, drug and alcohol teams or workers, education councils, voluntary
organizations, crown prosecution service, crown court manager, court committee,
neighbourhood watch committee, and victim support workers (Rogers, 2006). “Many of
these groups have a large amount of information gathered during their day-to-day
activities and can provide a fuller picture and understanding of the root causes of crime
and disorder in the local community” (Rogers, 2006:201).
Bullock et al. (2006) reminds us that engaging some partners has been difficult,
and this was further acknowledged in the review of the Crime and Disorder Act
conducted by the Home Office in 2006. Furthermore, Crawford states that “there is a big
gulf between the often-heard ideals of ‘partnerships’ and the reality of its practice”
(1998b:184).
Crawford (1999) explains that the reluctance of private sector involvement is due
to crime not being a priority. In addition, since this sector is subject to economic
fluctuations, it prefers short-term projects that are more quantifiable. Tilley found
“efforts to involve the community create a host of further puzzles about whom to involve,
how to engage them, what they can do and the means by which they can relate to local
formal organizations” (2005:9). The health sector is the area most commonly referred to
in discussions around agencies reluctance to participate (Hughes and Gilling, 2004;
Keene, Rodriguez, & Badger, 2005). The reasons for this reluctance are (1) health
authorities have limited resources to commit to the partnership process, (2) they have

22

doubts about the ir own role in crime and disorder partnerships, and (3) there is little
recognition that it is part of their core responsibility (Philips, Jacobson, Prime, Carter, &
Considine, 2002).
To date, much has been written about the need for partnerships to have clarity on
the roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in crime reduction work. First of
all, it increases efficiency by avoiding duplication of work. Second, it helps overcome
the dependency on the Criminal Justice System to reduce crime on its own. Third, it
extends and encourages responsibility to all of the organizations necessary in crime
control. Finally, it is necessary to make the best use of available expertise (Bullock et al.,
2006; Gilling and Barton, 1997; Millie and Erol, 2006).
Gelsthorpe differentiates between five types of partnerships in terms of roles and
identity:
?
?
?
?
?

The Communications Model: organizations recognize that they have a role to
play with one another but go little beyond communication.
The Cooperation Model: agencies maintain separate boundaries and identities
but work together on a mutually-agreed problem.
The Coordination Model: agencies work together in a systematic way, there are
defined boundaries, and resources are pooled to tackle mutually-agreed
problems.
The Federation Model: agencies retain their organizational distinctiveness but
also adopt degrees of central focus.
The Merger Model: agencies become indistinguishable from one another in
working on a mutually-defined problem. (1985; as cited in Johnston and
Shearing, 2003:108)

For the purposes of the work in the U.K., Crawford describes the role of multi- agency
partnerships as a whole:
Multi-agency partnerships involve the coming together of various agencies in
relation to a given problem, without this significantly affecting or transforming
the work they do. The same tasks are conducted in cooperation with others. The
roles of the partners remain distinct. Key officers are called on to represent their
organization and to pool collective expertise and resources. Their core tasks
remain largely unaltered, as multi-agency work is grafted on to existing practices,
or those existing practice are redefined. (1998b:174-175)

23

Furthermore, Sansfacon states “more than working alongside other organizations or
taking responsibility or participating in roundtables, integrated approaches involve
working with others to create new tools and develop a shared vision in order to coproduce community safety” (2006:3).
Johnston and Shearing claim ‘embedding’ is occurring at the occupational and
functional level. As a result, they claim that “it is now virtually impossible to identify
any function within the governance of security in democratic states that is not,
somewhere and under some circumstances, performed by non-state authorities as well as
by state ones” (2003:33).
Harris (2003) and Crawford (1998b) discuss the blurring of boundaries between
organizations. Crawford states “partnerships, by their nature, blur the boundaries
between the roles and functions of incorporated organizations. This can present
difficulties for accountability and for the appropriate distribution of responsibilities.
Hence, there is a need to maintain clarity of the divergent inputs and their collaborative
objectives” (1998b:175). Millie and Erol say that “this merging of boundaries between
traditional roles is not unique to probation and prisons. There has been also an increasing
involvement of police officers in offender supervision, often alongside existing probation
supervision—as some have put it, possibly leading to a future polibation officer”
(2006:692). Harris notes that the issues surrounding boundary blurring are likely to
continue in the partnership structures in the U.K.
Crawford explains that there is more than one partner involved in the decisionmaking and implementation processes; therefore, there is not one agency alone that can
be held responsible for the outcomes. Furthermore, he describes accountability as

24

“fragmented and dispersed” (1998b:180). Gilling also raises concerns about roles and
responsibilities.
…it has been recognized for a long while that criminal justice is more of a
fragmented, contradictory process than a coordinated system. There is no reason
to assume that the absorption of even more agencies under the community safety
umbrella will result in greater coordination, but some logic is suggesting it might
result in less. (2000:136)

e. Value Conflicts and Power Differentials in Partnerships
Conflict in multi-agency partnerships can be traced back to differences in agency
philosophy, organizational style, professional history, procedures, structures, resources,
leadership, lack of trust, and different beliefs on crime prevention (Crawford 1999;
Gilling, 1993; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Tilley 2005). According to Garland, “the
criminal justice system itself is an historically contingent and (arbitrary) social construct,
which has arisen more through competition between professional groups and agencies in
pursuit of their own claims to specialist expertise and legitimacy than any rational
strategic plan” (1990; as cited in Crawford, 1998b:11).
According to Gilling (1993) partners have different discourses about crime
causation. Gilling states:
Normally there is space within the criminal justice system for these different
discourses to coexist in splendid isolation and independence, making conflict
largely unnecessary. There is a separation of powers and responsibilities which
minimizes the need for communication and, resources allowing, enable each
agency to effectively plough its own furrow. However, a distinctive feature of
the multi-agency approach is that is seeks to force agencies from a position of
independence to one of interdependence, where the means to crime prevention
effectiveness lies beyond the control of a single agency. … But it does not fit the
actuality of two separate discourses and professional traditions. If these
traditions are required to come together and seek a common base for decision
making in the situational approach to crime prevention then, like oil and water,
they simply will not mix. (1993:153)

Similarly, in critiquing the Crime Reduction Program, Maguire states:

25

It demanded the rapid identification, mobilization and coordination of large
numbers of people and organizations with an array of skills in project design,
oversight, management, monitoring and evaluation that were not in abundant
supply within the criminal justice field. It also relied, implicitly at least, upon an
assumed flexibility in professional cultures, whereby practitioners could be told
or persuaded to work in new ways, not only within individual agencies, but also
in the context of new forms of partnership between agencies unfamiliar with (and
sometimes hostile to) each others’ aims, assumptions and practices. (2004:217)

Crawford acknowledges that “not all agencies and groups are equally powerful.
Organizations bring to crime problems competing claims to specialist knowledge and
expertise, as well as differential access to both human and material resources. It is not
surprising, therefore, that certain agencies tend to dominate the policy agenda”
(1998b:171-172). Similarly, Homel et al. states “… this does not mean that the
relationships within any partnership arrangements will always be equal. The nature of the
power relationship between each agency involved in the partnership will be a product of
what value they can add to the achievement of the joint outcomes” (2004a:20). Phillips
et al. (2002) also found that voluntary and community agencies experienced power
imbalances with statutory organizations.
The police are the agency most commonly perceived as dominating meetings and
the policy agenda (Gilling, 1993; Harris, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Millie and
Erol, 2006; Phillips et al., 2002; Rogers, 2006). Johnston and Shearing explain that “in
the past, similar ‘community’-based initiatives have tended to be dominated by the police
either because they have successfully maintained their hegemony over policing matters or
– more usually – because they have been left to bear the responsibility for implementing
initiatives alone” (2003:11). “The police are often enthusiastic proponents of the multiagency approach, but they tend to prefer to set the agenda and dominate forum meetings,
and then to ignore the multi-agency framework when it suits their own needs” (Sampson

