# CRIME REDUCTION AND LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH COLUMBIA

By

Sherry-Lynn Bot
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| **Name:** | Sherry-Lynn Bot |
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


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## Abstract

This paper explores the challenges of and the explanations for multi-agency partnerships in crime reduction work in the United Kingdom and Canada. It begins by reviewing the rise of crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom with a focus on legislation, programs, and strategies with partners. Partnerships at the local level, information sharing, accountability, roles and responsibilities, and value conflicts and power differentials in partnerships are additional themes in the paper. The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is provided as a Canadian example of multi-agency partnerships. An explanation for the rise of partnership work is also outlined in the paper. The differences in government structure, legislation, and delivery of a crime reduction model, accountability systems, blurring boundaries, and the offloading of responsibilities are discussed and analysed. The paper concludes by providing recommendations for further crime reduction and partnership studies.

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

The emergence of crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom and the recent development of similar multi-agency partnerships in Surrey, British Columbia will be the focus of this paper. Crime reduction in the United Kingdom is based on collaboration and commitment between agency leaders, city officials, and police at the local level. In the United Kingdom crime reduction model targets are identified, partners are held accountable, and strategies are evaluated. The aim of this comprehensive approach is to give some of the work of preventing and reducing crime a new focus across a wide range of local agency services. Crime reduction is a matter of putting crime and disorder considerations at the center of decision making for a wider range of agency leaders who will work in partnership with police (Rogers, 2006; United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction, 2006).

Essentially, the crime reduction model in the United Kingdom is made up of the following components: drug treatment, prolific offenders, youth programs, evidence-based research, partnerships, and integrated justice. The crime reduction model is broader in that it also encompasses education, employment, housing, offender management, and reintegration. Examples of crime reduction include a sophisticated drug strategy program, a prolific offender strategy, and certain crime prevention strategies. Multi-agency coordination in these strategies is needed in order to effectively and efficiently deal with crime and individuals involved in the crime cycle (Rogers, 2006; United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction, 2006).

If crime reduction continues to be implemented in Canada, it may require a fundamental shift within the Criminal Justice System, particularly at the local levels, and could eventually be viewed as a new paradigm that will require major changes in the way agencies and governments manage crime reduction. However, it is apparent from the disjointed approach that currently exists between agencies, such as health, education, corrections, courts, and police, that a change in governance is necessary (City of Surrey, 2007a).

This paper will be organized into five chapters consisting of an introduction, review of the literature, explanations for governance through partnerships, discussion and analysis of the literature, and conclusion. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on local partnerships and multi-agency work in the United Kingdom and Canada. It consists of the history and development of crime reduction in the United Kingdom and the challenges for partnership work, including: (1) information and resource sharing in partnerships, (2) accountability in partnerships, (3) partnerships at the local level, (4) roles and responsibilities in partnerships, and (5) value conflicts and power differentials in partnerships. Canada's partnership approach, specifically through the example of City of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy, will be included in the literature review.

Chapter 3 explains the emergence of partnerships and draws on the literature about governance strategies, community mobilization, and partnerships in the United Kingdom and Canada. The importance of inter-agency and multi-agency cooperation, key public partners, service providers, community involvement, and the private sector will also be included in this chapter.

Chapter 4 examines the importance of multi-agency cooperation in implementing crime reduction strategies as well as the extent to which the United Kingdom crime reduction model of partnerships can be applied at the local level in a Canadian context. Additional areas of discussion include the practicality of the current governance and responsibilization strategies in Canada and whether they need to be challenged and improved. Differences between the United Kingdom and Canada in legislation, government structures, and implementation and delivery will also be discussed. Chapter 5 brings together a summary of findings and recommendations and proposals for future research.

# Chapter 2: Review of the Literature

Prior to discussing the implementation of crime reduction strategies in the form of multi-agency partnerships in Canada, it is important to examine closely the studies and work previously conducted by others in the area of crime reduction partnerships. Therefore, the focus in this chapter will be on the partnership approaches being used in the United Kingdom. The below literature review is divided into sections which are intended to inform the reader about the theories and positions in the field of crime reduction with a focus on multi-agency partnership work.

## *Crime Reduction Partnerships in the United Kingdom*

There are several key pieces of legislation and government policies as well as publications that influenced crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom (U.K.), prior to the enactment of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA). While a full discussion on the U.K. policy context is not possible in this paper, the most significant pieces relating to multi-agency partnerships will be examined.

### a. Legislation and Policies for Partnerships

The Home Office Crime Reduction Centre (2003) is useful in summarizing the steps that led up to the Crime and Disorder Act. Partnership work has been officially advocated in the U.K. since the 1984 inter-departmental circular which encouraged the organization of multi-agency groups at the local level to tackle crime. In 1988 the Safer Cities program started and focused on specific problems and multi-agency projects in inner cities. In 1990 another circular as well as a booklet emphasizing partnerships in

crime prevention was issued. In 1991, the Morgan Report said that crime prevention work should be coordinated at the local level. According to the Morgan Report, structure, leadership, information, identity, durability, and resources were the six main elements that needed to be addressed along with providing the local authorities with statutory duty. The Morgan report presented the shift in language from 'crime prevention' to 'crime and disorder reduction' (Hughes and Gilling, 2004).

The significance of the Morgan Report is commonly referred to throughout the literature even though the Conservative government at the time did not implement the recommendations from the report (Crawford, 1999; Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Hughes and Edwards, 2005; Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Rogers, 2006). Instead, the recommendations of the Morgan Report were put forward in 1997 by the Labour government. The next significant step towards crime reduction and the partnership approach took place in 1998 with the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA). The CDA took into account the recommendations of the Morgan Report regarding local statutory responsibility along with multi-agency partnerships and audits (Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Rogers, 2006).

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created a framework for agencies to work together on locally-agreed targets. The 'responsible authorities' referred to in the CDA consist of the local government and the police. Health Services, known as Primary Care Trust in England, and Fire Services have since been added as responsible authorities when the CDA was amended by the Police Reform Act 2002 (Rogers, 2006). In partnership, these authorities have the responsibility for creating, implementing, and monitoring a crime reduction strategy. The CDA also states that any other state-led

person or authority has the duty to cooperate with these responsible authority partners in reducing crime. The CDA has had the impact of tying the government bodies together under the law (Rogers, 2006).

## b. The Development of Partnerships

As a result of the CDA, three-hundred-and-seventy-six Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) were created in England and Wales. The statutory partnerships in Wales were known as Community Safety Partnerships, but they were essentially the same as CDRPs in England. While the CDRPs were funded by the Home Office, they gave the lead responsibility for crime and disorder reduction to the police and local authorities which were set up in geographical areas and were considered to be the local government (Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003).

The CDRPs include investments in initiatives to improve prevention, sentencing, target hardening, work with offenders, and to tackle high volume crime. The Crime and Disorder Act created new powers, some of which are: anti-social behaviour orders, reparation orders, parenting orders, local curfew schemes, removal of truants, drug treatment and testing orders, and information sharing between agencies (Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Rogers, 2006). The structure of most CDRPs consist of a CDRP tasking, coordinating, and commissioning group with several specific task forces branching off of it to assist the process, such as street robberies working group, car crimes working group, and domestic burglary working group. Rogers explains that the tasking group "oversees the implementation of the strategic vision, making the aims and objectives a reality by liaising with the different task groups to ensure that the partnership's targets are attained" (2006:42). They adopt a joint problem solving

approach to tackling issues, such as drug misuse. In addition, community consultation is a requirement for the CDRPs as this information-sharing process helps the partnerships decide what priorities will guide their strategy (Rogers, 2006).

The CDA resulted in the formation of several other partnerships and boards most of which are multi-agency in order to meet the crime reduction objectives of the Home Office. While this list is not inclusive, some of these partnerships include Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs), Youth Justice Board (YJB), Youth Offending Teams (YOTs), Drug Action Teams (DATs), and Criminal Justice Intervention Teams (CJITs) (Rogers, 2006). These partnerships and boards will be summarized below in their related context.

A Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) is a single non-statutory, multi-agency body which matches local authority boundaries. Essentially, the role of the LSPs are overarching local coordination between the private, community, and voluntary sectors; delivering improved services and meeting government targets; and developing and delivering a community strategy and Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategies (Homel, Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004b).

Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs) were set up in 2003 and have a current count of forty-three boards across England. They are responsible for the justice system at the local level because they (1) increase offences brought to justice, (2) reduce ineffective trials, (3) improve timeliness in courts, (4) enforce fines, and (5) meet the young offender pledge. The young offender pledge is accelerating time from arrest to sentence for persistent young offenders (United Kingdom Government Crime Reduction, 2006).

The Youth Justice Board (YJB) was established by the Crime and Disorder Act. The YJB is a Home Office sponsored non-departmental public body which has the task of monitoring and coordinating the delivery of youth justice services for young people. Youth Offending Teams (YOTS) were also formed under the CDA. YOTS are multi-agency groups implementing and coordinating youth justice services at the local level. The Youth Justice Board and anyone working in the youth justice system have a statutory duty of preventing offending by youth (Chapman and Niven, 2000).

Drug Action Teams (DATs) are integrated with CDRPs and are responsible for the delivery of the drug strategy locally by commissioning services, monitoring progress, and communicating with stakeholders. Drug treatment services are often managed through a Drug Action Team partnership that provides treatment and other services for offenders with drug problems. Essentially, the DATs deliver on the ground treatment, assessments, and referrals (Millie and Erol, 2006).

The Home Office (2006) describes the Drug Interventions Program (DIP) as the key element of the strategy to tackle drug-related crime. It aims to prevent crime through early interventions as well as reduce crime levels by engaging the most problematic and prolific offenders. It offers offenders whose crimes are drug-related the support they need to break the cycle of drug misuse, offending behaviour, and custody.

The Drugs Act aims to increase the effectiveness of the DIP by getting more offenders into treatment as there is clear evidence that treatment works. For every one pound spent on treatment, at least 9.50 pounds is saved in criminal justice and health costs (Rogers, 2006). If tested positive in DIP, an offender is legally required to see a drugs worker, which is a huge legislative step forward. As a result, this legislation

increases the number of people in treatment since drug workers see people while they are still in custody. If the individual is not charged and is released, they go to a Criminal Justice Intervention Team (CJIT) which also has offices outside of prison. It is important to note that the Drug Strategy has a workforce development strategy to ensure that there are sufficiently trained drug workers to meet the demand for treatment (Millie and Erol, 2006).

Criminal Justice Intervention Teams (CJITs) facilitate delivery at the local level and are set up by the Drug Action Teams. CJITs deliver the DIP program in local areas by case managing clients in treatment from the point of arrest to sentence, as well as during their time in prison and upon release through aftercare. While the CJITs get them into treatment and deal with the services of the inter-agency work, an offender manager supervises the offender's process (Home Office, 2004).

### c. Expanding the Policing Family through Partnerships

Since the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998, in addition to the offender manager position, policing in the U.K. has become pluralized through partnerships and the creation of new positions. Hughes and Gilling claim that "this apparent redistribution – but actual 'dispersal' – of governmental competencies and responsibilities and the creation of new local actors – not least community safety managers – that play a role in crime control and safety policies is most developed in Britain" (2004:130). The crime reduction or community safety manager plays an important role in liaising with partnerships and developing policy and strategies. Hughes and Gilling describe the community safety manager as "one of the key new partnership experts" (2004:130). Stockdale and Whitehead recognize that "a project manager of

some sort is necessary for project implementation, as this person can devote themselves to the project rather than do it on top of existing duties" (2003:226).

While the community safety manager appears to be an important player in community safety and crime reduction, other positions have also been created in an effort to share the police workload. Community safety officers are part of what Rogers (2006) refers to as the 'extended policing family'. The Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) patrols and uses his or her powers to resolve order maintenance problems as well as assist the beat manager with assistance in dealing with minor instances of public disorder and anti-social problems. The purpose of these officers is "to provide visible and accessible uniformed presence and to engage with the public and as such they spend the majority of their time patrolling on foot and dealing with low-level antisocial behaviour" (Cooper et al., 2006; as cited in Bullock, Erol, & Tilley, 2006:128).

Another way policing has been pluralized in the U.K. is through neighbourhood wardens. They are uniformed and offer what Bullock et al. call a "semi-official presence" (2006:966). They do their security patrols in residential areas, but they also assist with environmental improvements, liaison with landlords and tenants, look after void properties, respond to minor instances of anti-social behaviour, and are an information source for the local authorities (Bullock et al., 2006; Johnston, 2001; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). In addition, Bullock et al. describe traffic wardens who enforce road traffic offences and issue fixed-penalty notices for certain other offences. Similar to neighbourhood wardens, traffic wardens supply the police with criminal and community intelligence through their visible presence in the community.

As in other countries, private security guards are used for extra services at pubs, concerts, and commercial property. In the U.K., private security guards are also used for prisoner escort and other custody duties assisting police officers (Bullock et al., 2006). In addition to the above listed control agents, Closed Circuit Televisions (CCTVs) are risk management techniques in the U.K. (Rose 2000). Building on what appears to already be taking place in the U.K., Gilling suggests:

> The police service may find it easier to manage its new-found responsibilities through a division of labour which may ultimately result in two-tier policing, where the police service seeks to manage serious crime, as now through a combination of prevention and detection, while a combination of other agencies, including local authority patrols and other bodies, private security organizations and the local community itself, take on the major responsibility for minor crimes and disorder. (2000:137)

## d. Programs and Strategies for Partnerships

Much of the current work taking place in the U.K. is based on the partnerships and positions mentioned above and initiatives that stem from the United Kingdom's Crime Reduction Program (CRP) which begun in 1998 ending in 2002. Chapman and Niven (2000) describe the program as being an evidence-based approach to crime reduction where resources are invested in initiatives that provide significant and sustained impacts on levels of crime. The Crime Reduction Program covers five general themes. The first theme is working with families, children, and schools to prevent young people from becoming future offenders. The second theme entails tackling high volume crime in communities. The development of products and systems which are more resistant to crime is the third theme. Lastly, more effective sentencing practices and working with offenders to ensure they do not re-offend are the remaining two themes (Bullock, Farrell, & Tilley, 2002; Chapman and Niven, 2000; Tilley, 2004).

A defining aspect of the U.K. crime reduction model is the Prolific and Priority Offender (PPO) scheme developed in 2004. It focuses resources on and targets the small minority of people that commit the most crime. The idea behind this scheme is that by targeting such people, this will bring down wider offending levels (Dawson, 2005; Home Office, 2004; Millie and Erol, 2006).

The PPO strategy is delivered at the local level by the police, but it is managed by the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. The PPO strategy requires multi-agency work between all agencies dealing with adult offenders. Also, since a PPO is not a legally defined term, the locality can determine their PPOs by deciding which individuals in their locality cause the most crime and disorder. The police National Intelligence Model (NIM) and a matrix system are used to make final decisions as to who is considered a PPO (Dawson, 2005; Home Office, 2004).

The partnerships are guided by three complementary strands that were developed for the PPO strategy:

1. Prevent and deter: stopping people, in particular young people, from becoming involved in offending behaviour and becoming prolific offenders.
2. Catch and convict: actively tackling adults who are already prolific offenders.
3. Rehabilitate and resettle: working with identified prolific adult offenders serving custodial or community-based sentences to stop re-offending by offering a range of support services postsentence, delivered through joint agency working. (Dawson, 2005; Home Office, 2004; Rogers, 2006)

Worrall, Dunkerton, and Leacock explain that the last two strands are delivered as a whole. The offender is given the choice to turn away from crime and rehabilitate or get caught and go to prison as "there is an agreed procedure for swift enforcement in the event of noncompliance or further offending (which requires the co-operation of courts)" (2001/2002:289).

The rehabilitate and resettle strand require the work of many agencies, including the police and drug treatment workers. However, The National Probation Service and the Prison Service are the main partners. The Home Office (2004c; as cited in Millie and Erol, 2006:696) states "the rehabilitate-and-resettle strand aimed to ensure that in every CDRP close partnership working is in place, with the result that seamless, effective case management is guaranteed for every PPO". This takes place through care plans and premium or wrap-around services. If an offender receives any training or treatment while in prison, this information is passed on to external support agencies once the offender is no longer in prison (Millie and Erol, 2006). Dawson (2005) explains how the multi-agency partnership work has results in an increase in data sharing which provides all agencies involved with a PPO with a complete picture of the offender since becoming involved with the justice system.

A challenge that has impeded the PPO strategy is insufficient housing being available upon release. Millie and Erol emphasize that in order to resolve such housing issues, partnership work has been key. They describe "better linkages across agencies" (2006:770) as an important factor for the PPO strategy to work. In particular, Homel, Nutley, Webb, and Tilley (2004a) found that links with prisons, drug agencies, and employment and training providers are important in resettlement of offenders.

In summary, partnerships in the United Kingdom were developed as a result of the Crime and Disorder Act and created the Crime Reduction Program along with crime reduction strategies such as the Drug Strategy, Drug Interventions Program, Prolific and Priority Offender Scheme, CCTVs, parenting orders, and information sharing agreements. Crime reduction partnerships, teams, boards, and roles were created in an

effort to reduce crime through multi-agency approaches. The Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships are a key component to crime reduction strategies at the local level and serve as an overarching body for other partnerships.

## *Challenges for Crime Reduction Partnerships*

### a. Information and Resource Sharing in Partnerships

Throughout the crime reduction literature, a common obstacle to partnership work is the process of information and resource sharing along with appropriate disclosure between agencies and partners (Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006; Dawson, 2005; Gilling, 2005; Laycock and Webb, 2003; Maguire, 2004; Millie and Erol, 2006; Rogers, 2006). Bullock et al. state that "the general aim of working in partnership in the field of crime reduction is to share and mobilize resources in order to target them to best effect and to avoid unnecessary confusion, duplication and contradiction" (2006:143). Maguire (2004) also points out the cost-effective and efficient aspects of multi-agency cooperation.

Similarly, Rogers states "working together requires all local agencies to share information and to collaborate in planning basic service delivery in the interests of the community" (2006:39). A number of writers list a variety of sources of information that are needed to assist in forming a crime reduction strategy and to profile an area. These include recorded crime figures, service calls, census information, unemployment data, retail crime, housing data, social services data, exclusion and truancy data from schools, details of noise complaints from environmental health departments, probation data on offenders, data on drug treatment from health authorities, accident and emergency records on assaults, police authority data, fire service statistics, and data from voluntary

and private sector organizations (Bullock et al., 2002; Burgess, 2003; Hough and Tilley, 1998; Rogers, 2006). Information from all of the above agencies provides a more accurate picture of the problem and its social context (Bullock et al., 2002; Hough and Tilley, 1998).

Burgess (2003) lists partners that can assist in decreasing the supply of drugs while recognizing that this is still primarily a police responsibility. These partners are: neighbourhood or community wardens, traffic wardens, caretakers, and housing management staff. Burgess also found that "this can identify buildings from which drugs are sold, streets with young people hanging around and the size, position and nuisance caused by sex markets" (2003:14).

The Crime and Disorder Act was supposed to aid data sharing between agencies within the constraints of the 1998 Data Protection Act; however, Laycock and Webb argue that this has not happened. They claim that "two thirds of bids had no data from other agencies when clearly in many cases this would have been extremely useful" (2003:291). Some of the problems with multi-agency data sharing are (1) data protection, (2) practical difficulties of exchanging data between different computer systems, (3) geo-coding to different boundaries, (4) failures to collect or record information; incomplete or inaccurate data, (5) failure to code/enter information collected in standard ways, (6) issues of confidentiality, and (7) suspicion about why the data is needed and how it will be used (Bullock et al., 2002; Bullock et al., 2006; Dawson, 2005; Gilling, 2005; Home Office Crime Reduction Centre, 2003; Laycock and Webb, 2003).