26

et al., 1988; as cited in Rogers, 2006:8). Gilling suggests “as the main custodians of
information on crime it is they who are in the strongest position to authoritatively identify
what is or is not to be regarded as a problem suitable for special preventive effort”
(1993:154).
Millie and Erol note that “if a wide range of non-statutory agencies are consulted,
then it is important that they feel their views are valued—otherwise, cooperation and
participation in such meetings will not be guaranteed” (2006:699). Shaw states “if
initiatives are to be sustained and effective, people must feel they have had a major role
in creating and shaping them” (2006:6). She goes on to state that “the development of
meaningful participation, rather than consultation, in community safety and prevention is
seen as a key mechanism for facilitating ownership, leadership and building skills and
capacity, and for helping to change attitudes, strengthen social networks and build trust
between partners” (2006:8).
Harris (2003) says that teachers hold the power in drug education and prevention
in the schools. However, the teachers do not feel that they have this power because they
are not as familiar with the legislative aspects of drugs or all the issues surrounding
drugs. Crawford provides a useful summary of the current situation:
In the new order of things, diverse agencies and the public are to become coproducers of public safety. Yet the process of co-production is riddled with sites
of conflict over values, purposes and priorities as well as considerable power
imbalances between the parties incorporated into the co-production process.
(1998b:193)

In summary, partnerships in the United Kingdom have posed a number of
challenges about (1) information and resource sharing, (2) accountability systems, (3)
implementation at the local level, (4) roles and responsibilities, and (5) value conflicts
and power differentials. The exchange of information is difficult between some

27

organizations, but also necessary for effective and efficient partnership work. Part of the
sophistication of the U.K. crime reduction model is because of the accountability systems
implemented by the local and central government including audits, performance targets,
assessments, and evaluations. These accountability structures are between the Home
Office, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and communities. Partnerships at
the local level emphasize the major role of local authorities and agencies in gathering
information and creating crime reduction strategies. The lack of clarity of roles and
responsibilities between partners result in the blurring of boundaries, embedding
responsibilities of security and safety within other occupations instead of within a
specialist occupation, and confusion around accountability. Value conflicts and power
differentials occur due to different discourses about crime causation, leadership roles, and
agency domination.
Partnership work in the United Kingdom is influencing initiatives in Canada.
Canada’s crime reduction partne rships will now be discussed through an example of the
City of Surrey’s Crime Reduction Strategy.

Crime Reduction Partnerships in Canada
British Columbia’s Crime Reduction Initiative (CRI) is primarily based on the
U.K. crime reduction approaches. The British Columbia initiative was officially
launched in September 2005 by the “E” Division RCMP as six detachments were chosen
to implement crime reduction strategies (RCMP, 2006). The three main objectives of the
strategy are: to reduce crime rates, to reduce fear of crime and to reduce the impact of
anti-social behaviour on the quality of life (RCMP, 2006). According to the RCMP:

28

Within policing, new teams and strategies drawn from existing resources will
bring intelligence and contemporary criminology to bear on chronic crime
problems and prolific offenders. Across the justice system, partnerships will
ensure that major players are working in the same direction with a common tool
kit. … Rather than imposing a rigid “template” of CR activity in these
jurisdictions, the pilot communities will take on the challenge of developing
strategies tailored specifically to their local enforcement and criminal justice
environment. (2006:6)

The RCMP asserts that a crime reduction strategy should not be solely the responsibility
of the police but should involve local partnerships and inter-agency cooperation, resulting
in a shared undertaking.
After visiting the United Kingdom and New York City the Mayor of the City of
Surrey, Dianne Watts, announced an official Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) (Skelton,
2007, February 26). The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is described in two ways.
First, it states “t he City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is an innovative problem
solving approach to addressing the causes and effects of crime”. Second, “t he Surrey
Crime Reduction Strategy is a complete paradigm shift from what is currently being done
in Canadian municipalities to combat crime. It is an approach that seeks to incorporate
all the key stakeholders and create one, unified, comprehensive plan” (City of Surrey,
2007b). The mayor describes the strategy as comprehensive in that it involves over fifty
organizations and all three levels of government. The organizations include: RCMP,
non-profit, provincial and federal governments, parole, crown counsel, school board,
Board of Trade, and community agencies.
The Mayor of Surrey states that the provincial and federal governments are in
support of the CRS. However, while she acknowledges the importance of support from
higher levels of government, she asserts that “municipal governments should take the
lead in fighting crime” (Skelton, 2007, February 26:A2). Furthermore, Wally Oppal, the

29

Attorney General for British Columbia, states “the problem with the existing criminal
justice system is that its components operate in isolation … we need a complete shift in
philosophy. We can’t keep doing business the way it’s been done in the past. The world
has changed” (Bellett, 2007, February 27:B8).
The mayor recognizes that some recommendations in the CRS are outside of
municipal jurisdiction, such as community courts and changes in prison sentencing. The
mayor explains that some initiatives can be carried out without the support of higher
levels of government and that they have already begun implementing some of these
initiatives (Skelton, 2007, February 27). Initiatives that have taken place so far include a
part-time homelessness outreach worker to find permanent housing for individuals, the
creation of Prolific Offender Target Teams by the Surrey RCMP, and the creation of
partnerships.
The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy describes its four primary objectives
as:
1.
2.
3.
4.

reduce crime and increase community safety
increase public involvement in reducing crime
increase integration between all stakeholders involved in crime reduction
improve public awareness around the reality and perception of crime. (City of Surrey,
2007a)

These objectives are to be attained through the development of initiatives and action
plans under the four components, or strands, of the strategy: (1) prevent and deter crime,
(2) apprehend and prosecute offenders, (3) rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders, and (4)
reality and perceptions of crime. The Mayor’s Task Force on Public Safety and Crime
Reduction is divided into four sub-committees representing each of the four strands (City
of Surrey, 2007a).

30

Under the Prevent and Deter Strand, the strategy advises that the City and the
RCMP look into the creation of Community Safety Officers (CSO). A CSO is “not a
member of the police force but has a level of delegated authority to support the RCMP in
the prevention and deterrence of crime” (City of Surrey, 2007a:11). In addition to
Community Safety Officers, another recommendation is the development of a protocol
that requires these officers, outdoor city workers, community volunteer patrols,
firefighters, and RCMP to wear visible safety vests for increased visibility and awareness
for the public (City of Surrey, 2007a). Enhancing safety on transit and skytrains is
another recommendation requiring partnership work with transit authorities.
Ensuring databases are current and available to researchers is an important aspect
of the Crime Reduction Strategy. In addition, the City wants to establish a Shopping
Centre Advisory Committee with the RCMP, representatives from large shopping centers
in the city, Surrey Board of Trade, Chambers of Commerce, and Business Improvement
Associations (City of Surrey, 2007a).
The mayor also intends to put CCTVs in crime hot spots (City of Surrey, 2007a;
Skelton, 2007, February 27). This would require working with private sector partners
and input from the Privacy Commissioner. Insurance companies will provide rate
reduction program for private property owners who install CCTV cameras (City of
Surrey, 2007a:16).
Another important component to the crime reduction strategy is the establishment
of Community Drug Action Teams. The following agencies would take part in creating a
protocol for these teams: the RCMP, Fire Department, Probation, School District, Fraser

31

Health Authority – Mental Health and Addiction. According to the Crime Reduction
Strategy:
These community based outreach teams will deliver the city’s drug strategy at the
local level and assist individuals on the street (ie. homeless, sex trade workers,
cronic runaways, drug addicts, youth at risk etc.) to access social support
networks and wrap around services (ie. housing, medical attention, treatment
etc.). Research shows that 1-on-1 contact has the greatest benefit in assisting
those at risk. (City of Surrey, 2007a:16)

The City of Surrey is also recommending:
That the City work in collaboration with the School District and appropriate
Provincial authorities to establish a process for the creation of legally-binding,
negotiated and voluntary “parenting orders” that would support parents, whose
children are determined to be involved in crime, to become re-involved with
raising their children in a responsible manner.
That the City, Fraser Health Authority and community agencies review and
expand, where appropriate, parenting support programs to assist parents in
raising their children in a responsible manner. (2007a:18)