Obtaining information from health services has been a challenge, specifically drug treatment agencies. The basis for this problem is a conflict between patient

confidentiality issues and the general need for public protection (Keene, Rodriguez, & Badger, 2005; Laycock and Webb, 2003; Maguire, 2004). Burgess (2003) discusses how drug agencies are in a position where they can provide possible information that will help with locating hot spots and specific individuals involved in the drug market. However, he explains that many of these agencies are reluctant to share sensitive information about individuals because they are there to provide a service to the drug users. In relation to the obstacles discussed Maguire claims:

> It was unwise to assume that cooperation with crime reduction projects could readily be obtained from agencies for whom crime was not a focus of their mainstream activities. …Such problems were usually eased or resolved over time, but caused delays, changes or omissions in the planned implementation of multi-stranded projects. (2004:223)

Some partnerships have dealt with the challenge of information exchange by having an information sharing agreement which addresses some of the concerns mentioned above. Rogers (2006) notes that many agencies involved in CDRPs use a protocol which clearly states the responsibilities regarding sharing information.

## b. Accountability in Partnerships

Gilling (2000) describes crime prevention in most countries over the past century to be a 'principle', whereas the U.K. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 emphasizes crime prevention as a 'practical project'. Accountability in the U.K. is often determined and described by strategies, audits, performance management objectives and targets, assessments, and others. Also, there is a heavy emphasis on evaluation and the requirement to publish these accountability systems (Hough and Tilley, 1998; Maguire, 2004).

The Home Office accountability systems have a managerial focus. Crawford claims:

> The Crime and Disorder Act is infused with a managerialist philosophy which is output-fixated and driven by performance measurement. …The local community safety partnerships reflect this managerialist focus in the tasks and duties which they have been allocated. They will be required to set targets and identify performance indicators. (1998a:248)

The 2006 Home Office document titled *Reducing crime, the harm caused by drugs and anti-social behaviour: Delivering PSA 1, PSA 4 and PSA 2: Partnership Assessment and Delivery System (PADS): Guidance for partnerships* is an assessment process which measures partnerships against ten indicators of quality in its ability to deliver and sustain improvements in crime reduction, to deliver the government's drug strategy, and to tackle anti-social behaviour. These quality indicators are leadership, establishing a shared vision and processes to deliver the vision, managing the local Community Safety Strategy, relationship management/people and partners, problem solving, effective use of resources, successful programs, performance management, community engagement, and communication.

The audit is one of the U.K.'s main accountability methods as it helps partnerships set targets and develop strategies. Rogers advises that "an audit is essentially a piece of research and should be structured to reflect sound research principles" (2006:202). He lists four areas for carrying out an audit: engaging with the community, reviewing activity and performance, helping to plan for change, and identifying priorities that fit in with broader community plans.

Evidence-based policy and practice are evident in the U.K.'s accountability methods and lend themselves to the 'modernization agenda', according to Bullock et al.:

> 'Modernization' has included, among other things, performance management, local responsiveness, a move in principle to government steering (setting priorities and targets) and local agency rowing (deciding what to do to get there), joined-up working and the promise of devolved authority for those who perform well (earned autonomy), in addition to an emphasis on EBPP and the improved effectiveness, efficiency and value for money that are expected to follow suit. (2006:172)

Crawford (1998a) also describes the setting of performance standards to be a process of governmental 'steering'.

Gilling claims that the concern over how crime prevention partnerships have performed and been perceived in the past is the reason for governmental concern and heavy involvement of the Audit Commission in crime reduction initiatives. He advises that the Audit Commission deals with "the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and value for money of local public services, such as the police and local authorities, who are now heavily involved in CDRPs" (2005:735). Crawford shares some of these crime prevention partnership concerns:

> There is a distinct ambivalence about crime prevention; it is much lauded but less often practiced. For example, despite the heavy financial burden of the criminal justice system, relatively little money is allocated to crime prevention. (1998b: 63)

> Only belatedly have issues concerned with the implementation and delivery of crime prevention risen to the fore in the criminological literature. In the naivete of the early days of crime prevention it was as if all that was needed was a 'good idea' and the rest would take care of itself. However, researchers have highlighted the importance of the concept of programme, its delivery and evaluation. (1998b:161)

In addition, Crawford states:

> …the relationship between 'prevention' and 'partnerships' can be explained in part by the fact that crime prevention has tended to exist as a peripheral concern of numerous agencies, and yet a core activity of none. (1999:44)

The partnerships are accountable to the community; therefore, it is appropriate that community consultation and engagement are other accountability mechanisms in the

strategies developed. In 2006, the Home Office conducted a review of the partnership provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This review included a recommendation that CDRPs engage more fully with communities. In addition to being an accountability concern, this recommendation is focused on the Home Office governance strategy of engaging with the community (Bullock et al., 2006).

A local survey is now part of the audit process for every crime and disorder partnership (Rogers, 2006). Community consultation is one of the responsibilities of the CDRPs as it is part of the process leading up to the development of a crime reduction strategy that reflects the priority problems in a locality (Home Office Crime Reduction College, 2003).

The influence of the civil renewal agenda can be seen in the government's most recent White Paper on police reform, *Building Safer Communities Together*, which argues for the following governance structure:

> A genuinely "bottom-up" approach to decision making on community safety issues - with opportunities for direct input and engagement for communities, together with strong oversight mechanisms at a local level and a higher, "strategic" level. (United Kingdom, Home Office 2003b:5.54; as cited in Hope, 2005:381-382)

## c. Partnerships at the Local Level

Crawford (1999) raises the question of why partnerships in criminal justice are on the rise. Rogers states:

> The consequence of believing the myths for so long has been the creation of an expensive, inefficient, and self-perpetuating criminal justice system, a high crime rate, and large numbers of young people drifting into crime, which appears hard to refute. Consequently, it is argued, only a comprehensive partnership approach to tackling crime and its associated problems involving all agencies can be seen as the way forward. (2006:10)

The Criminal Justice System will not be able to prevent crime on its own because it is not in control of many of the social and environmental causations of crime, and this is the reason for the emphasis on partnership work (Bright, 1991; Capobianco, 2005; Crawford, 1998b, 1999; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Scott, 2005).

Many writers conclude that governments and other agencies at the local level are in the most strategic position to directly deal with crime and disorder issues through policy development (Bright, 1991; Hope, 2001; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Shaw, 2001). Crawford states:

> The very notion of community safety echoes the importance of locality. It stands in contrast to what Rosenbaum (1988a) referred to as an 'implant hypothesis' which underscores much crime prevention practice, whereby pre-packaged programmes are implanted into local social environments with little sensitivity to the specific local context in the implementation process. Rather than solutions being imposed on a local ecology, they should emerge out of the environment in which they have to survive. (1998b:193)

Bright (1991) asserts that the crime prevention component of such services needs to be strengthened. Capobianco states that there needs to be "emphasis on what can be done to prevent crime from occurring before the intervention of the criminal justice system, and to complement the work of the criminal justice system" (2005:5). Scott recognizes:

> Much of police business consists of handling problems and cases that fall through the cracks in the 'social net' or constitute an overflow stemming from the limited resources of other agencies – for example, mentally ill persons who are not adequately cared for in the community; drug addicts who do not receive treatment services; parks, playgrounds and housing developments that are not adequately maintained; and cars and homes that are abandoned, etc. (2005:395)

In 1990 the United Nations Congress wanted to "bring together those with responsibility for planning and development, for family, health, employment and training, housing and social services, leisure activities, schools, the police and the justice system in

order to deal with the conditions that generate crime" (United Nations, 1991; as cited in Rogers, 2006:27; Crawford, 1998b:32).

### d. Roles and Responsibilities in Partnerships

Shaw (2006) advises that it is not the community safety concepts that have changed much over the years; instead, it is that they have been enhanced, and there has been a shift in the roles and responsibilities of all the actors. In the U.K., crime control was traditionally known to be the responsibility of the Home Office, police, and criminal justice agencies (Rogers, 2006; Stenson and Edwards, 2003). The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 intended to end the police monopoly over crime control by legislating a shared responsibility between the local authorities (Rogers, 2006).

In order to decipher if there is a dominant agency in a partnership, Crawford uses the five models of coordination and structure which were identified in the Morgan Report:

- The 'independent' model, with an independent coordinator
- The 'local authority based' model
- The 'police centred local' model
- The 'police centred headquarters' model
- The 'indeterminate' model, with no clear leader, coordinator or strategy. (1998b:170)

The 'corporate' model was added by Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994). This model has no lead agency; therefore, the partnership group shares responsibility. Crawford (1998b) suggests that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 creates a model of its own because the police and local authority are designated as the leaders.

Probation and education are examples of cooperating bodies that have been identified as having the expertise and resources to contribute to crime control; therefore, they have a legal obligation to help deliver the objectives of crime reduction strategies (Rogers, 2006). As a result, the recognition of specific roles and expectations of these

agencies is important in order to determine what information, resources, and knowledge they can provide.

The responsible authorities must also invite the participation of others such as social landlords, drug and alcohol teams or workers, education councils, voluntary organizations, crown prosecution service, crown court manager, court committee, neighbourhood watch committee, and victim support workers (Rogers, 2006). "Many of these groups have a large amount of information gathered during their day-to-day activities and can provide a fuller picture and understanding of the root causes of crime and disorder in the local community" (Rogers, 2006:201).

Bullock et al. (2006) reminds us that engaging some partners has been difficult, and this was further acknowledged in the review of the Crime and Disorder Act conducted by the Home Office in 2006. Furthermore, Crawford states that "there is a big gulf between the often-heard ideals of 'partnerships' and the reality of its practice" (1998b:184).

Crawford (1999) explains that the reluctance of private sector involvement is due to crime not being a priority. In addition, since this sector is subject to economic fluctuations, it prefers short-term projects that are more quantifiable. Tilley found "efforts to involve the community create a host of further puzzles about whom to involve, how to engage them, what they can do and the means by which they can relate to local formal organizations" (2005:9). The health sector is the area most commonly referred to in discussions around agencies reluctance to participate (Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Keene, Rodriguez, & Badger, 2005). The reasons for this reluctance are (1) health authorities have limited resources to commit to the partnership process, (2) they have

doubts about their own role in crime and disorder partnerships, and (3) there is little recognition that it is part of their core responsibility (Philips, Jacobson, Prime, Carter, & Considine, 2002).

To date, much has been written about the need for partnerships to have clarity on the roles and responsibilities of each agency involved in crime reduction work. First of all, it increases efficiency by avoiding duplication of work. Second, it helps overcome the dependency on the Criminal Justice System to reduce crime on its own. Third, it extends and encourages responsibility to all of the organizations necessary in crime control. Finally, it is necessary to make the best use of available expertise (Bullock et al., 2006; Gilling and Barton, 1997; Millie and Erol, 2006).

Gelsthorpe differentiates between five types of partnerships in terms of roles and identity:

- *The Communications Model:* organizations recognize that they have a role to play with one another but go little beyond communication.
- *The Cooperation Model:* agencies maintain separate boundaries and identities but work together on a mutually-agreed problem.
- *The Coordination Model:* agencies work together in a systematic way, there are defined boundaries, and resources are pooled to tackle mutually-agreed problems.
- *The Federation Model:* agencies retain their organizational distinctiveness but also adopt degrees of central focus.
- *The Merger Model:* agencies become indistinguishable from one another in working on a mutually-defined problem. (1985; as cited in Johnston and Shearing, 2003:108)

For the purposes of the work in the U.K., Crawford describes the role of multi-agency partnerships as a whole:

> Multi-agency partnerships involve the coming together of various agencies in relation to a given problem, without this significantly affecting or transforming the work they do. The same tasks are conducted in cooperation with others. The roles of the partners remain distinct. Key officers are called on to represent their organization and to pool collective expertise and resources. Their core tasks remain largely unaltered, as multi-agency work is grafted on to existing practices, or those existing practice are redefined. (1998b:174-175)

Furthermore, Sansfacon states "more than working alongside other organizations or taking responsibility or participating in roundtables, integrated approaches involve working with others to create new tools and develop a shared vision in order to co-produce community safety" (2006:3).

Johnston and Shearing claim 'embedding' is occurring at the occupational and functional level. As a result, they claim that "it is now virtually impossible to identify any function within the governance of security in democratic states that is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, performed by non-state authorities as well as by state ones" (2003:33).

Harris (2003) and Crawford (1998b) discuss the blurring of boundaries between organizations. Crawford states "partnerships, by their nature, blur the boundaries between the roles and functions of incorporated organizations. This can present difficulties for accountability and for the appropriate distribution of responsibilities. Hence, there is a need to maintain clarity of the divergent inputs and their collaborative objectives" (1998b:175). Millie and Erol say that "this merging of boundaries between traditional roles is not unique to probation and prisons. There has been also an increasing involvement of police officers in offender supervision, often alongside existing probation supervision—as some have put it, possibly leading to a future polibation officer" (2006:692). Harris notes that the issues surrounding boundary blurring are likely to continue in the partnership structures in the U.K.

Crawford explains that there is more than one partner involved in the decision-making and implementation processes; therefore, there is not one agency alone that can be held responsible for the outcomes. Furthermore, he describes accountability as

"fragmented and dispersed" (1998b:180). Gilling also raises concerns about roles and responsibilities.

> …it has been recognized for a long while that criminal justice is more of a fragmented, contradictory process than a coordinated system. There is no reason to assume that the absorption of even more agencies under the community safety umbrella will result in greater coordination, but some logic is suggesting it might result in less. (2000:136)

## e. Value Conflicts and Power Differentials in Partnerships

Conflict in multi-agency partnerships can be traced back to differences in agency philosophy, organizational style, professional history, procedures, structures, resources, leadership, lack of trust, and different beliefs on crime prevention (Crawford 1999; Gilling, 1993; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Tilley 2005). According to Garland, "the criminal justice system itself is an historically contingent and (arbitrary) social construct, which has arisen more through competition between professional groups and agencies in pursuit of their own claims to specialist expertise and legitimacy than any rational strategic plan" (1990; as cited in Crawford, 1998b:11).

According to Gilling (1993) partners have different discourses about crime causation. Gilling states:

> Normally there is space within the criminal justice system for these different discourses to coexist in splendid isolation and independence, making conflict largely unnecessary. There is a separation of powers and responsibilities which minimizes the need for communication and, resources allowing, enable each agency to effectively plough its own furrow. However, a distinctive feature of the multi-agency approach is that is seeks to force agencies from a position of independence to one of interdependence, where the means to crime prevention effectiveness lies beyond the control of a single agency. … But it does not fit the actuality of two separate discourses and professional traditions. If these traditions are required to come together and seek a common base for decision making in the situational approach to crime prevention then, like oil and water, they simply will not mix. (1993:153)

Similarly, in critiquing the Crime Reduction Program, Maguire states:

> It demanded the rapid identification, mobilization and coordination of large numbers of people and organizations with an array of skills in project design, oversight, management, monitoring and evaluation that were not in abundant supply within the criminal justice field. It also relied, implicitly at least, upon an assumed flexibility in professional cultures, whereby practitioners could be told or persuaded to work in new ways, not only within individual agencies, but also in the context of new forms of partnership between agencies unfamiliar with (and sometimes hostile to) each others' aims, assumptions and practices. (2004:217)

Crawford acknowledges that "not all agencies and groups are equally powerful. Organizations bring to crime problems competing claims to specialist knowledge and expertise, as well as differential access to both human and material resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that certain agencies tend to dominate the policy agenda" (1998b:171-172). Similarly, Homel et al. states "… this does not mean that the relationships within any partnership arrangements will always be equal. The nature of the power relationship between each agency involved in the partnership will be a product of what value they can add to the achievement of the joint outcomes" (2004a:20). Phillips et al. (2002) also found that voluntary and community agencies experienced power imbalances with statutory organizations.

The police are the agency most commonly perceived as dominating meetings and the policy agenda (Gilling, 1993; Harris, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Millie and Erol, 2006; Phillips et al., 2002; Rogers, 2006). Johnston and Shearing explain that "in the past, similar 'community'-based initiatives have tended to be dominated by the police either because they have successfully maintained their hegemony over policing matters or – more usually – because they have been left to bear the responsibility for implementing initiatives alone" (2003:11). "The police are often enthusiastic proponents of the multi-agency approach, but they tend to prefer to set the agenda and dominate forum meetings, and then to ignore the multi-agency framework when it suits their own needs" (Sampson

et al., 1988; as cited in Rogers, 2006:8). Gilling suggests "as the main custodians of information on crime it is they who are in the strongest position to authoritatively identify what is or is not to be regarded as a problem suitable for special preventive effort" (1993:154).

Millie and Erol note that "if a wide range of non-statutory agencies are consulted, then it is important that they feel their views are valued—otherwise, cooperation and participation in such meetings will not be guaranteed" (2006:699). Shaw states "if initiatives are to be sustained and effective, people must feel they have had a major role in creating and shaping them" (2006:6). She goes on to state that "the development of meaningful participation, rather than consultation, in community safety and prevention is seen as a key mechanism for facilitating ownership, leadership and building skills and capacity, and for helping to change attitudes, strengthen social networks and build trust between partners" (2006:8).

Harris (2003) says that teachers hold the power in drug education and prevention in the schools. However, the teachers do not feel that they have this power because they are not as familiar with the legislative aspects of drugs or all the issues surrounding drugs. Crawford provides a useful summary of the current situation:

> In the new order of things, diverse agencies and the public are to become co-producers of public safety. Yet the process of co-production is riddled with sites of conflict over values, purposes and priorities as well as considerable power imbalances between the parties incorporated into the co-production process. (1998b:193)

In summary, partnerships in the United Kingdom have posed a number of challenges about (1) information and resource sharing, (2) accountability systems, (3) implementation at the local level, (4) roles and responsibilities, and (5) value conflicts and power differentials. The exchange of information is difficult between some

organizations, but also necessary for effective and efficient partnership work. Part of the sophistication of the U.K. crime reduction model is because of the accountability systems implemented by the local and central government including audits, performance targets, assessments, and evaluations. These accountability structures are between the Home Office, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and communities. Partnerships at the local level emphasize the major role of local authorities and agencies in gathering information and creating crime reduction strategies. The lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities between partners result in the blurring of boundaries, embedding responsibilities of security and safety within other occupations instead of within a specialist occupation, and confusion around accountability. Value conflicts and power differentials occur due to different discourses about crime causation, leadership roles, and agency domination.

Partnership work in the United Kingdom is influencing initiatives in Canada. Canada's crime reduction partnerships will now be discussed through an example of the City of Surrey's Crime Reduction Strategy.

## *Crime Reduction Partnerships in Canada*

British Columbia's Crime Reduction Initiative (CRI) is primarily based on the U.K. crime reduction approaches. The British Columbia initiative was officially launched in September 2005 by the "E" Division RCMP as six detachments were chosen to implement crime reduction strategies (RCMP, 2006). The three main objectives of the strategy are: to reduce crime rates, to reduce fear of crime and to reduce the impact of anti-social behaviour on the quality of life (RCMP, 2006). According to the RCMP:

> Within policing, new teams and strategies drawn from existing resources will bring intelligence and contemporary criminology to bear on chronic crime problems and prolific offenders. Across the justice system, partnerships will ensure that major players are working in the same direction with a common tool kit. … Rather than imposing a rigid "template" of CR activity in these jurisdictions, the pilot communities will take on the challenge of developing strategies tailored specifically to their local enforcement and criminal justice environment. (2006:6)

The RCMP asserts that a crime reduction strategy should not be solely the responsibility of the police but should involve local partnerships and inter-agency cooperation, resulting in a shared undertaking.

After visiting the United Kingdom and New York City the Mayor of the City of Surrey, Dianne Watts, announced an official Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) (Skelton, 2007, February 26). The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is described in two ways. First, it states "the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is an innovative problem solving approach to addressing the causes and effects of crime". Second, "the Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is a complete paradigm shift from what is currently being done in Canadian municipalities to combat crime. It is an approach that seeks to incorporate all the key stakeholders and create one, unified, comprehensive plan" (City of Surrey, 2007b). The mayor describes the strategy as comprehensive in that it involves over fifty organizations and all three levels of government. The organizations include: RCMP, non-profit, provincial and federal governments, parole, crown counsel, school board, Board of Trade, and community agencies.