In addition, the CRS explained the concept of creating Community Action Groups:
In conjunction with Neighbourhood Associations, RCMP, Surrey Fire
Department, Surrey Bylaw Enforcement, Surrey Building Inspectors, Surrey
Electrical Fire Safety Initiative, Board of Trade, Chambers of Commerce,
Business Improvement Associations and other stakeholders in each of Surrey’s
Town Centres. These groups will work with the RCMP to develop strategies to
address neighourhood issues such as graffiti, vandalism, drug dealing, drug
houses, businesses that attract crime, motels allowing criminal activity to take
place, crime hot spots and general nuisance activity. (City of Surrey, 2007a:19)

Multi-agency cooperation is also anticipated in the zero tolerance policy for
graffiti. This would pertain to public and private property through by- laws as well as
involve partnership work with the Ministry of Highways, the GVTA, BC Hydro, Telus,
BC Hydro, Shaw Cable and Terasen (City of Surrey, 2007a).
The second strand is the Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders Strand. This strand
targets prolific offenders since “estimates indicate that approximately 20% of the
criminals are involved in or cause 80% of the “priority” crimes” (City of Surrey,
2007a:20). Some of the recommendations under this strand include sharing information
32

among organizations, raising the importance of data gathering; and implementing the
Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) systems. This strand also targets drugs in
the city. As a result, it suggests that the City work closely with the Surrey Fire
Department, RCMP, Solicitor General, and Electrical Inspectors in relation to grow
operations, the equipment used in grow-ops, and the electrical safety hazards they create
(City of Surrey, 2007a).
The second strand aims to establish a Community Court for offenders who have
an addiction. This wo uld include a Community Justice Resource Team which is a team
of support service experts. “This process must involve the police, Crown Counsel,
defense Counsel and Court judges to ensure the full benefit of the alternative Community
Court process is recognized” (City of Surrey, 2007a:22). In addition to Community
Court, the CRS suggests Night Court to increase courtroom capacity and to shorten the
delay time from charge to trial. Along with enhanced treatment programs in and out of
prison, the CRS promotes longer incarceration time for offenders who do not go into
treatment.
Another component of the CRS under the Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders
Strand is the establishment of Prolific Offender Management Teams (POMT). The City
is required to work with probation, social services, health authorities, community support
teams, Attorney General, Solicitor General, RCMP, and others to form POMTs. The City
of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy explains that “POMTs will follow an offender
throughout the criminal justice system to assess and address factors that cause the
offender to commit crime” (City of Surrey, 2007a:23).

33

The third strand is the Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Strand. This is described as a
“client-centered approach” that delivers “wrap around services” for offenders (City of
Surrey, 2007a). The wrap around services entail treatment, housing, education and skills
development, career development, support worker, leisure/social activities, and program
monitoring. Legislation has been recommended allowing for drug testing upon arrest.
Treatment programs become mandatory for prolific offenders with addiction problems.
The Crime Reduction Strategy says that “the City continue to work with the
private sector, not for profit organizations and key stakeholders to provide treatment
facilities, beds and programs” (City of Surrey, 2007a:25). In order to aim for continuity
of support for individuals as they move throughout the different services, agencies, and in
some cases in and outside of prison, the CRS recommends that Community Support
Teams be created. Community Support Teams provide “ongoing support to individuals
on a one-on-one basis through the duration of their program of treatment and
reintegration from the Criminal Justice System” (City of Surrey, 2007a:29). The creation
of cross- functional outreach teams for prolific offenders with mental disorders is also part
of the Crime Reduction Strategy.
The Reality and Perceptions of Crime is the fourth strand and it contains
information gathering, communication of information, prioritizing actions to address
most fearful/most vulnerable first, and increasing physical “visibility” to reduce the fear
of crime (City of Surrey, 2007a). One of the main recommendations that arose out of this
strand is to regularly conduct community safety surveys. The Reality and Perceptions of
Crime strand calls for the creation of databases of agencies that can provide the various
services listed throughout the CRS and performance indicators for each recommendation

34

and monitoring systems for measurement, evaluation, and accountability purposes. A
board would develop and oversee the implementation of the recommendations (City of
Surrey, 2007a).
The first stage of the CRS is to publish recommendations. The second phase is to
create and implement the recommendations by the end of 2007 (City of Surrey, 2007a).
The job posting for a crime reduction strategy manager describes the position as:
Responsible for the leadership, development and implementation of a
groundbreaking crime reduction program for the City of Surrey. … responsible
for conducting research, analyzing data, developing effective strategy and related
operational plans and then assisting with implementing the strategy.
Communicating and building effective partnerships with a broad range of
stakeholders and agencies is fundamental to success in this position. (City of
Surrey, 2007b)

The strategy states that it will be this person’s role “to coordinate the preparation of the
Implementation Plan and assist in the “roll out” of the Implementation Plan with the wide
array of stakeholders that will need to be involved in that process” (City of Surrey,
2007a:35).
In summary, the City of Surrey is bringing together key players in an effort to
develop multi-agency partnerships and strategies to reduce crime. The Crime Reduction
Strategy addresses housing and homelessness issues, drug addictions and treatment,
prolific offenders, and crime “hot spots” through recommendations for the development
of new roles and partne rships. Drug Action Teams, Prolific Offender Target Teams, and
Community Support Teams will target drug-using offenders caught in the crime cycle
with an aim of rehabilitating and reintegrating them into the community. The Crime
Reduction Strategy Manager position and the recommendation for Community Safety
Officers are ways to branch out the duties of policing in reducing crime. The crime
reduction strategies in the United Kingdom and Canada are very comprehensive and

35

include many partnerships. Explana tions for the developments of such partnerships will
be discussed in the next chapter.

36

Chapter 3: Explanations for Governance through
Partnerships
Over the past forty years there has been a significant change in how we govern
and view crime. These cha nges are apparent in all sectors of the Criminal Justice System
because crime has become an established part of society. Although the government
sector of policing has not had any radical changes, policing has still shifted over the
years. For example, community policing, crime prevention, crime reduction and
partnership work emerged and have all had roles in this shift. An overview of the
changes that have occurred in general throughout the government and Criminal Justice
System in Canada and the United Kingdom will be outlined followed by a closer look at
the policing sector, as well as how one accounts for such changes.
Garland (2000) and Rose (2000) claim there have been a series of transformations
in official perceptions of crime, in criminological discourse, in modes of governmental
action and in the structure of criminal justice organizations. Garland (1996) discusses the
new criminologies of everyday life which are made up of a set of theoretical frameworks
including rational choice theory, routine activities theory, crime as opportunity and
situational crime prevention theory. These theories are based on the idea that crime is a
normal part of society and, as a result, a new collective experience of crime will
inevitably emerge.
The primary purpose of the government is the welfare of the population, the
improvement of its condition, and the increase of its wealth (Foucault, 1991). In order to
meet this objective to the best of its ability, the government has shifted dramatically over
the past few decades from a welfare state to a neo- liberal government. With regard to the
37

Criminal Justice System specifically, crime and punishment have undergone a marked
change. Garland (1996) suggests that as the “war against crime” campaign slowly fades,
there is a decrease in the overall commitment towards a penal welfare strategy. Instead,
the effects of crime-costs, victims, and fearful citizens became the focus. This shift is
described as a transition from being causes-oriented to effects-oriented. Hughes and
Edwards states five broad reasons for what they refer to as “the crisis of the welfare-penal
complex”:
?
?
?
?

The increasing rate of recorded crime and the numbers of people passing through
the different parts of the system, despite the growing affluence and the welfare
state;
Overload combined with a crisis of efficiency (e.g. the declining clear-up rates of
the police, overloaded courts and the overcrowding of prisons);
A growing awareness of extensive social and economic costs of crime; and
The increasing recognition that formal processes of criminal justice (i.e.
detection, apprehension, prosecution, sentencing and punishment of offenders)
have only a limited effect on controlling crime. (2005:17)

According to Foucault (1991), the problems of government are how to govern
oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom people will accept being
governed, and how to be the best possible governor. Rhodes provides a useful definition
of governance:
Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process
of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which
society is governed. (1995; as cited in Crawford, 1999:3, original emphasis)

Active state involvement is the welfare state approach to governing and it has the
mentality of taking care of everyone it governs and any associated social problems
(Garland, 1996). Many writers, however, have questioned the effectiveness of the
welfare state in governing crime (Bright, 1991; Capobianco, 2005; Crawford, 1998b,
1999; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Rose, 2000; Scott, 2005). There has been a loss of
confidence in welfare states approaches to crime and public concern has remained high.