The Mayor of Surrey states that the provincial and federal governments are in support of the CRS. However, while she acknowledges the importance of support from higher levels of government, she asserts that "municipal governments should take the lead in fighting crime" (Skelton, 2007, February 26:A2). Furthermore, Wally Oppal, the

Attorney General for British Columbia, states "the problem with the existing criminal justice system is that its components operate in isolation … we need a complete shift in philosophy. We can't keep doing business the way it's been done in the past. The world has changed" (Bellett, 2007, February 27:B8).

The mayor recognizes that some recommendations in the CRS are outside of municipal jurisdiction, such as community courts and changes in prison sentencing. The mayor explains that some initiatives can be carried out without the support of higher levels of government and that they have already begun implementing some of these initiatives (Skelton, 2007, February 27). Initiatives that have taken place so far include a part-time homelessness outreach worker to find permanent housing for individuals, the creation of Prolific Offender Target Teams by the Surrey RCMP, and the creation of partnerships.

The *City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy* describes its four primary objectives as:

1. reduce crime and increase community safety
2. increase public involvement in reducing crime
3. increase integration between all stakeholders involved in crime reduction
4. improve public awareness around the reality and perception of crime. (City of Surrey, 2007a)

These objectives are to be attained through the development of initiatives and action plans under the four components, or strands, of the strategy: (1) prevent and deter crime, (2) apprehend and prosecute offenders, (3) rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders, and (4) reality and perceptions of crime. The Mayor's Task Force on Public Safety and Crime Reduction is divided into four sub-committees representing each of the four strands (City of Surrey, 2007a).

Under the Prevent and Deter Strand, the strategy advises that the City and the RCMP look into the creation of Community Safety Officers (CSO). A CSO is "not a member of the police force but has a level of delegated authority to support the RCMP in the prevention and deterrence of crime" (City of Surrey, 2007a:11). In addition to Community Safety Officers, another recommendation is the development of a protocol that requires these officers, outdoor city workers, community volunteer patrols, firefighters, and RCMP to wear visible safety vests for increased visibility and awareness for the public (City of Surrey, 2007a). Enhancing safety on transit and skytrains is another recommendation requiring partnership work with transit authorities.

Ensuring databases are current and available to researchers is an important aspect of the Crime Reduction Strategy. In addition, the City wants to establish a Shopping Centre Advisory Committee with the RCMP, representatives from large shopping centers in the city, Surrey Board of Trade, Chambers of Commerce, and Business Improvement Associations (City of Surrey, 2007a).

The mayor also intends to put CCTVs in crime hot spots (City of Surrey, 2007a; Skelton, 2007, February 27). This would require working with private sector partners and input from the Privacy Commissioner. Insurance companies will provide rate reduction program for private property owners who install CCTV cameras (City of Surrey, 2007a:16).

Another important component to the crime reduction strategy is the establishment of Community Drug Action Teams. The following agencies would take part in creating a protocol for these teams: the RCMP, Fire Department, Probation, School District, Fraser

Health Authority – Mental Health and Addiction. According to the Crime Reduction Strategy:

> These community based outreach teams will deliver the city's drug strategy at the local level and assist individuals on the street (ie. homeless, sex trade workers, cronic runaways, drug addicts, youth at risk etc.) to access social support networks and wrap around services (ie. housing, medical attention, treatment etc.). Research shows that 1-on-1 contact has the greatest benefit in assisting those at risk. (City of Surrey, 2007a:16)

The City of Surrey is also recommending:

> That the City work in collaboration with the School District and appropriate Provincial authorities to establish a process for the creation of legally-binding, negotiated and voluntary "parenting orders" that would support parents, whose children are determined to be involved in crime, to become re-involved with raising their children in a responsible manner.
>
> That the City, Fraser Health Authority and community agencies review and expand, where appropriate, parenting support programs to assist parents in raising their children in a responsible manner. (2007a:18)

In addition, the CRS explained the concept of creating Community Action Groups:

> In conjunction with Neighbourhood Associations, RCMP, Surrey Fire Department, Surrey Bylaw Enforcement, Surrey Building Inspectors, Surrey Electrical Fire Safety Initiative, Board of Trade, Chambers of Commerce, Business Improvement Associations and other stakeholders in each of Surrey's Town Centres. These groups will work with the RCMP to develop strategies to address neighourhood issues such as graffiti, vandalism, drug dealing, drug houses, businesses that attract crime, motels allowing criminal activity to take place, crime hot spots and general nuisance activity. (City of Surrey, 2007a:19)

Multi-agency cooperation is also anticipated in the zero tolerance policy for graffiti. This would pertain to public and private property through by-laws as well as involve partnership work with the Ministry of Highways, the GVTA, BC Hydro, Telus, BC Hydro, Shaw Cable and Terasen (City of Surrey, 2007a).

The second strand is the Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders Strand. This strand targets prolific offenders since "estimates indicate that approximately 20% of the criminals are involved in or cause 80% of the "priority" crimes" (City of Surrey, 2007a:20). Some of the recommendations under this strand include sharing information

among organizations, raising the importance of data gathering; and implementing the Automatic License Plate Recognition (ALPR) systems. This strand also targets drugs in the city. As a result, it suggests that the City work closely with the Surrey Fire Department, RCMP, Solicitor General, and Electrical Inspectors in relation to grow operations, the equipment used in grow-ops, and the electrical safety hazards they create (City of Surrey, 2007a).

The second strand aims to establish a Community Court for offenders who have an addiction. This would include a Community Justice Resource Team which is a team of support service experts. "This process must involve the police, Crown Counsel, defense Counsel and Court judges to ensure the full benefit of the alternative Community Court process is recognized" (City of Surrey, 2007a:22). In addition to Community Court, the CRS suggests Night Court to increase courtroom capacity and to shorten the delay time from charge to trial. Along with enhanced treatment programs in and out of prison, the CRS promotes longer incarceration time for offenders who do not go into treatment.

Another component of the CRS under the Apprehend and Prosecute Offenders Strand is the establishment of Prolific Offender Management Teams (POMT). The City is required to work with probation, social services, health authorities, community support teams, Attorney General, Solicitor General, RCMP, and others to form POMTs. The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy explains that "POMTs will follow an offender throughout the criminal justice system to assess and address factors that cause the offender to commit crime" (City of Surrey, 2007a:23).

The third strand is the Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Strand. This is described as a "client-centered approach" that delivers "wrap around services" for offenders (City of Surrey, 2007a). The wrap around services entail treatment, housing, education and skills development, career development, support worker, leisure/social activities, and program monitoring. Legislation has been recommended allowing for drug testing upon arrest. Treatment programs become mandatory for prolific offenders with addiction problems.

The Crime Reduction Strategy says that "the City continue to work with the private sector, not for profit organizations and key stakeholders to provide treatment facilities, beds and programs" (City of Surrey, 2007a:25). In order to aim for continuity of support for individuals as they move throughout the different services, agencies, and in some cases in and outside of prison, the CRS recommends that Community Support Teams be created. Community Support Teams provide "ongoing support to individuals on a one-on-one basis through the duration of their program of treatment and reintegration from the Criminal Justice System" (City of Surrey, 2007a:29). The creation of cross-functional outreach teams for prolific offenders with mental disorders is also part of the Crime Reduction Strategy.

The Reality and Perceptions of Crime is the fourth strand and it contains information gathering, communication of information, prioritizing actions to address most fearful/most vulnerable first, and increasing physical "visibility" to reduce the fear of crime (City of Surrey, 2007a). One of the main recommendations that arose out of this strand is to regularly conduct community safety surveys. The Reality and Perceptions of Crime strand calls for the creation of databases of agencies that can provide the various services listed throughout the CRS and performance indicators for each recommendation

and monitoring systems for measurement, evaluation, and accountability purposes. A board would develop and oversee the implementation of the recommendations (City of Surrey, 2007a).

The first stage of the CRS is to publish recommendations. The second phase is to create and implement the recommendations by the end of 2007 (City of Surrey, 2007a). The job posting for a crime reduction strategy manager describes the position as:

> Responsible for the leadership, development and implementation of a groundbreaking crime reduction program for the City of Surrey. … responsible for conducting research, analyzing data, developing effective strategy and related operational plans and then assisting with implementing the strategy. Communicating and building effective partnerships with a broad range of stakeholders and agencies is fundamental to success in this position. (City of Surrey, 2007b)

The strategy states that it will be this person's role "to coordinate the preparation of the Implementation Plan and assist in the "roll out" of the Implementation Plan with the wide array of stakeholders that will need to be involved in that process" (City of Surrey, 2007a:35).

In summary, the City of Surrey is bringing together key players in an effort to develop multi-agency partnerships and strategies to reduce crime. The Crime Reduction Strategy addresses housing and homelessness issues, drug addictions and treatment, prolific offenders, and crime "hot spots" through recommendations for the development of new roles and partnerships. Drug Action Teams, Prolific Offender Target Teams, and Community Support Teams will target drug-using offenders caught in the crime cycle with an aim of rehabilitating and reintegrating them into the community. The Crime Reduction Strategy Manager position and the recommendation for Community Safety Officers are ways to branch out the duties of policing in reducing crime. The crime reduction strategies in the United Kingdom and Canada are very comprehensive and

include many partnerships. Explanations for the developments of such partnerships will be discussed in the next chapter.

# Chapter 3: Explanations for Governance through Partnerships

Over the past forty years there has been a significant change in how we govern and view crime. These changes are apparent in all sectors of the Criminal Justice System because crime has become an established part of society. Although the government sector of policing has not had any radical changes, policing has still shifted over the years. For example, community policing, crime prevention, crime reduction and partnership work emerged and have all had roles in this shift. An overview of the changes that have occurred in general throughout the government and Criminal Justice System in Canada and the United Kingdom will be outlined followed by a closer look at the policing sector, as well as how one accounts for such changes.

Garland (2000) and Rose (2000) claim there have been a series of transformations in official perceptions of crime, in criminological discourse, in modes of governmental action and in the structure of criminal justice organizations. Garland (1996) discusses the new criminologies of everyday life which are made up of a set of theoretical frameworks including rational choice theory, routine activities theory, crime as opportunity and situational crime prevention theory. These theories are based on the idea that crime is a normal part of society and, as a result, a new collective experience of crime will inevitably emerge.

The primary purpose of the government is the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, and the increase of its wealth (Foucault, 1991). In order to meet this objective to the best of its ability, the government has shifted dramatically over the past few decades from a welfare state to a neo-liberal government. With regard to the

Criminal Justice System specifically, crime and punishment have undergone a marked change. Garland (1996) suggests that as the "war against crime" campaign slowly fades, there is a decrease in the overall commitment towards a penal welfare strategy. Instead, the effects of crime-costs, victims, and fearful citizens became the focus. This shift is described as a transition from being causes-oriented to effects-oriented. Hughes and Edwards states five broad reasons for what they refer to as "the crisis of the welfare-penal complex":

- The increasing rate of recorded crime and the numbers of people passing through the different parts of the system, despite the growing affluence and the welfare state;
- Overload combined with a crisis of efficiency (e.g. the declining clear-up rates of the police, overloaded courts and the overcrowding of prisons);
- A growing awareness of extensive social and economic costs of crime; and
- The increasing recognition that formal processes of criminal justice (i.e. detection, apprehension, prosecution, sentencing and punishment of offenders) have only a limited effect on controlling crime. (2005:17)

According to Foucault (1991), the problems of government are how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom people will accept being governed, and how to be the best possible governor. Rhodes provides a useful definition of governance:

> Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a *new* process of governing; or a *changed* condition of ordered rule; or the *new* method by which society is governed. (1995; as cited in Crawford, 1999:3, original emphasis)

Active state involvement is the welfare state approach to governing and it has the mentality of taking care of everyone it governs and any associated social problems (Garland, 1996). Many writers, however, have questioned the effectiveness of the welfare state in governing crime (Bright, 1991; Capobianco, 2005; Crawford, 1998b, 1999; Johnston, 2001; Rogers, 2006; Rose, 2000; Scott, 2005). There has been a loss of confidence in welfare states approaches to crime and public concern has remained high.

The present neo-liberal approach focuses on responsibilization. In contrast to the welfare state approach, the government does not solve everyone's problems for them and does not lead society to believe that it is able to cure the social problem of crime. Garland (1996) refers to this new way of governing crime problems as the 'responsibilization strategy' where the public takes responsibility for its own security. Consequently, with a shift from the welfare state to neo-liberalism, government objectives and tactics change. The government needs to employ tactics rather than laws because goals are no longer being achieved through law and a true understanding of how one is governing is to examine the tactics used (Foucault, 1991; O'Malley, 1992). As a result, neo-liberalism uses the strategic approach of involving and empowering families, communities, and other institutions to address many social problems and to take more responsibility for crime control. This adaptive state strategy can be described as governing-at-a-distance (Rose, 2000). Rogers says that "others must be made aware that they too have a responsibility in this regard, and have to be persuaded to change their practices in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase formal controls" (2006:7).

In the United Kingdom there has been a movement from 'crime prevention' to 'community safety'. The Home Office points out:

> The term crime prevention is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term community safety is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community. (1991; as cited in Rogers, 2006:4)

Throughout this shift in governance the government becomes a facilitator opposed to a provider. This new role means that the government has to withdraw as the main provider for security and crime control. In part this is due to the monopolizing tendencies of the state apparatus (Garland, 1996). Herman Goldstein states that, "we must restore a

balance between citizen and police responsibilities that reflects a more accurate assessment of actual capacities and acknowledges that effective social control cannot possibly be achieved by hired hands alone" (cited in Sheptycki, 1998:492). In other words, the government does not want to give up its role as state protector, but at the same time, it has proven to be incapable of carrying out the tasks that they were once in charge of on their own.

Although there has been a shift from a welfare state to a neo-liberal state, in many ways, the two forms of governance are occurring simultaneously in the area of crime control (Braithwaite, 2000). On the one hand we have three strikes and you are out, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, parole release restrictions, no frills prisons, corporal punishment, boot camps, super maximum prisons, zero tolerance policies, and community notification laws and pedophile registers (Rose, 2000). On the other hand we have prevention and partnership as well as rehabilitation (Braithwaite, 2000).

There has been a new penology of actuarial decision making and public private partnerships. Braithwaite states that there has been "a shift from reactive, punishment-based systems of justice to proactive, preventive ones whose practices are consistent with the principles of restoration, reparation and mediation." (2000; as cited in Johnston, 2001:974). This is evident in the emergence of programs such as restorative justice and victim services, which focus on the effects of crime instead of the causes as discussed earlier. Stenning and Shearing (1980) noted that in the late 1970s a 'quiet revolution' had undermined the centrality of state-centered policing. In the late 18th century, policing gradually changed its role into one concerned with the maintenance of public order, riot control, and crime prevention (Sheptycki, 1998).

There is a new view of policing as a 'service' and a redesignation of the community as 'consumers'. Bayley and Shearing (1996) report that some departments treat the public like customers and measure performance by surveys of public satisfaction instead of only by the number of crimes and arrests. Crawford notes that "the 'community' and public, previously defined as recipients of a service – a conception supported and extended by the establishment of the welfare state – more recently have been called upon, in various different ways, to join the 'fight against crime'" (1999:265). Rogers states, "by holding out the belief that the police alone can solve the problem of crime, this may serve to undermine the fact that the police need the support and trust of the local public and other agencies" (2006:158).

Since the duties of policing have been distributed across a range of institutions, policing became pluralized and continues to pluralize. Shearing offers an understanding of the process of pluralization of police:

> We are witnessing what Rose (1996) terms 'the death of the social': whereas governance was once conducted through and for a social sphere, we are presently seeing an expansion of political power beyond the state, in which non-state agencies govern expanses of formerly social space with a view to securing community interests. (2000:392)

The police redefine themselves as a facilitator rather than a provider. Crawford (2006) describes the state as performing 'steering' functions while leaving the 'rowing' to others. Similarly, Johnston and Shearing (2003) refer to the government separating functions into 'establishing' and 'implementing' their standards.

Johnston (2005) describes the challenges to police sovereignty. Four models of security governance are proposed by Johnston:

> … that police should maintain the governing status quo, doing more street level policing but doing it more effectively; that police should accept the reality of pluralization but, having done so, should secure oversight of its coordination and

> regulation; that police should compete with commercial and municipal providers in order to secure 'in house' governance of street-level policing; and that police should accept pluralization, devolve certain functions to the private sector and concede on any automatic claim to sovereignty. (2005:242-243)

Five driving forces behind the restructuring under private and government support are listed by Bayley and Shearing (1996). These forces consist of fear of crime, inability of the government to satisfy society's longing for security, cultural individualism, the commodification of security, and the rise of mass private property. Bayley and Shearing (1996) define this shift or change as being due to two developments; the pluralizing of policing and the search by the public police for an appropriate role. Johnston argues:

> People's knowledge of crime and experiences of fear are embedded in local social relations and inscribed within routine acts of (self)-governance. This suggests two things: that an understanding of fear of crime demands an analysis of local issues other than crime; and that any solution to the governance of crime – particularly under present-day conditions where the provision of security is highly diversified – will demand a consideration of non-state modes of governance, including citizen-based ones. (2001:959)

The police are no longer considered the experts on policing issues because the area has expanded by becoming very broad in nature (Crawford, 1998b, 1999; Harris, 2003; Millie and Erol, 2006). Braithwaithe (2000) found that business regulatory agencies grew to be more significant law enforcers than the police with at least twice as many private police, such as hired security, as public police in Canada and the United Kingdom. Malm et al. reported that security companies "have begun to act in matters such as investigating corporate fraud, preventing computer crime and conducting forensic analyses that have traditionally been done by public police" (2005:3). There is a recognition that crime is too extensive and complex to be dealt with solely by the police; therefore, they are disseminating some of their duties to other control providers. Over the

past fifteen years, governments have gone beyond passive acceptance to active encouragement of commercial private security (Bayley and Shearing, 1996).

Since WWII, private security is seen as a necessary addition to the public police. Private security uses the approach of prevention rather than the public police approach of detection and punishment. The police now look at similar approaches to those of private security (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). Bayley and Shearing (1996) have observed that it is now popular with the public and the police to encourage volunteers to do "police work".

Bayley and Shearing (1996) describe how the police currently share their work in other ways. First of all, they sell their protective services, such as charging fees for covering rock concerts and being hired as private security guards. Secondly, civilians and police auxiliaries share responsibilities with public policing. For example, auxiliaries serve without pay and weapons, but they are very similar in appearance as the police. Also, work traditionally performed by uniformed officers is being given to civilian employees in areas such as dispatch, forensics, records, victim services, volunteer coordination, crime prevention classes, and security inspections of premises.

Many police departments have reduced their activities in licensing bars, enforcing parking violations, organizing neighbourhood watches, and advising property owners about home security measures (Bullock et al., 2006). As a result, these activities have been given to the private sector, the community, volunteers, and government ministries to employ and to establish partnerships in an effort to reduce crime (Griffiths, Parent, & Whitelaw, 2001). Shearing observes that "this has reshaped states, from states conceived of governance largely in terms of direct provision, to what Braithwaite (2000) has termed

"regulatory states" that prefer to steer while leaving much of the rowing of governance to others" (2004:197-198).