38

The present neo- liberal approach focuses on responsibilization. In contrast to the
welfare state approach, the government does not solve everyone’s problems for them and
does not lead society to believe that it is able to cure the social problem of crime.
Garland (1996) refers to this new way of governing crime problems as the
‘responsibilization strategy’ where the public takes responsibility for its own security.
Consequently, with a shift from the welfare state to neo-liberalism, government
objectives and tactics change. The government needs to employ tactics rather than laws
because goals are no longer being achieved through law and a true understanding of how
one is governing is to examine the tactics used (Foucault, 1991; O’Malley, 1992). As a
result, neo-liberalism uses the strategic approach of involving and empowering families,
communities, and other institutions to address many social problems and to take more
responsibility for crime control. This adaptive state strategy can be described as
governing-at-a-distance (Rose, 2000). Rogers says that “others must be made aware that
they too have a responsibility in this regard, and have to be persuaded to change their
practices in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase formal controls” (2006:7).
In the United Kingdom there has been a movement from ‘crime prevention’ to
‘community safety’. The Home Office points out :
The term crime prevention is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the
view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term
community safety is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater
participation from all sections of the community. (1991; as cited in Rogers,
2006:4)

Throughout this shift in governance the government becomes a facilitator opposed
to a provider. This new role means that the government has to withdraw as the main
provider for security and crime control. In part this is due to the monopolizing tendencies
of the state apparatus (Garland, 1996). Herman Goldstein states that, “we must restore a

39

balance between citizen and police responsibilities that reflects a more accurate
assessment of actual capacities and acknowledges that effective social control cannot
possibly be achieved by hired hands alone” (cited in Sheptycki, 1998:492). In other
words, the government does not want to give up its role as state protector, but at the same
time, it has prove n to be incapable of carrying out the tasks that they were once in charge
of on their own.
Although there has been a shift from a welfare state to a neo- liberal state, in many
ways, the two forms of governance are occurring simultaneously in the area of crime
control (Braithwaite, 2000). On the one hand we have three strikes and you are out,
mandatory minimum sentencing laws, parole release restrictions, no frills prisons,
corporal punishment, boot camps, super maximum prisons, zero tolerance policies, and
community notification laws and pedophile registers (Rose, 2000). On the other hand we
have prevention and partnership as well as rehabilitation (Braithwaite, 2000).
There has been a new penology of actuarial decision making and public private
partnerships. Braithwaite states that there has been “a shift from reactive, punishmentbased systems of justice to proactive, preventive ones whose practices are consistent with
the principles of restoration, reparation and mediation. ” (2000; as cited in Johnston,
2001:974). This is evident in the emergence of programs such as restorative justice and
victim services, which focus on the effects of crime instead of the causes as discussed
earlier. Stenning and Shearing (1980) noted that in the late 1970s a ‘quiet revolution’ had
undermined the centrality of state-centered policing. In the late 18th century, policing
gradually changed its role into one concerned with the ma intenance of public order, riot
control, and crime prevention (Sheptycki, 1998).

40

There is a new view of policing as a ‘service’ and a redesignation of the
community as ‘consumers’. Bayley and Shearing (1996) report that some departments
treat the public like customers and measure performance by surveys of public satisfaction
instead of only by the number of crimes and arrests. Crawford notes that “the
‘community’ and public, previously defined as recipients of a service – a conception
supported and extended by the establishment of the welfare state – more recently have
been called upon, in various different ways, to join the ‘fight against crime’” (1999:265).
Rogers states, “by holding out the belief that the police alone can solve the problem of
crime, this may serve to undermine the fact that the police need the support and trust of
the local public and other agencies” (2006:158).
Since the duties of policing have been distributed across a range of institutions,
policing became pluralized and continues to pluralize. Shearing offers an understanding
of the process of pluralization of police:
We are witnessing what Rose (1996) terms ‘the death of the social’: whereas
governance was once conducted through and for a social sphere, we are presently
seeing an expansion of political power beyond the state, in which non-state
agencies govern expanses of formerly social space with a view to securing
community interests. (2000:392)

The police redefine themselves as a facilitator rather than a provider. Crawfo rd (2006)
describes the state as performing ‘steering’ functions while leaving the ‘rowing’ to
others. Similarly, Johnston and Shearing (2003) refer to the government separating
functions into ‘establishing’ and ‘implementing’ their standards.
Johnston (2005) describes the challenges to police sovereignty. Four models of
security governance are proposed by Johnston:
… that police should maintain the governing status quo, doing more street level
policing but doing it more effectively; that police should accept the reality of
pluralization but, having done so, should secure oversight of its coordination and

41

regulation; that police should compete with commercial and municipal providers
in order to secure ‘in house’ governance of street-level policing; and that police
should accept pluralization, devolve certain functions to the private sector and
concede on any automatic claim to sovereignty. (2005:242-243)

Five driving forces behind the restructuring under private and government support
are listed by Ba yley and Shearing (1996). These forces consist of fear of crime, inability
of the government to satisfy society’s longing for security, cultural individualism, the
commodification of security, and the rise of mass private property. Bayley and Shearing
(1996) define this shift or change as being due to two developments; the pluralizing of
policing and the search by the public police for an appropriate role. Johnston argues:
People’s knowledge of crime and experiences of fear are embedded in local
social relations and inscribed within routine acts of (self)-governance. This
suggests two things: that an understanding of fear of crime demands an analysis
of local issues other than crime; and that any solution to the governance of crime
– particularly under present-day conditions where the provision of security is
highly diversified – will demand a consideration of non-state modes of
governance, including citizen-based ones. (2001:959)

The police are no longer considered the experts on policing issues because the
area has expanded by becoming very broad in nature (Crawford, 1998b, 1999; Harris,
2003; Millie and Erol, 2006). Braithwaithe (2000) found that business regulatory
agencies grew to be more significant law enforcers than the police with at least twice as
many private police, such as hired security, as public police in Canada and the United
Kingdom. Malm et al. reported that security companies “have begun to act in matters
such as investigating corporate fraud, preventing computer crime and conducting forensic
analyses that have traditionally been done by public police” (2005:3). There is a
recognition that crime is too extensive and complex to be dealt with solely by the police;
therefore, they are disseminating some of their duties to other control providers. Over the

42

past fifteen years, governments have gone beyond passive acceptance to active
encouragement of commercial private security (Bayley and Shearing, 1996).
Since WWII, private security is seen as a necessary addition to the public police.
Private security uses the approach of prevention rather than the public police approach of
detection and punishment. The police now look at similar approaches to those of private
security (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). Bayley and Shearing (1996) have observed that it
is now popular with the public and the police to encourage volunteers to do “police
work”.
Bayley and Shearing (1996) describe how the police currently share their work in
other ways. First of all, they sell their protective services, such as charging fees for
covering rock concerts and being hired as private security guards. Secondly, civilians
and police auxiliaries share responsibilities with public policing. For example, auxiliaries
serve without pay and weapons, but they are very similar in appearance as the police.
Also, work traditionally performed by uniformed officers is being given to civilian
employees in areas such as dispatch, forensics, records, victim services, volunteer
coordination, crime prevention classes, and secur ity inspections of premises.
Many police departments have reduced their activities in licensing bars, enforcing
parking violations, organizing neighbourhood watches, and advising property owners
about home security measures (Bullock et al., 2006). As a result, these activities have
been given to the private sector, the community, volunteers, and government ministries to
employ and to establish partnerships in an effort to reduce crime (Griffiths, Parent, &
Whitelaw, 2001). Shearing observes that “t his has reshaped states, from states conceived
of governance largely in terms of direct provision, to what Braithwaite (2000) has termed