Under the Crime and Disorder Act in the United Kingdom "non-specialized state agents (such as education, health and housing departments), commercial organizations, voluntary bodies and 'responsible citizens', have a collective duty to work alongside the specialized police organizations in pursuit of security goals" (Johnston and Shearing, 2003:70). Bullock, Erol, and Tilley state "more recently, in the U.K., the term 'problem-oriented partnership' has come to be preferred by many to 'problem-oriented policing'" (2006:7-8). Crawford discusses the potential benefits of these "new horizontal relations that cut across traditional hierarchies" as:

> [A] fundamental shift in the way we govern crime and its prevention . . . afford the potential to encourage a stronger and more participatory civil society and challenge many of the modernist assumptions about professional expertise, specialisation, state paternalism and monopoly. (1998; as cited in Crawford, 2006:460)

Capobianco summarizes the recent shift in governing accordingly:

> The traditional model of government agencies administering education, health, social service, security, environment and criminal justice programmes in isolation from each other is giving way to increased collaboration within departments, between agencies, between levels of governments and between public, private, and nonprofit sectors. As governments continue to face more complex problems, and citizens expect more, the way in which government delivers services and results, is changing to a more 'joined-up' and multi-partnership approach. (2005:5)

Garland clarifies that "this arrangement does not necessarily mean that the State offloads the responsibility for public safety to citizens, but rather, engages other actors such as businesses, local authorities, and community based organizations in local crime prevention efforts" (1996, 2001; as cited in Capobianco, 2005:5). Gilling states "the promotion of partnerships has allowed government to avoid economically damaging allegations of the state over-reaching itself, and overstating its competence, whilst

cleverly facilitating the corollary of this, namely, the off-loading of responsibility for crime and security on to others" (2005:743). Power discusses how the new methods in crime control include the requirement of statutory partnerships at the local level, audits, contracts, and performance indicators and that these techniques "allow those that 'steer' to monitor and correct the activities of those that 'row'" (1997; as cited in Crawford, 1998b:253). Sansfaçon argues that "the responsibility devolved to local authorities can mean a loss of sovereignty by the central government and a tendency toward communitarianism instead of the traditional top-down approach to equal justice" (2004:11). Sansfaçon implies that this may also be a new way or technique for the state to ensure its presence at the local level. Crawford asserts that this new technique does not imply a withdrawal of the state. Crawford states "the British state is engaged in ambitious projects of social engineering in which the deployment of hierarchy, command and interventionism are prevalent" (1999:449). Sansfaçon balances these observations when he states "the point is not so much the offloading by the State but rather the decentering of the ways standards are set, which was formerly done exclusively from the top down" (2004:12). Crawford observes:

> [T]he trends are not merely *upward* (to the nation state or even supra-national state) or *downward* (to localities, communities, and consumers), but also *outward* into the new policy networks of 'partnerships' which are increasingly refiguring relations between centre and periphery in the criminal justice complex. (Crawford, 1999:223, original emphasis)

Crawford uses a boat analogy when discussing crime prevention and partnership policies at the local level under the U.K. system of governance. He comments:

> For if these institutions occupy merely a 'rowing' function, this would appear to fly in the face of government rhetoric about the importance of 'local ownership' and the elaboration of a 'local vision'. What, therefore, is the policymaking role of local community safety partnerships? Are they merely rowing a boat, the direction of which is set by others, or are they themselves in charge of the direction? There seems to be a crucial tension between local control and central

> steering which government has not addressed. Even if steering is conceived of as only a limited process of setting boundaries within which local initiatives must operate, then the question remains: how constraining are these boundaries to be? (1998b:255)

In summary, there are a number of explanations for the move to "partnerships" or "pluralizing" of police in Canada: (1) the shift from a welfare state to a neo-liberal state, (2) the loss of faith in the Criminal Justice System, (3) the end of the police monopoly over crime control, (4) the managerialism of policing and the consumerization of the public, and (5) the rise in mass private property. As a result, governing-at-a-distance and responsibilization strategies developed. One of the governance tactics has been an emphasis on partnerships in an effort to address crime.

In order to link together the gathered literature on partnerships in the United Kingdom and Canada along with the explanations for these partnerships, the following themes will be addressed in the next chapter: (1) differences in government structure and legislation, (2) implementation and delivery of a crime reduction model, and (3) limitations and governance issues, such as accountability systems, blurring boundaries, and the offloading of responsibilities.

# Chapter 4: Discussion and Analysis

There are differences between the United Kingdom and Canada which should be addressed before implementing the British model in Canada. First, the government structure in the United Kingdom is different than the structure in Canada. Second, legislation, policy, and regulation are more evident in the United Kingdom. Third, the program concept is being driven in a bottom-up fashion in British Columbia, primarily by policing and City officials. In other jurisdictions where similar programs have been implemented, such as in the United Kingdom, the process was driven from the top-down. In addition to these three challenges, multi-agency partnerships in any country will encounter difficulties in the partnership work itself.

## *a. Government Structures and Legislation*

While both the U.K. and Canada are parliamentary democracies, there are some differences in the structure and responsibilities of local government. The Criminal Justice System in England and Wales has the Home Office to deal with issues relating to criminal law, the police, prisons, and probation. There are twenty government offices for the nine English regions, but these are not separate decision and policy making bodies from central governments. In contrast, the responsibility of Canada's Criminal Justice System and social services are divided between the federal, provincial, and municipal government.

The social service structure in the U.K. is different from Canada in that the central government is responsible for social housing and drug treatment options. Therefore, the central government is able to make health and housing authorities assist in crime

reduction initiatives and partnerships. The governing body is common for all of these areas whereas in Canada emergency housing and local drug treatment services fall under either provincial government level responsibility, or non-profit, non-governmental responsibility, or are often privately owned.

In the U.K., at the municipal level, there is 'local government' or 'local authorities'. Each municipality has either an elected mayor or a council leader. Councilors represent a 'ward' usually comprising forty thousand people although the size of wards varies. The U.K. is divided into counties, districts, cities, boroughs, and wards. In an area with a high population, a local authority could have sixty or more councilors. Therefore, there are many more councilors with responsibility for local affairs than in Canada. This means that crime reduction strategies are the mandate of many more local officials in the United Kingdom. This results in more crime reduction work being implemented locally and more people to share the responsibility and workload.

The difference in government structure as well as legislation in the United Kingdom and Canada may pose a challenge in the level of success of crime reduction strategies in Canadian municipalities. In the United Kingdom, crime reduction is a funded and legislated government vision to deal with crime issues, and the model offers a different way of governance. The model consists of legislated multi-agency partnerships where specific crime reduction targets are set out and followed because the partners are held accountable and the outcomes of the strategies are measured and sustained. In the United Kingdom, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 acts as a driver for agencies to work together on crime problems. Unlike the U.K., Canada has not legislated the requirement

of certain agencies to cooperate with the police and city officials in reducing crime. This raises the question of what is driving agencies in British Columbia.

### *b. Implementation and Delivery*

The implementation of crime reduction in Canada will not be about requiring local government to deliver a major new service or to take on substantial new burdens because unlike the United Kingdom, Canada has not legislated such action into existence. Therefore, the crime reduction initiative, at least in its initial phase, will have to be launched on the good will, commitment, and vision of agency leaders who can see its potential. This is likely to look differently in every municipality.

While the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy states that all of the strategies will be monitored, evaluated, and shared with the public, what kind of accountability will be built into the Canadian model to ensure agencies within the partnerships remain accountable to each other and to the strategy itself? Also, what happens if an agency, whose participation is necessary in order to implement a strategy to its fullest potential, does not wish to participate in the process? Without legislation governing partnerships, it may be impossible to ensure complete commitment or to acquire secure accountability systems. This raises the issue of whether these new crime reduction strategies will unfold any differently than crime prevention initiatives in the past. For instance, it is possible that once the initial enthusiasm for such an elaborate initiative fades, partners will simply view it as just another committee they are a part of with the occasional meeting to attend and only do a minimal amount of work when time allows on top of their regular duties.

The extent of sustainable public safety initiatives in British Columbia municipalities has been limited. For example, currently, there is little accountability and

respect for existing crime prevention initiatives because many of them offer few measurable outcomes. In comparison to the United Kingdom, Canada has not done crime prevention very well. Therefore, it needs to be asked if current crime prevention initiatives are productive in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. Are the resources being put towards these initiatives worth it? Are the effectiveness of programs being properly measured? While the Home Office in the U.K. is responsible for a sophisticated crime reduction model that provides direction at the local level, there is no set model or strategy for crime prevention programs carried out in police departments throughout Canada. Perhaps the crime reduction and partnership model will assist British Columbia in changing the current trend and getting past the failures of programs and partnerships whose effectiveness is not being measured.

In the past, Canada has seen partnership work result in minute effectiveness through community policing and crime prevention. Partnerships encompassed within community policing and crime prevention have simply involved organizational rearrangement and re-articulation, short-term projects, 'lip-service', public relations, very little resources, programs not being monitored or evaluated, and more of a philosophy than actual practice. It appears that consumerism accountability structures, such as targets, audits, performance indicators, and community surveys, are in place in the U.K. as a means to getting past the stigma that community policing, crime prevention initiatives, and partnerships have created in the past. In order to increase efficiency and effectiveness, a strong focus on community accountability, monitoring, and evaluation have been modeled in the U.K. For British Columbia, an advantage is that it has had the

opportunity to study the U.K. model and learn from its challenges and successes; thus, adapting best practices in accountability to fit a Canadian context.

The effort and research the City of Surrey has put into studying the U.K. model is likely to result in some crime reduction strategies and methods working in Surrey. Consequently, this provides Surrey with the potential to set the model for the rest of the province and possibly the country. Surrey has asked the following necessary questions: is it plausible, is it practical, has it worked elsewhere, would it work here, and is the context right. It was in England that the institution of policing developed and had a major effect upon Canadian policing. Similarly, the RCMP is utilizing best practices in crime reduction found in the United Kingdom. It is apparent that the RCMP is moving towards a crime reduction model with a focus on partnerships in an effort to become more effective and to deal with the fact that police resources are limited while police work is becoming more complex. While there have been advancements in technology and techniques in policing, these cannot substitute for the effects of partnership building at the local level. Effective partnership work at the national, regional, and local level as well as between public, private, and voluntary sectors is the ideal approach in addressing crime issues.

Crime reduction in British Columbia will have to recognize everyone's role and duties in reducing crime and would be a better coordinated approach to dealing with crime issues than what is currently in place. Currently, agencies and organizations operate in silos or independently with little meaningful partnership work in place. If the recommendations proposed within the City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy take place, other outside partners, such as probation service, crown counsel, health services,

and many others, must also change their current practices in order to bring about this change. Major changes in the alignment of federal and provincial ministries in their responsibilities and in their relationships with one another are required in order to establish a system that supports reforms that will truly reduce crime and disorder in Canada. For example, leadership within the Ministry of the Solicitor General, the Ministry of the Attorney General, Health Canada, and the Ministry of Children and Families will be necessary. If the recommendations in the City of Surrey CRS are implemented, they will require a restructuring of the justice system in some ways. However, it appears that a bottom-up approach is necessary to demonstrate the benefits of multi-agency work in order to gain support at a more strategic level.