43

"regulatory states" that prefer to steer while leaving much of the rowing of governance to
others” (2004:197-198).
Under the Crime and Disorder Act in the United Kingdom “non-specialized state
agents (such as education, health and housing departments), commercial organizations,
voluntary bodies and ‘responsible citizens’, have a collective duty to work alongside the
specialized police organizations in pursuit of security goals” (Johnston and Shearing,
2003:70). Bullock, Erol, and Tilley state “more recently, in the U.K., the term ‘problemoriented partnership’ has come to be preferred by many to ‘problem-oriented policing’”
(2006:7-8). Crawford discusses the potential benefits of these “new horizontal relations
that cut across traditional hierarchies” as:
[A] fundamental shift in the way we govern crime and its prevention . . . afford
the potential to encourage a stronger and more participatory civil society and
challenge many of the modernist assumptions about professional expertise,
specialisation, state paternalism and monopoly. (1998; as cited in Crawford,
2006:460)

Capobianco summarizes the recent shift in governing accordingly:
The traditional model of government agencies administering education, health,
social service, security, environment and criminal justice programmes in
isolation from each other is giving way to increased collaboration within
departments, between agencies, between levels of governments and between
public, private, and nonprofit sectors. As governments continue to face more
complex problems, and citizens expect more, the way in which government
delivers services and results, is changing to a more ‘joined-up’ and multipartnership approach. (2005:5)

Garland clarifies that “this arrangement does not necessarily mean that the State
offloads the responsibility for public safety to citizens, but rather, engages other actors
such as businesses, local authorities, and community based organizations in local crime
prevention efforts” (1996, 2001; as cited in Capobianco, 2005:5). Gilling states “the
promotion of partnerships has allowed government to avoid economically damaging
allegations of the state over-reaching itself, and overstating its competence, whilst
44

cleverly facilitating the corollary of this, namely, the off- loading of responsibility for
crime and security on to others” (2005:743). Power discusses how the new methods in
crime control include the requirement of statutory partnerships at the local level, audits,
contracts, and performance indicators and that these techniques “allow those that ‘steer’
to monitor and correct the activities of those that ‘row’” (1997; as cited in Crawford,
1998b:253). Sansfaçon argues that “the responsibility devolved to local authorities can
mean a loss of sovereignty by the central government and a tendency toward
communitarianism instead of the traditional top-down approach to equal justice”
(2004:11). Sansfaçon implies that this may also be a new way or technique for the state
to ensure its presence at the local level. Crawford asserts that this new technique does
not imply a withdrawal of the state. Crawford states “the British state is engaged in
ambitious projects of social engineering in which the deployment of hierarchy, command
and interventionism are prevalent” (1999:449). Sansfaçon balances these observations
when he states “the point is not so much the offloading by the State but rather the
decentering of the ways standards are set, which was formerly done exclusively from the
top down” (2004:12). Crawford observes:
[T]he trends are not merely upward (to the nation state or even supra-national
state) or downward (to localities, communities, and consumers), but also outward
into the new policy networks of ‘partnerships’ which are increasingly refiguring
relations between centre and periphery in the criminal justice complex.
(Crawford, 1999:223, original emphasis)

Crawford uses a boat analogy when discussing crime prevention and partnership
policies at the local level under the U.K. system of governance. He comments:
For if these institutions occupy merely a ‘rowing’ function, this would appear to
fly in the face of government rhetoric about the importance of ‘local ownership’
and the elaboration of a ‘local vision’. What, therefore, is the policymaking role
of local community safety partnerships? Are they merely rowing a boat, the
direction of which is set by others, or are they themselves in charge of the
direction? There seems to be a crucial tension between local control and central

45

steering which government has not addressed. Even if steering is conceived of as
only a limited process of setting boundaries within which local initiatives must
operate, then the question remains: how constraining are these boundaries to be?
(1998b:255)

In summary, there are a number of explanations for the move to “partnerships” or
“pluralizing” of police in Canada: (1) the shift from a welfare state to a neo- liberal state,
(2) the loss of faith in the Criminal Justice System, (3) the end of the police monopoly
over crime control, (4) the managerialism of policing and the consumerization of the
public, and (5) the rise in mass private property. As a result, governing-at-a-distance and
responsibilization strategies developed. One of the governance tactics has been an
emphasis on partnerships in an effort to address crime.
In order to link together the gathered literature on partnerships in the United
Kingdom and Canada along with the explanations for these partnerships, the following
themes will be addressed in the next chapter: (1) differences in government structure and
legislation, (2) implementation and delivery of a crime reduction model, and (3)
limitations and go vernance issues, such as accountability systems, blurring boundaries,
and the offloading of responsibilities.

46

Chapter 4: Discussion and Analysis
There are differences between the United Kingdom and Canada which should be
addressed before implementing the British model in Canada. First, the government
structure in the United Kingdom is different than the structure in Canada. Second,
legislation, policy, and regulation are more evident in the United Kingdom. Third, the
program concept is being driven in a bottom-up fashion in British Columbia, primarily by
policing and City officials. In other jurisdictions where similar programs have been
implemented, such as in the United Kingdom, the process was driven from the top-down.
In addition to these three challenges, multi-agency partnerships in any country will
encounter difficulties in the partnership work itself.

a. Government Structures and Legislation
While both the U.K. and Canada are parliamentary democracies, there are some
differences in the structure and responsibilities of local government. The Criminal
Justice System in England and Wales has the Home Office to deal with issues relating to
criminal law, the police, prisons, and probation. There are twenty government offices for
the nine English regions, but these are not separate decision and policy making bodies
from central governments. In contrast, the responsibility of Canada’s Criminal Justice
System and social services are divided between the federal, provincial, and municipal
government.
The social service structure in the U.K. is different from Canada in that the central
government is responsible for social housing and drug treatment options. Therefore, the
central government is able to make health and housing authorities assist in crime
47

reduction initiatives and partnerships. The governing body is common for all of these
areas whereas in Canada emergency housing and local drug treatment services fall under
either provincial government level responsibility, or non-profit, non- governmental
responsibility, or are often privately owned.
In the U.K., at the municipal level, there is ‘local government’ or ‘local
authorities’. Each municipality has either an elected mayor or a council leader.
Councilors represent a ‘ward’ usually comprising forty thousand people although the size
of wards varies. The U.K. is divided into count ies, districts, cities, boroughs, and wards.
In an area with a high population, a local authority could have sixty or more councilors.
Therefore, there are many more councilors with responsibility for local affairs than in
Canada. This means that crime reduction strategies are the mandate of many more local
officials in the United Kingdom. This results in more crime reduction work being
implemented locally and more people to share the responsibility and workload.
The difference in government structure as well as legislation in the United
Kingdom and Canada may pose a challenge in the level of success of crime reduction
strategies in Canadian municipalities. In the United Kingdom, crime reduction is a
funded and legislated government vision to deal with crime issues, and the model offers a
different way of governance. The model consists of legislated multi-agency partnerships
where specific crime reduction targets are set out and followed because the partners are
held accountable and the outcomes of the strategies are measured and sustained. In the
United Kingdom, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 acts as a driver for agencies to work
together on crime problems. Unlike the U.K., Canada has not legislated the requirement

48

of certain agencies to cooperate with the police and city officials in reducing crime. This
raises the question of what is driving agencies in British Columbia.

b. Implementation and Delivery
The implementation of crime reduction in Canada will not be about requiring
local government to deliver a major new service or to take on substantial new burdens
because unlike the United Kingdom, Canada has not legislated such action into existence.
Therefore, the crime reduction initiative, at least in its initial phase, will have to be
launched on the good will, commitment, and vision of agency leaders who can see its
potential. This is likely to look differently in every municipality.
While the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy states that all of the strategies
will be monitored, evaluated, and shared with the public, what kind of accountability will
be built into the Canadian model to ensure agencies within the partnerships remain
accountable to each other and to the strategy itself? Also, what happens if an agency,
whose participation is necessary in order to implement a strategy to its fullest potential,
does not wish to participate in the process? Without legislation gove rning partnerships, it
may be impossible to ensure complete commitment or to acquire secure accountability
systems. This raises the issue of whether these new crime reduction strategies will unfold
any differently than crime prevention initiatives in the past. For instance, it is possible
that once the initial enthusiasm for such an elaborate initiative fades, partners will simply
view it as just another committee they are a part of with the occasional meeting to attend
and only do a minimal amount of work when time allows on top of their regular duties.
The extent of sustainable public safety initiatives in British Columbia
municipalities has been limited. For example, currently, there is little accountability and

49

respect for existing crime prevention initiatives because many of them offer few
measurable outcomes. In comparison to the United Kingdom, Canada has not done crime
prevention very well. Therefore, it needs to be asked if current crime prevention
initiatives are productive in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. Are the resources being put
towards these initiatives worth it? Are the effectiveness of programs being properly
measured? While the Home Office in the U.K. is responsible for a sophisticated crime
reduction model that provides direction at the local level, there is no set model or strategy
for crime prevention programs carried out in police departments throughout Canada.
Perhaps the crime reduction and partnership model will assist British Columbia in
changing the current trend and getting past the failures of programs and partnerships
whose effectiveness is not being measured.
In the past, Canada has seen partnership work result in minute effectiveness
through community policing and crime prevention. Partnerships encompassed within
community policing and crime prevention have simply involved organizational
rearrangement and re-articulation, short-term projects, ‘lip-service’, public relations, very
little resources, programs not being monitored or evaluated, and more of a philosophy
than actual practice. It appears that consumerism accountability structures, such as
targets, audits, performance indicators, and community surveys, are in place in the U.K.
as a means to getting past the stigma that community policing, crime prevention
initiatives, and partnerships have created in the past. In order to increase efficiency and
effectiveness, a strong focus on community accountability, monitoring, and evaluation
have been modeled in the U.K. For British Columbia, an advantage is that it has had the

50

opportunity to study the U.K. model and learn from its challenges and successes; thus,
adapting best practices in accountability to fit a Canadian context.
The effort and research the City of Surrey has put into studying the U.K. model is
likely to result in some crime reduction strategies and methods working in Surrey.
Consequently, this provides Surrey with the potential to set the model for the rest of the
province and possibly the country. Surrey has asked the following necessary questions:
is it plausible, is it practical, has it worked elsewhere, would it work here, and is the
context right. It was in England that the institution of policing developed and had a
major effect upon Canadian policing. Similarly, the RCMP is utilizing best practices in
crime reduction found in the United Kingdom. It is apparent that the RCMP is moving
towards a crime reduction model with a focus on partnerships in an effort to become
more effective and to deal with the fact that police resources are limited while police
work is becoming more complex. While there have been advancements in technology
and techniques in policing, these cannot substitute for the effects of partnership building
at the local level. Effective partnership work at the national, regional, and local level as
well as between public, private, and voluntary sectors is the ideal approach in addressing
crime issues.
Crime reduction in British Columbia will have to recognize everyone’s role and
duties in reducing crime and would be a better coordinated approach to dealing with
crime issues than what is currently in place. Currently, agencies and organizations
operate in silos or independently with little meaningful partnership work in place. If the
recommendations proposed within the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy take
place, other outside partners, such as probation service, crown counsel, health services,

51

and many others, must also change their current practices in order to bring about this
change. Major changes in the alignment of federal and provincial ministries in their
responsibilities and in their relationships with one another are required in order to
establish a system that supports reforms that will truly reduce crime and disorder in
Canada. For example, leadership within the Ministry of the Solicitor General, the
Ministry of the Attorney General, Health Canada, and the Ministry of Children and
Families will be necessary. If the recommendations in the City of Surrey CRS are
implemented, they will require a restructuring of the justice system in some ways.
However, it appears that a bottom- up approach is necessary to demonstrate the benefits of
multi-agency work in order to gain support at a more strategic level.
The fact that the partnerships and the Crime Reduction Strategy in Surrey are
being delivered in a bottom-up process opposed to a federally legislated top-down
approach might prove to be more effective in the long-run. The U.K.’s top-down crime
reduction model approach involved a significant amount of funding and new legislation
and was led by a higher level of government. The large-scale nature of the U.K. model
has been described as possibly contributing to some of the difficulties encountered at the
local level. These challenges were outlined earlier in the paper: (1) information and
resource sharing, (2) accountability, (3) local partnerships, (4) roles and responsibilities,
and (5) value conflicts and power differentials. British Columbia is starting off slower
and smaller through detachment commanders and city officials at the municipal level
which might be a more appropriate way of unfolding crime reduction strategies since
crime issues need to be understood at the ground level in their local contexts. However,
while it seems to make sense that municipalities decide on their own crime reduction

52

strategies in order for them to be specific to their criminal justice environment and
community, it can also be viewed as a government tactic to shift responsibility to others.
As a result, the government is not directly blamed for any failures.
Police agencies have had to employ an array of responsibilization strategies in
order to effectively deal with allotted resources, demands from the public, and political
changes within the government. It is no longer possible for the government to solely and
properly govern all members of society. Society is too culturally and politically diverse
for population management to take place in democratic countries. Also, it would be
difficult to try to remove the power from the public that the governme nt has gradually
delegated to them over the past thirty to forty years. The future is likely to continue with
the government ‘steering’ and employing responsibilization strategies while allowing
other control providers to do the ‘rowing’.
The City of Surrey and the police are aware of the limitations of the justice
system in preventing and deterring crime as well as the breakdown of society. The Crime
Reduction Strategy is an attempt to change its service delivery through partnerships and
more effective tactics. Over the past forty years policing went from traditional reactive
policing and command and control to crime prevention and community-based policing
(Garland 1996; 2000). Crime reduction strategies might represent the next paradigm shift
in policing governance and act as a revolutionary change, or alternatively, they might
simply be a change in emphasis along the continuum of crime control. Crime reduction
strategies, based on partnerships represent a balanced approach to governing crime.
Partnerships play an important part in recent trends and developments in the local
governance of crime and personal security. The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy

53

emphasizes the notion that there is a collective duty within society to tackle crime and to
embed crime prevention into all occupations.

c. Governance Issues
While the responsibilization of non-state agencies through multi-agency
partnerships has the advantage of having more watchers, Garland (1996) reminds us that
implementing social and situational forms of crime prevention involve the reordering of
conduct in the everyday life of the public and some members of the public are not ready
for such changes. The challenges of roles and responsibilities, power differentials, and
accountability structures in building partnerships, show that there are limitations in
maintaining them.
This raises questions about how the City of Surrey will address roles and
responsibilities, power differentials, accountability structures, and information sharing
protocol issues that are so vital to partnerships in its crime reduction strategy. Many
obstacles and delays in the delivery of crime reduction strategies occur as a result of
problems within partnerships. The United Kingdom ran into several partnership
problems during its Crime Reduction Program. The City of Surrey will have to address
problems in implementing a Crime Reduction Strategy.
Governments have found a way to be more involved in crime issues at the local
level but have they offloaded too much of the responsibility for crime reduction to their
partners. While the U.K. claims to devolve the decision making powers and details of
crime reduction strategies to the local level, in reality the Home Office still has control of
the process by ensuring performance targets, performance indicators, assessments,
evaluations, and legislated partnerships are in place. This can be considered an effective

54

oversight mechanism because of the failures and ineffectiveness of crime prevention
programs and initiative s in the past. Also, the U.K. Home Office invested a great deal of
money into their crime reduction work; therefore, they could not risk leaving it all in the
hands of practitioners or partners at the local level. The government in the United
Kingdom found a way to become more involved at the local level where the ground work
takes place.
Through an elaborate level of partnership work demonstrated in the U.K. along
with what Surrey is similarly trying to implement, “boundary blurring” (Crawford 1998b;
Harris, 2003) seems to automatically take place between agencies and organizations
especially if roles and responsibilities have not been clearly defined. Multi-agency work
on initiatives causes confusion as to who is responsible for the outcomes if they are not
successful. For example, partnerships between the police and education departments can
become difficult when parties within the partnership are not completely clear about one
another’s roles. In addition, it causes confusion for the people accessing the services.
Also, the wrap-around strategy which ensures offenders receive treatment and aftercare
throughout their time in the Criminal Justice System and afterwards requires very close
work and information sharing between many agencies and organizations. Due to the
sophistication of such a strategy, the roles and responsibilities of agencies can easily
become blurred. If an offender falls through the cracks, will the blame fall on the police,
drug treatment workers, probation, housing, or another agency? This raises the issue of
whether the blame can be shared, and if so, what does this really mean. Boundary
blurring can be described as a governance tactic because it seems to be a form of
offloading by the Criminal Justice System. For instance, even though the municipal