The fact that the partnerships and the Crime Reduction Strategy in Surrey are being delivered in a bottom-up process opposed to a federally legislated top-down approach might prove to be more effective in the long-run. The U.K.'s top-down crime reduction model approach involved a significant amount of funding and new legislation and was led by a higher level of government. The large-scale nature of the U.K. model has been described as possibly contributing to some of the difficulties encountered at the local level. These challenges were outlined earlier in the paper: (1) information and resource sharing, (2) accountability, (3) local partnerships, (4) roles and responsibilities, and (5) value conflicts and power differentials. British Columbia is starting off slower and smaller through detachment commanders and city officials at the municipal level which might be a more appropriate way of unfolding crime reduction strategies since crime issues need to be understood at the ground level in their local contexts. However, while it seems to make sense that municipalities decide on their own crime reduction

strategies in order for them to be specific to their criminal justice environment and community, it can also be viewed as a government tactic to shift responsibility to others. As a result, the government is not directly blamed for any failures.

Police agencies have had to employ an array of responsibilization strategies in order to effectively deal with allotted resources, demands from the public, and political changes within the government. It is no longer possible for the government to solely and properly govern all members of society. Society is too culturally and politically diverse for population management to take place in democratic countries. Also, it would be difficult to try to remove the power from the public that the government has gradually delegated to them over the past thirty to forty years. The future is likely to continue with the government 'steering' and employing responsibilization strategies while allowing other control providers to do the 'rowing'.

The City of Surrey and the police are aware of the limitations of the justice system in preventing and deterring crime as well as the breakdown of society. The Crime Reduction Strategy is an attempt to change its service delivery through partnerships and more effective tactics. Over the past forty years policing went from traditional reactive policing and command and control to crime prevention and community-based policing (Garland 1996; 2000). Crime reduction strategies might represent the next paradigm shift in policing governance and act as a revolutionary change, or alternatively, they might simply be a change in emphasis along the continuum of crime control. Crime reduction strategies, based on partnerships represent a balanced approach to governing crime.

Partnerships play an important part in recent trends and developments in the local governance of crime and personal security. The City of Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy

emphasizes the notion that there is a collective duty within society to tackle crime and to embed crime prevention into all occupations.

### *c. Governance Issues*

While the responsibilization of non-state agencies through multi-agency partnerships has the advantage of having more watchers, Garland (1996) reminds us that implementing social and situational forms of crime prevention involve the reordering of conduct in the everyday life of the public and some members of the public are not ready for such changes. The challenges of roles and responsibilities, power differentials, and accountability structures in building partnerships, show that there are limitations in maintaining them.

This raises questions about how the City of Surrey will address roles and responsibilities, power differentials, accountability structures, and information sharing protocol issues that are so vital to partnerships in its crime reduction strategy. Many obstacles and delays in the delivery of crime reduction strategies occur as a result of problems within partnerships. The United Kingdom ran into several partnership problems during its Crime Reduction Program. The City of Surrey will have to address problems in implementing a Crime Reduction Strategy.

Governments have found a way to be more involved in crime issues at the local level but have they offloaded too much of the responsibility for crime reduction to their partners. While the U.K. claims to devolve the decision making powers and details of crime reduction strategies to the local level, in reality the Home Office still has control of the process by ensuring performance targets, performance indicators, assessments, evaluations, and legislated partnerships are in place. This can be considered an effective

oversight mechanism because of the failures and ineffectiveness of crime prevention programs and initiatives in the past. Also, the U.K. Home Office invested a great deal of money into their crime reduction work; therefore, they could not risk leaving it all in the hands of practitioners or partners at the local level. The government in the United Kingdom found a way to become more involved at the local level where the ground work takes place.

Through an elaborate level of partnership work demonstrated in the U.K. along with what Surrey is similarly trying to implement, "boundary blurring" (Crawford 1998b; Harris, 2003) seems to automatically take place between agencies and organizations especially if roles and responsibilities have not been clearly defined. Multi-agency work on initiatives causes confusion as to who is responsible for the outcomes if they are not successful. For example, partnerships between the police and education departments can become difficult when parties within the partnership are not completely clear about one another's roles. In addition, it causes confusion for the people accessing the services. Also, the wrap-around strategy which ensures offenders receive treatment and aftercare throughout their time in the Criminal Justice System and afterwards requires very close work and information sharing between many agencies and organizations. Due to the sophistication of such a strategy, the roles and responsibilities of agencies can easily become blurred. If an offender falls through the cracks, will the blame fall on the police, drug treatment workers, probation, housing, or another agency? This raises the issue of whether the blame can be shared, and if so, what does this really mean. Boundary blurring can be described as a governance tactic because it seems to be a form of offloading by the Criminal Justice System. For instance, even though the municipal

levels of government are involved in crime reduction strategies and have one of the lead roles, they are outnumbered by the amount of private, non-profit, and other government agencies involved in the crime reduction strategies.

The creation of new roles such as community safety managers, community safety officers, traffic wardens, and neighbourhood wardens, are all examples of the sharing of work that was once considered to be the sole responsibility of the police. Also, the dispersal of the appearance of more watchers by means of similar uniforms is present. This has resulted in the pluralizing of policing and government regulation. Some of these positions report to the local authorities, rather than only to the police. In the future, areas of crime control that fall under the responsibility of these new roles will be less and less perceived as duties falling within police jurisdiction. It would be difficult for the police to ever get their power and responsibility back once it has been dispersed across several new roles under different supervision. On the other hand, this form of two-tiered policing, where the police deal with more complex crime issues and devolve the less complex duties to other auspices may serve to be more efficient and effective in terms of resources, public satisfaction, and outcomes.

The police often dominate meetings, agendas, and strategies (Gilling, 1993; Harris, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Millie and Erol, 2006; Phillips et al., 2002; Rogers, 2006); however, a consideration is whether initiatives would actually get off the ground without their lead. While the police may not be considered the sole experts on crime issues anymore, they certainly still have the knowledge of what has worked and not worked in the past and what is feasible with existing resources. Also, some major initiatives, such as the programs and teams created to deal with prolific offenders, require

the police to take a lead role while engaging other partners in the process. The City of Surrey CRS provides some focus for agency roles by dividing the goal of tackling crime into four strands. These four strands have specific strategies and involve the specifics of how partners will need to participate in order to successfully reach the objectives of the overall strategy. The U.K. Prolific and Priority Offender scheme had similar strands in effect.

In summary, partnerships will experience many challenges in multi-agency work. These challenges are differences in government structure, legislation, implementation and delivery of a crime reduction model, governance issues surrounding accountability systems, blurring boundaries, and the offloading of responsibilities. Being aware of such obstacles from the onset and putting systems in place to deal with these issues may be the only feasible option when setting up successful crime reduction partnerships and strategies.

# Chapter 5: Conclusion

Multi-agency partnerships are on the rise as a result of the limitations of the Criminal Justice System in many democratic countries. It is evident that these partnership approaches have become the current trend in governance as more countries develop crime reduction strategies which entail strong partnership components. There are two dominant views regarding the intentions of the government in encouraging multi-agency partnership work at the local level. First, the government is becoming more involved at the local level by way of devolving decision-making authority to city officials and the police. The reasons presented for this view include the fact that audits, targets, and performance indicators are part of the U.K. crime reduction model at the local level which are systems that are monitored and evaluated by a higher level of government. Second, these partnerships are simply another government technique to offload responsibility on to others in an effort to no longer be held responsible for failures of the welfare of the population and society.

While it is apparent that all emerging methods for dealing with crime issues will have obstacles, it appears that difficulties within partnerships themselves serve as the primary obstacle in crime reduction work. These obstacles include information sharing, accountability systems, roles and responsibilities, value conflicts, and power differentials. In addition, other factors to take into consideration while adapting a model being used elsewhere are differences in government structures, legislation, and delivery of a crime reduction strategy, such as who the stakeholders and partners will be, who will create and implement the strategy, and who will lead the initiative.

The lack of evidence-based literature on Canadian public safety initiatives along with the non-existent crime reduction literature in our country calls for practical research to be done in this area. It would be useful to see what the views of the multi-agency partnership approach are from partners apart from the police and city officials once the delivery of the strategies are underway. This analysis could be conducted through surveys and interviews. Also, while it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all of the conflict issues that arise in multi-agency partnerships, it would be useful to cover additional themes as well as examine the themes presented in this paper in further depth. Other themes include decision-making processes, overcoming communication barriers, and ensuring a sufficient amount of time to develop relationships before forming partnerships. Another important theme would be productivity within partnerships. Working in partnerships can be labour and time intensive due to frequent meetings to discuss projects and progress with the result that participants can feel that they are managing a process of working together rather than accomplishing targets and goals.

Since the City of Surrey is the first Canadian municipality to create a formal Crime Reduction Strategy, there is no other available research to draw comparisons from in Canada. While some RCMP detachments are incorporating crime reduction strategies into their work, these cannot yet be compared to the detailed and comprehensive strategy that the City of Surrey has presented and is beginning to work towards. If other municipalities follow the lead of Surrey, comparisons may be possible in the future. Once outcomes and evaluations have taken place for the City of Surrey CRS, it is recommended that a review of the partnerships be part of future analysis. In addition, it would be beneficial to evaluate the long-term outcomes of the Crime Reduction Strategy.

While the United Kingdom has made substantial progress in reducing crime since implementing the crime reduction model in the mid-1990's, future research examining crime reduction partnership literature in other commonwealth countries, such as the United States, New Zealand, and Australia, is necessary. It is likely that partnerships in these countries face similar challenges and successes in crime reduction partnership work. Although many areas may have good crime reduction strategies in place there will be problems throughout the implementation and delivery stages of the initiatives if the issues are not addressed.

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