55

levels of government are involved in crime reduction strategies and have one of the lead
roles, they are outnumbered by the amount of private, non-profit, and other government
agencies involved in the crime reduction strategies.
The creation of new roles such as community safety managers, community safety
officers, traffic wardens, and neighbourhood wardens, are all examples of the sharing of
work that was once considered to be the sole responsibility of the police. Also, the
dispersal of the appearance of more watchers by means of similar uniforms is present.
This has resulted in the pluralizing of policing and government regulation. Some of these
positions report to the local authorities, rather than only to the police. In the future, areas
of crime control that fall under the responsibility of these new roles will be less and less
perceived as duties falling within police jurisdiction. It would be difficult for the police
to ever get their power and responsibility back once it has been dispersed across several
new roles under different supervision. On the other hand, this form of two-tiered
policing, where the police deal with more complex crime issues and devolve the less
complex duties to other auspices may serve to be more efficient and effective in terms of
resources, public satisfaction, and outcomes.
The police often dominate meetings, agendas, and strategies (Gilling, 1993;
Harris, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Millie and Erol, 2006; Phillips et al., 2002;
Rogers, 2006); however, a consideration is whether initiatives would actually get off the
ground without their lead. While the police may not be considered the sole experts on
crime issues anymore, they certainly still have the knowledge of what has worked and not
worked in the past and what is feasible with existing resources. Also, some major
initiatives, such as the programs and teams created to deal with prolific offenders, require

56

the police to take a lead role while engaging other partners in the process. The City of
Surrey CRS provides some focus for agency roles by dividing the goal of tackling crime
into four strands. These four strands have specific strategies and involve the specifics of
how partners will need to participate in order to successfully reach the objectives of the
overall strategy. The U.K. Prolific and Priority Offender scheme had similar strands in
effect.
In summary, partnerships will experience many challenges in multi-agency work.
These challenges are differences in government structure, legislation, implementation and
delivery of a crime reduction model, governance issues surrounding accountability
systems, blurring boundaries, and the offloading of responsibilities. Being aware of such
obstacles from the onset and putting systems in place to deal with these issues may be the
only feasible option when setting up successful crime reduction partnerships and
strategies.

57

Chapter 5: Conclusion
Multi-agency partnerships are on the rise as a result of the limitations of the
Criminal Justice System in many democratic countries. It is evident that these
partnership approaches have become the current trend in governance as more countries
develop crime reduction strategies which entail strong partnership components. There
are two dominant views regarding the intentions of the government in encouraging multiagency partnership work at the local level. First, the government is becoming more
involved at the local level by way of devolving decision- making authority to city officials
and the police. The reasons presented for this view include the fact that audits, targets,
and performance indicators are part of the U.K. crime reduction model at the local level
which are systems that are monitored and evaluated by a higher level of government.
Second, these partnerships are simply another government technique to offload
responsibility on to others in an effort to no longer be held responsible for failures of the
welfare of the population and society.
While it is apparent that all emerging methods for dealing with crime issues will
have obstacles, it appears that difficulties within partnerships themselves serve as the
primary obstacle in crime reduction work. These obstacles include information sharing,
accountability systems, roles and responsibilities, value conflicts, and power differentials.
In addition, other factors to take into consideration while adapting a model being used
elsewhere are differences in government structures, legislation, and delivery of a crime
reduction strategy, such as who the stakeholders and partners will be, who will create and
implement the strategy, and who will lead the initiative.

58

The lack of evidence-based literature on Canadian public safety initiatives along
with the non-existent crime reduction literature in our country calls for practical research
to be done in this area. It would be useful to see what the views of the multi-agency
partnership approach are from partners apart from the police and city officials once the
delivery of the strategies are underway. This analysis could be conducted through
surveys and interviews. Also, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all of the
conflict issues that arise in multi-agency partnerships, it would be useful to cover
additional themes as well as examine the themes presented in this paper in further depth.
Other themes include decision- making processes, overcoming communication barriers,
and ensuring a sufficient amount of time to develop relationships before forming
partnerships. Another important theme would be productivity within partnerships.
Working in partnerships can be labour and time intensive due to frequent meetings to
discuss projects and progress with the result that participants can feel that they are
managing a process of working together rather than accomplishing targets and goals.
Since the City of Surrey is the first Canadian municipality to create a formal
Crime Reduction Strategy, there is no other available research to draw comparisons from
in Canada. While some RCMP detachments are incorporating crime reduction strategies
into their work, these cannot yet be compared to the detailed and comprehensive strategy
that the City of Surrey has presented and is beginning to work towards. If other
municipalities follow the lead of Surrey, comparisons may be possible in the future.
Once outcomes and evaluations have taken place for the City of Surrey CRS, it is
recommended that a review of the partnerships be part of future analysis. In addition, it
would be beneficial to evaluate the long-term outcomes of the Crime Reduction Strategy.

59

While the United Kingdom has made substantial progress in reducing crime since
implementing the crime reduction model in the mid-1990’s, future research examining
crime reduction partnership literature in other commonwealth countries, such as the
United States, New Zealand, and Australia, is necessary. It is likely that partnerships in
these countries face similar challenges and successes in crime reduction partnership
work. Although many areas may have good crime reduction strategies in place there will
be problems throughout the implementation and delivery stages of the initiatives if the
issues are not addressed.

60

References
Bayley, D., & Shearing, C. (1996). The future of policing. Law and Society Review,
30(3), 585-607.
Bellett, G. (2007, February 27). Surrey takes dead aim at crime. The Vancouver Sun,
p. B1 & B8.
Braithwaite, J.R. (2000). The new regulatory state and the transformation of
criminology. British Journal of Criminology, 40(2), 222-238.
Bright, J. (1991). Crime prevention: The British experience. In Stenson, K., and Cowell,
D. (Eds.), The Politics of Crime Control (pp. 62-86). London: Sage.
Bullock, K., Erol, R., & Tilley, N. (2006). Problem-oriented policing and partnerships:
Implementing an evidence-based approach to crime reduction. Cullompton, UK:
Willan.
Bullock, K., Farrell, G. & Tilley, N. (2002). Funding and implementing crime reduction.
Retrieved November 6, 2006, from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/
rdsolr1002.pdf
Burgess, R. (2003). Disrupting crack markets: A practice guide. Retrieved November 6,
2006, from http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/drugsalcohol/ drugsalcohol70.htm
Capobianco, L. (2005). Sharpening the lens: Private sector involvement in crime
prevention. Retrieved January 15, 2007, from http://www.crime-preventionintl.org/ publications/pub_124_1.pdf
Chapman, B., & Niven, S. (2000). A guide to the criminal justice system in England and
Wales. Retrieved January 15, 2007, from http://www.homeoffice.gov. uk/rds/pdfs/
cjs2000.pdf
City of Surrey. (2007a). City of Surrey crime reduction strategy. Retrieved February 27,
2007, from http://www.surrey.ca/NR/rdonlyres/4D63836D-9691-44EA-939341320D92C105/33777/SurreyCrimeReductionStrategyweb.pdf
City of Surrey. (2007b). Surrey crime reduction strategy backgrounder. Retrieved
February 27,2007, from http://www.surrey.ca/Inside+City+Hall/
Your+Mayor+and+Council/ Crime+Reduction+Strategy.htm
Crawford, A. (2006). Networked governance and the post-regulatory state. Theoretical
Criminology, 10(4), 449-479.

61

Crawford, A. (1999). The local governance of crime: Appeals to community and
partnerships. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crawford, A. (1998a). Community safety and the quest for security: Holding back the
dynamics of social exclusion. Policy Studies, 19(3-4), 237-253.
Crawford, A. (1998b). Crime prevention and community safety: Politics, policies and
practices. Harlow: Longman.
Dawson, P. (2005). Early findings from the prolific and other priority offenders
evaluation. Retrieved October 1, 2006, from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/
dprpubs1.html
Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (Eds.),
The Foucault Effect (pp. 87-104). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Garland, D. (2000). The culture of high crime societies. British Journal of Criminology,
40(3), 347-375.
Garland, D. (1996). The limits of the sovereign state. British Journal of Criminology,
36(4), 445-471.
Gilling, D. (2005). Partnership and crime prevention. In Tilley, N. (Ed.), Handbook of
crime prevention and community safety (pp. 734-756). Cullompton, UK : Willan.
Gilling, D. (2000). Policing, crime prevention and partnerships. In Leishman, F.,
Loveday, B., & Savage, S. (Eds.), Core issues in policing 2/e (pp. 125-139).
Harlow: Longman.
Gilling, D. (1993). Crime prevention discourses and the multi-agency approach.
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 21, 145-157.
Gilling, D. & Barton, A. (1997). Crime prevention and community safety: a new home
for social policy? Critical Social Policy 52, 63-83.
Griffiths, C.T., Parent, R.B., & Whitelaw, B. (2001). Community policing in Canada.
Scarborough, ON: Nelson Thomas.
Harris, S. (2003). Inter-agency practice and professional collaboration: The case of drug
education and prevention. Journal of Education Policy, 18(3), 303-314.
Home Office. (2006). Reducing crime, the harm caused by drugs and anti-social
behaviour: Delivering PSA 1, PSA 4 and PSA 2: Partnership Assessment and
Delivery System (PADS): Guidance for partnerships. Retrieved July 10, 2006,
from http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/partnerships68.doc

62

Home Office. (2004). Prolific and other priority offender strategy, initial guidance, catch
and convict framework. Retrieved February, 28, 2007, from http://www.
crimereduction.gov.uk/ppo/ppo_e.doc
Home Office Crime Reduction Centre. (2003). Passport to crime reduction.
Retrieved July 10, 2006, from http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/learningzone/
passport_to_cr.htm
Homel, P., Nutley, S., Webb, B., & Tilley, N. (2004a). Making it happen from the centre:
Managing for the regional delivery of local crime reduction outcomes. Retrieved
November 6, 2006, from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/
rdsolr5404.pdf
Homel, P., Nutley, S., Webb, B., & Tilley, N. (2004b). Investing to deliver: Reviewing
the implementation of the UK crime reduction programme. Retrieved September
26, 2006, from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors281.pdf
Hope, T. (2005). The new local governance of community safety in England and Wales.
Canadian Journal of Criminology, 47(2), 369-387.
Hope, T. (2001). Community crime prevention in Britain: A strategic overview.
Criminal Justice, 1, 421-439.
Hough, M. & Tilley, N. (1998). Auditing crime and disorder: Guidance for local
partnerships. Retrieved November 6, 2006, from http://www.homeoffice.
gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fcdps91.pdf
Hughes, G. & Edwards, A. (2005). Crime prevention in context. In Tilley, N. (Ed.),
Handbook of crime prevention and community safety (pp. 14-34). Cullompton,
UK: Willan.
Hughes, G., & Gilling, D. (2004). Mission impossible? The habitus of the Community
Safety Manager and the new expertise in the local partnership governance of
crime and safety. Criminal Justice 4(2), 129-149.
Johnston, L. (2001). Crime, fear and civil policing. Urban Studies, 38(5-6), 959-976.
Johnston, L. & Shearing, C. (2003). Governing security. New York, NY: Routledge.
Keene, J., Rodriguez, J., & Badger, D. (2005). Mental health and criminal justice
partnerships: A case study from the substance misuse field. The Journal of
Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology,16(1), 1-10.
Laycock, G. & Webb, B. (2003). Conclusions: the role of the centre. In Bullock, K. &
Tilley, N. (Eds.), Crime reduction and problem-oriented policing (pp. 285-301).
Cullompton, UK: Willan.

63

Liddle, A.M. & Gelsthorpe, L.R. (1994). Inter-agency crime prevention: Organising
local delivery. Retrieved November 6, 2006, from http://www.homeoffice.
gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fcpu52.pdf
Maguire, M. (2004). The crime reduction programme in England and Wales: Reflections
of the vision and the reality. Criminal Justice, 4(3), 213-237.
Malm, A., Pollard, N., Brantingham, P., Tinsley, P., Plecas, D., Brantingham, P., Cohen,
& I., Kinney, B. (2005). A 30 year analysis of police service delivery and costing:
“E” division. Unpub lished.
Millie, A., & Erol, R. (2006). Rehabilitation and resettlement: A study of offender case
management in Birmingham, United Kingdom. International Journal of
Offender Therapy andComparative Criminology, 50(6), 691-710.
O’Malley, P. (1992). Risk, power and crime prevention. Economy and Society, 21(3),
253-275.
Phillips, C., Jacobson, J., Prime, R., Carter, M., & Considine, M. (2002). Crime and
disorder reduction partnerships: Round one. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
RCMP. (2006, Autumn). “E” division launches crime reduction initiative. Horse and
Rider Press, 1(2), 6.
Rogers, C. (2006). Crime reduction partnerships. New York, NY: Oxford.
Rose, N. (2000). Government and control. British Journal of Criminology, 40(2), 321339.
Sansfaçon, D. (2004). Of prevention and security: Reflections on sustainable governance.
Retrieved January 15, 2007, from http://www.crime-prevention- intl.org/
publications/pub_134_1.pdf
Scott, M.S. (2005). Shifting and sharing police responsibility to address public safety
problems. In Tilley, N. (Ed.), Handbook of crime prevention and community
safety (pp. 385-410). Cullompton, UK : Willan.
Shaw, M. (2006). Communities in action for crime prevention. Retrieved January 15,
2007, from http://www.crime-prevention- intl.org/publications/pub_174_1.pdf
Shaw, M. (2001). The role of local government in community safety. Retrieved January
15, 2007, from http://www.crime-prevention- intl.org/publications/pub_5_2.pdf
Shearing, C. (2004). Introduction: Diversity in policing: Multi-agency frameworks and
strategies in South Africa. Society in Transition,35(2), 197-203.

64

Shearing, C. (2000). A new beginning for policing. Journal of Law and Society, 27(3),
386-393.
Sheptycki, J.W.E. (1998). Policing, postmodernism and transnationalization. British
Journal of Criminology, 38(3), 485-503.
Skelton, C. (2007, February 27). Surrey takes dead aim at crime. The Vancouver Sun,
p. B1 & B8
Skelton, C. (2007, February 26). Surrey plans to attack crime. The Vancouver Sun, p. A1
& A2.
Stenning, P. & Shearing, C. (1980). The quiet revolution: The nature, development and
general legal implications of private policing in Canada. Criminal Law Quarterly,
22, 220-248.
Stenson, K., & Edwards, A. (2003). Crime control and local governance: The struggle for
sovereignty in advanced liberal polities. ContemporaryPolitics, 9(2), 203-217.
Stockdale, J.E., & Whitehead, C.M.E. (2003). Assessing cost-effectiveness. In Bullock,
K. & Tilley, N. (Eds.), Crime reduction and problem-oriented policing (pp. 217251). Devon, UK: Willan.
Tilley, N. (2005). Introduction: Thinking realistically about crime prevention. In Tilley,
N. (Ed.), Handbook of crime prevention and community safety (pp. 3-13).
Cullompton, UK : Willan.
Tilley, N. (2004). Applying theory-driven evaluation to the British crime reduction
programme: The theories of the programme and of its evaluations. Criminal
Justice, 4(3), 255-276.
United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction (2006). Retrieved July 17, 2006, from
http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk).
Worrall, A., Dunkerton, L., & Leacock, V. (2001/2002). Targeting and treatment? Do
prolific offender projects have a futur e? Criminal Justice Matters, 46, p. 22-23.

65